































Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
under the Executive Committee 


















































All rights reserved 
 
ABSTRACT 
Evaluating the Effect of New-teacher Induction Programs on Teacher Turnover 
You You 
 
New-teacher induction programs are widely used as non-monetary interventions, with the 
reduction of teacher turnover being one of their purposes. During the last three decades, states 
have been active in legislation to mandate induction programs for new teachers in public 
schools. Motivated by the discrepancy of the estimated program effects on teacher turnover in 
the existing literature, this study attempts to examine whether analytical methods used to 
address the endogeneity of induction-program participation matter in explaining this 
inconsistency in the estimation of the effect of new-teacher induction programs and how 
mandatory induction legislation and/or policy are linked with new-teacher induction 
programs and teacher turnover. Specifically, three key research questions are examined, 
including what are the determinants of new teachers’ turnover, whether new-teacher induction 
programs have effects on teacher turnover, and whether state induction legislation and/or 
local mentoring policy have effects on teacher turnover. Two main sources of data are 
employed, including multiple cycles of Schools and Staffing Survey and Teacher Follow-up 
Survey, the largest nationally representative sample surveys on teachers and their schools in 
the United States, as well as New York City Department of Education administrative data, the 
longitudinal data concerning public school new teachers and their job status in the largest 
public education system in the United States. In order to address the potential endogeneity 
problem that may be associated with the induction program participation, this study employs 
identification strategies such as propensity-score matching, instrumental variable, and 
difference-in-difference methods. Particularly, in estimation, the difference-in-differences 
strategy is incorporated with the instrumental variable method as well as nonlinear models. 
The current study finds that, after addressing the endogeneity problem,  new-teacher 
induction programs hardly have any effects on reducing teacher turnover, which is different 
from what most previous studies have found. It is also implied that if a mandatory 
induction/mentoring law/policy does not encourage new teachers’ participation in a 
comprehensive induction/mentoring program, it may not work in terms of reducing teachers’ 
exit turnover at best. This study contributes in literature on new-teacher induction programs 
and teacher turnover in terms of analytical methods, generalizability of findings, 
understanding of induction legislation and policy, and proper research design considerations 
for future studies. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
The individual teacher is commonly believed to be the most important factor affecting 
education quality in a classroom. Topics concerning the teaching profession have thus received 
considerable publicity in the United States. Having been a feature of U.S. K-12 teachers’ labor 
market for more than half a century1, the shortage of teachers2 nowadays could become more 
severe due to the demand-side shocks from recent demographical changes3. To address this 
issue, attracting more candidates with appropriate qualifications into the teaching profession and 
retaining the existing teaching force are thus considered as two strategies. In fact, it is often 
argued that, there have been an increasing number of teachers entering the teaching profession 
each year, and it is the teacher retention/attrition that lies in the essence of the school staffing 
problem (NCTAF, 2003). 
Teacher turnover, as a dynamic to maintain the vigor of an education system (e.g., the 
teaching profession, a school), itself may not necessarily be bad. Given the quality of entering 
teachers, whether teacher turnover is detrimental to the system largely depends on who leaves 
the arena. In terms of its effects on the distribution of teacher resources, there are two issues to 
be considered, efficiency and equity. For the issue of efficiency, teacher turnover could be 
beneficial to the system when the education system is efficient at driving bad teachers out. 
However, teacher turnover could be detrimental to the system when the education system is not 
                                                          
1 The shortage of Science and Math teachers was severe in the 1950s because of the surge in enrollment rate from 
the baby boomers. 
2 Shortage of teachers could be a general statement of quantity, and could also refer to the shortage of teachers in 
certain disciplines, or in certain geographical areas, or just effective teachers as a whole, etc. 
3 For example, baby boomer teachers’ retirement, baby boomer echo cohorts (the children of baby boomers) turn 
to school age. 
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efficient at retaining the more capable teachers. As for the issue of equity, teacher turnover could 
be beneficial (or detrimental) when teacher quality is evenly (or unevenly) redistributed across 
schools through teacher turnover. 
No matter whether the impact of teacher turnover is detrimental to the system or not, it is 
recognized that teacher turnover is inevitably associated with substantial costs of recruitment, 
assessment, selection, training, mentoring, and lower initial performance with less experience of 
the new teacher (Barnes et al., 2007). With the reduction of the teacher turnover being one of 
their chief purposes, new-teacher induction programs are widely used as non-monetary 
interventions. Beginning in the 1980s, states started to provide their new teachers with support 
by implementing state-level induction projects, with Florida and California leading the way in 
this regard4. During the last three decades, states also have been active in legislation to mandate 
induction programs for new teachers in public schools. The participation in induction programs 
increased from 40% in 1990 to 80% in 2000 (Smith & Ingersoll, 2004). According to “Quality 
Counts” reports, in the 2009-10 school year 18 states required all new teachers to participate in a 
state-funded induction program, while 23 states required all new teachers to participate in a state-
funded mentoring program5. 
New-teacher induction programs vary in their forms and contents, as well as in duration and 
intensity, with such programs thereby ranging from a single orientation meeting held at the 
beginning of the school year to a series of highly structured multiple activities and frequent 
meetings conducted over a period of several years (Smith & Ingersoll, 2004). Mentoring6 is the 
most common form of new-teacher induction program, while other services, such as assigning a 
                                                          
4 See Lopez et al. (2004)’s review of Gunter’s (1985) and Brown and Wambac’s (1987) studies. 
5 Mentoring is one form of teacher induction program. States requiring mentoring for new teachers not necessarily 
have systematic induction programs. 
6 Its contents, duration, and intensity may also vary. 
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teacher’s aide, workload reduction, etc., could also be included in the whole induction package. 
According to Smith (2007), “while formal induction programs typically are organized by 
districts, they also can follow a state-developed, state-mandated model (e.g., The Kentucky 
Teacher Internship Program), a model supplied by external sources (e.g., The New Teacher 
Center Model from the University of California, Santa Cruz), or one developed in the individual 
district or school.” 
Besides, as with other policy/program interventions, new-teacher induction programs are 
not cost-free. Usually, substantial resources are mobilized and utilized in the implementation of 
such programs. In 2005, among the 16 states requiring and financing mentoring for all novice 
teachers, the estimated cost of their programs ranges from $600 per teacher in Louisiana to 
$3,526 in California (Education Week, 2005). 
 
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
Given the significant roles teacher turnover plays in influencing an education system and 
the substantive resources involved in implementing diversified new-teacher induction programs, 
a large volume of research has already explored the effects of those programs on teacher 
turnover. 
While it is true that many studies have attempted to evaluate new-teacher induction 
programs,7 these programs’ effect-sizes have been estimated as varying from negative to zero to 
positive, with different levels of statistical significance. This discrepancy has triggered many 
thoughts as to its potential causes. One explanation is that different induction programs vary in 
terms of the program components (Smith and Ingersoll, 2004) and/or quality (Smith, 2007; 
                                                          
7 Ingersoll and Kralik (2004) reviewed over 150 empirical studies on the impact of mentoring on teacher retention. 
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Rockoff, 2008), which may influence teacher turnover differently. Another explanation for the 
inconsistency is that a given program (or program component) may have different effects on 
different groups of teachers, for example, new teachers who work in districts serving low-income 
students (Glazerman et al., 2008), newly hired teachers who have versus have no prior teaching 
experiences (Rockoff, 2008). The most commonly accepted explanation, however, is that most 
previous studies do not employ analytic approaches that are sufficiently rigorous in the 
estimation of new-teacher induction programs’ effect on teacher turnover (Ingersoll & Kralik, 
2004; Glazerman et al., 2008). As indicated in Ingeroll and Kralik (2004)’s review of over 150 
relevant empirical studies, only 10 of them have used well-defined and verifiable outcome 
variables, and have compared teachers who participated in an induction program with those who 
did not. Although this review has found that induction programs in general have a positive 
impact on teacher retention, it is admitted that few empirical studies (Glazerman et al., 2008, 
Rockoff, 2008) have addressed the issue that there might be factors that influence both program 
enrollment and turnover outcome. If any of these factors were not measured and addressed in the 
regression, estimates of program effects would be biased. Particularly, many states have devoted 
significant resources to new-teacher induction programs; however, the empirical support for such 
programs based on rigorous studies is rather thin. Therefore, there should be more research on 
the effect of new-teacher induction programs. 
Thus, as distinct from most previous studies, the present study attempts to address this 
potential endogeneity issue, given that induction program participation is not randomly assigned 
in observational studies. Specifically, this study employs multiple analytic techniques, including 
propensity-score matching, instrumental variables, as well as difference-in-differences and its 
variant, to examine whether methods matter in the estimation of induction programs’ effect on 
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teacher turnover. Particularly, this study considers the timing of state legislation and/or local 
policy concerning mandatory induction requirements as the exogenous source of variation, and 
uses it to isolate the covariation in the endogenous induction participation and teacher turnover. 
 
1.3 Significance of This Study 
This study advances knowledge in the following ways: 
First of all, this study contributes to previous literature of new-teacher induction programs’ 
effect on teacher turnover in that it postulates, examines, and demonstrates that methods do 
matter. Technically, this study employs multiple methods as well as combines them in order to 
take advantage of their strengths. For example, this study incorporates instrumental variable 
method with difference-in-differences method, and also incorporates nonlinear models with 
difference-in-differences framework. 
In addition, this is also the first study that links the new-teacher induction programs to the 
broader background of relevant legislation. In particular, this study researches all 50 states and 
District of Columbia’s legal provisions with regard to new-teacher induction and mentoring.  
Using an advanced method, mandatory law on teacher induction is related to participation in 
teacher induction which is linked to teacher turnover. 
Moreover, the findings of this study are generalizable. Specifically, this study combines 
data from multiple cycles of the biggest nationally representative survey concerning teachers and 
schools, which makes the findings generalizable both geographically and temporally. 
Furthermore, the combination of analyses based on national cross-sectional data and a local 
administrative longitudinal data further makes the findings generalizable to different education 
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settings as well as to different measures of teacher turnover (e.g., one-year turnover vs. time to 
turnover). 
Finally, it provides a critique of the data sources and suggests guidelines for proper design 
for data collection for research on the effect of new-teacher induction programs on teacher 
turnover. Data employed in the study are criticized on their strengths and limitations, based on 
which considerations for proper research designs concerning data collection for research on 
topics of new-teacher induction programs and teacher turnover are summarized for future 
benefit. 
  
1.4 Definition of Key Terms 
1.4.1 Teacher turnover 
Many terms8 are used in the description of teachers’ labor market dynamics. This study uses 
the term “turnover” to indicate teachers’ job change behaviors. A broad definition9 is adopted by 
considering any departure of teachers from their teaching jobs as teachers’ turnover (Ingersoll, 
2001). For example, teachers may leave teaching for administrative positions no matter whether 
they change their current employers or not. 
According to the beneficiary dimension, teacher turnover can be differentiated into 
voluntary turnover and involuntary (forced) turnover. According to the temporal dimension, 
teacher turnover can be divided into permanent turnover and temporary turnover. Teachers who 
leave their positions move spatially across schools, across school districts, across states, or across 
                                                          
8 See Macdonald (1999) for a discussion of the distinctions among wastage, attrition, turnover, and mobility. And 
terms such as retention, length, tenure, etc. are used in the description of labor market stability in many studies as 
well. 
9 Some studies adopt its narrow definition, for example, Farber (1998) defined job change as change of employer, 
which excludes the change of job titles within an organization. 
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professions10, and thus according to the spatial dimension, teacher turnover can be distinguished 
as transfer turnover and exit turnover. And lastly, according to the social dimension, teacher 
turnover can be classified into lateral turnover and vertical turnover, with the latter one being 
further broken down into upward turnover and downward turnover. 
Since differentiation between transfer turnover and exit turnover is practically more feasible 
and has important policy implications, this study will mainly examine these types of turnover. 
However, it is noted that transfer turnover and exit turnover may differ in the scope slightly. For 
example, from a national perspective, transfer turnover refers to switching schools and exit 
turnover refers to leaving the teaching profession; whereas from a local education system’s 
perspective, transfer turnover refers to switching schools within the local education system and 
exit turnover refers to leaving the local education system. 
 
1.4.2 New teacher 
New teachers in this study refer to those who are new to the teaching profession or an 
education system, especially teachers who are in their first year of teaching. One reason is that 
the turnover rate of new teachers is relatively high. The age of teachers’ departures from their 
jobs can be roughly represented by a U-shaped curve, with beginning teachers standing at one of 
the highest ends11 and mid-career teachers at the bottom of the valley (Grissmer & Kirby, 1987, 
1997; Hanushek, Kain, & Rivkin, 2004; Ingersoll, 2001; Murnane, Singer, & Willett, 1988). 
New teachers’ turnover rates in public schools are high, with one in five new teachers leaving the 
profession within three years of entry (Henke et al, 200012). Research has shown that teachers 
                                                          
10 Being out of labor market can be considered as move from teaching profession to home/leisure profession. 
11 And retiring teachers stand at the other highest end. 
12 It is originally cited by Johnson and Birkeland (2003). 
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with experience are more effective at raising student achievement than are new teachers 
(Rockoff, 2004; Rivkin et al., 2005, Harris and Sass, 2006; Clotfelter et al., 2007), and yet the 
high level of attrition among new teachers may prevent them from acquiring profession- and/or 
school-specific human capital by piling up valuable experiences. The other reason why new 
teachers are of interest is because new teachers are a disadvantaged group. Since new teachers 
are new to the teaching profession, most are in the transition from college students majoring in 
teaching to student teachers. In their life of transition, new teachers are facing many difficulties 
in meeting the expectations on their classroom teaching and the demands beyond their 
pedagogical tasks. Compared with veteran teachers, new teachers are new hands, and they are in 
the disadvantaged position; therefore, this group needs more attention. 
 
1.4.3 New-teacher induction programs 
New-teacher induction programs are widely used non-monetary interventions on K-12 
teacher labor market in the United States. One of their general purposes is to help retain teachers 
through providing them a certain period of on-the-job trainings and experiences. New-teacher 
induction programs are ultimately implemented at the school level. Thus, their forms, contents, 
durations as well as intensities may differ across schools, regardless of the models they follow. 
For example, mentoring is the most common form of an induction program. The match of 
subject specialties and schools between mentor and mentee may or may not be required, 
depending on the contents of an induction program. Some induction programs may last as long 
as three years, while some of them only last for several weeks or months. And even for an 
induction program with the same length of time, the intensity or frequency of mentoring may 
also differ. Due to a lack of detailed data, for simplicity and practical reasons, this study will first 
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consider whether a teacher participates in such a program, regardless of a program’s detailed 
components, intensity and length. Then, it will further distinguish the package of the induction 
into “comprehensive”, “intermediate”, or “basic”, according to the types of services and 
assistance a teacher received. 
 
1.4.4 State laws and New York City policy regarding mandatory induction/mentoring 
During the last three decades, states have been active in legislation to mandate induction 
programs for new teachers in public schools. According to my review of legal provisions of all 
50 states and the District of Columbia, about two thirds (28 out of 51) of the states by far have 
already required that new teachers participate in an induction/mentoring program during their 
initial year(s) of employment. In terms of the specific mandatory induction requirements, each 
state may have its own implementation. For example, some states adopt a state-wide uniform 
program, while others authorize local education agencies to develop state-approved programs. 
Some states may also integrate their mandatory induction requirements with their requirements 
on teacher licensures, etc. 
At the end of 2003, New York State revised the Commissioner’s Regulations and began to 
require that new teachers must participate in a mentoring program in the first year of 
employment to meet the teaching experience requirement for the professional certificate, and that 
the school districts are responsible to plan, design, and implement such programs. Motivated by 
the passage of this state law, in August of 2004, New York City Department of Education 
launched its local education policy, with an annual budget of $36 million, requiring newly hired 




1.5 Organization of the Dissertation 
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews previous literature 
with regard to theories, methods, and empirical analysis of teacher turnover. Chapter 3 states the 
key research questions and describes the methods employed to answer these questions. Chapter 4 
presents empirical results using national-level data from the Schools and Staffing Survey and the 
Teacher Follow-up Survey data.  Chapter 5 presents empirical results using local-level data from 
the New York City Department of Education. Chapter 6 summarizes strengths and limitations of 
the data employed in this study and provides suggestions on proper research design 
considerations for future research. And Chapter 7 is devoted to a summary of findings, 
discussion of research limitations, and suggestions for further research. 
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter reviews previous literature about teacher turnover in the United States. 
Specifically, section 2.1 illustrates economic theories that explains job turnover and 
summarizes the theoretical roles of new teacher induction programs. Section 2.2 reviews 
empirical studies on the effects of new-teacher induction programs and summarizes findings 
of previous studies on the determinants and costs of teacher turnover. Section 2.3 reviews 
quantitative methods employed in teacher turnover studies. Section 2.4 summarizes this 
chapter. 
 
2.1 Economic Theories 
2.1.1 Theories related to job turnover 
Job turnover, as a particular type of human migration, is viewed as a form of human 
capital investment (Sjaastad, 1962). In the human capital framework, workers evaluate the 
values of job opportunities available to them, subtract the costs of migration, and choose the 
position that yields the maximal net present value of their lifetime earnings13. Consider a case 
of choosing whether to stay or move at period 1 for simplicity, the present value (in the value 
of period 0) of lifetime earnings for worker  i  of staying at the original job position PVstay  is 
given by equation (2.1): 
𝑃𝑉𝑖




𝑡=1                                                   (2.1) 
                                                          
13 Earnings can be generalized to utilities. 
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where 𝑤 is his/her earnings at each period, and 𝑟 with a subscript 𝑖 indicates worker 𝑖’s 
discount rate. Similarly, the present value of lifetime earnings for worker 𝑖 of moving to a 






𝑡=1                                                   (2.2) 
If 𝐶 indicates the costs of moving, then the net gain of moving to a new position for this 
worker is given by equation (2.3): 
𝐺𝑖 = 𝑃𝑉𝑖𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒 − 𝑃𝑉𝑖
𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑦 − 𝐶                                            (2.3) 
And, if the net gain is positive, then the worker chooses to move. 
From an only-money-valued system to a more general utility-maximizing framework14, 
the above human capital model can further incorporate non-pecuniary factors in evaluating 
the utilities of alternative job opportunities. Correspondingly, the net gain in utility of moving 
to a new position for worker 𝑖 is given by equations (4) through (6), where 𝑢(∙) is a worker’s 
utility function, and 𝑊 and 𝑁𝑃 indicate sums of the present values of pecuniary and non-
pecuniary return streams, respectively. And the worker chooses to move if his/her net gain in 
utility is positive. 
𝑃𝑉𝑖
𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑦(𝑢𝑖) =  𝑢𝑖�𝑊𝑖
𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑦,𝑁𝑃𝑖
𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑦�                                     (2.4) 
𝑃𝑉𝑖𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒(𝑢𝑖) =  𝑢𝑖(𝑊𝑖𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒 ,𝑁𝑃𝑖𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒)                                  (2.5) 
𝐺𝑖(𝑢𝑖) = 𝑃𝑉𝑖𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒(𝑢𝑖) − 𝑃𝑉𝑖
𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑦(𝑢𝑖) − 𝑢𝑖(𝐶)                           (2.6) 
Three implications follow immediately the human capital model. First, pecuniary 
factors, such as wages, influence workers’ turnover decision. Second, workers consider their 
                                                          
14 This is a one-player utility-maximizing model, and it can be generalized to a two-player game theoretical utility model, 
which accommodates both supply and demand sides’ utilities of a job-match or a job-separation. 
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jobs’ non-pecuniary conditions as well when making decisions of departure. And third, 
individual workers have their own views (or utilities) in terms their values of time, cost, and 
return. 
Becker (1964) in his seminal work extends the human capital model and brings in on-
the-job training in explaining job turnover due to the fact that costs of training are imposed on 
workers and/or firms. Suppose for simplicity that the worker gets training only during the 









𝑡=1                                (2.7) 
where  k  refers to the training cost imposed in period 0,  mp  and  w  are the marginal 
productivity and wage, and  r  indicates the discount rate. Equation (2.7) can be rewritten as: 
𝑚𝑝𝑜 + 𝐺 = 𝑤0 + 𝑘                                                 (2.8) 
where  G  is the net gain to the employer in the future: 
𝐺 = ∑ 𝑚𝑝𝑡−𝑤𝑡
(1+𝑟)𝑡
𝑛−1
𝑡=1                                                  (2.9) 
General training and specific training are two types of on-the-job trainings. The 
difference between these two types of trainings lies in whether workers’ increased marginal 
productivities after receiving trainings are tied to the firms providing the trainings. In the 
spectrum of on-the-job trainings, completely general training increases trainees’ productivity 
by exactly the same amount in firms providing the training as in other firms, while 
completely specific training increases the trainees’ productivity only in the firm providing the 
training with no effect on their productivity in other firms. Therefore, the cost-sharing 
arrangements for different types of on-the-job trainings are different. To illustrate it, consider 
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 α  as the fraction of the total return collected by firms and that total cost  k  equals total 
return of the training collected by both the firm and the worker, then as the return collected 
by the firm,  G = αk . Thus equation (2.8) can be rewritten as: 
𝑚𝑝𝑜 + 𝛼𝑘 = 𝑤0 + 𝑘                                              (2.10) 
or 
𝑤0 = 𝑚𝑝𝑜 − (1 − 𝛼)𝑘                                           (2.11) 
It shows that trainee pays the same fraction of the training costs, 1-α , as they collect in 
returns. Specifically, if  α = 0, equation (2.11) implies that this training is completely general 
and the trainee pays all the cost, while rational firm pays nothing; if  α = 1, it implies the 
training is completely specific, so that the firm pays all the cost and will recoup all the return 
in the future; and if 0 < α < 1, it could be the case that the training is specific training or 
includes specific training, and trainee and firm share in paying the cost of the training 
according to the ratios of return they collected. 
In terms of job turnover, the on-the-job training model has a few implications. First, 
separation rates would have an inverse relationship with the amount of specific training, 
because the more the firms and workers share in the costs of specific training, the less the 
incentives to quit of workers with specific training, and also the less the incentives of firms to 
fire workers with specific training. If tenure in a firm measures the specific training a worker 
has, then we would not be surprised to see that younger workers change jobs more frequently 
than their older counterparts15. 
                                                          
15 Here young and old refer to the age in the firm. 
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Another implication comes when the assumption of the competitive market does not 
hold. If the firm providing training pays for at least part of its costs without offering market 
wages of trainees, then the firm will have “relatively easy access to ‘students’ and heavy 
losses of ‘graduates’ (Becker, 1964).” And this is particularly true when the training is 
general. In the teacher labor market, this is very possible due to the single salary schedule.16 
And people may be familiar with the phenomenon that some schools serve as “revolving 
doors” and have high levels of teachers’ turnover rates. 
The above theoretical models are based on the perfect information assumption. Job 
matching models relax this assumption and look at job as an “experience good”, indicating 
that the quality of match is revealed only through experience over time. Jovanovic (1979a) 
provides an example of a pure matching model. 
In his model, a good job match means higher marginal product of labor (MPL ) for the 
worker, and the  MPL  is remunerated by higher wage17. Each worker has true 𝑀𝑃𝐿s at 
different firm, but  MPL  is uncertain before a job match. However, this uncertainty is 
symmetric to both the worker and the firm. Each period’s true  MPL  serves as the signal for 
the estimation of next period’s true  MPL . Consider a simple two-period framework,  q  is the 
best alternative wage (reservation wage) for a worker, and w1 is the true wage offer in the 
first period. If the worker matches the firm in the first period, then w1 > q . In the second 
period, the true wage offer is w2, which is the value that worker (and the firm) have to guess 
                                                          
16 Salary varies only based on teachers’ education and experience. 
17 Worker may accept job even if wage < MPL because of the existence of option value. 
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before they make the decision about whether to separate. The guess, indicated by w�2, is 
uncertain: 
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑤�2) > 0                                                        (2.12) 
And the best guess of w2 is w1: 
𝐸(𝑤�2|𝑤1) = 𝑤1                                                      (2.13) 
After period one, the worker18 has to solve the inequality (2.14) to inform him/her about 
whether to leave the firm in period two: 
𝑤1 + 𝐸[max(𝑤�2,𝑤1|𝑤1)] > 2𝑞                                      (2.14) 
which boils down to inequality (2.15): 
𝐸[max(𝑤�2,𝑞)] > 𝑞                                               (2.15) 
If it is true, then the worker will continue to work in period two, and leave if it is false. 
One thing to note is that the reservation wage increases as the worker’s tenure increases, 
because the variance of the wage guess process decreases as the signal becomes precise. The 
reservation wage finally converges to  q , as  var(w�2) goes down to 0. In the early period of a 
job match, the uncertainty in terms of the current job match quality is still too high for the 
worker to quit. The quitting is still too costly due to large noise of job match quality and the 
worker might finally reveal that the match quality is good after a certain length of time’s 
experience. However, over time, after updating the information, the noise of job match 
quality decreases, and the separation rate increases. Quality of match, like specific training, is 
a special type of specific human capital, in that it makes the productivity of a worker with 
good quality of match higher than one with lower quality of match, and makes the 
                                                          
18 Same thing is true for the firm. 
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productivity of a worker in a well-matched job higher than in a not-well-matched job, holding 
other things equal. 
One important implication on the relationship between tenure and turnover from 
Jovanovic’s job matching model is that the probability of separation is first increasing, and 
then decreasing over time. 
A good example of the search models is illustrated by Jovanovic (1979b), which is also 
based on imperfect information assumption. But different from the pure matching model 
(Jovanovic, 1979a), his search model considers job as a “search good” 19, in that the 
evaluation of a job can take place prior to the job match rather than after the match is formed. 
In the basic setup of his search model, the rate of arrival of new wage offers is 
determined by worker’s intensity of search, and wage offers are randomly drawn from a 
known wage-offer-distribution rather than in a deterministic way. In a simple two-period 
framework, worker works in the first period for a particular firm with  t  year of tenure 
attained. The worker’s total productivity, MPL1(t), is determined by both the quality of job 
match (µ1) and the human-capital stock accumulated through on-the-job training (k1(t)): 
𝑀𝑃𝐿1(𝑡) = 𝜇1 + 𝑘1(𝑡)                                            (2.16) 
with                                     𝑀𝑃𝐿1(0) = 𝜇1                                              
(2.17) 
The worker spends a fraction of time, φ1(t), on on-the-job training, while devoting another 
fraction of time, s1(t), to on-the-job search: 
0 ≤ 𝜑1(𝑡) + 𝑠1(𝑡) ≤ 1                                            (2.18) 
                                                          
19 Or “inspection good” in the terminology of Hirshleifer (1973). 
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Then, the worker’s wage in period 1 is determined by his net marginal productivity: 
𝑤1(𝑡) = [1 − 𝜑1(𝑡) − 𝑠1(𝑡)]𝑀𝑃𝐿1(𝑡)                                (2.19) 
In the second period, the worker could keep on working in the same firm, or switch to 
new firm. If the worker quits the original firm and works for another firm, it means he 
accepts the wage offer w2(0). Before the second period, new wage offers come from a know 
wage-offer distribution with a positive variance: 
𝑣𝑎𝑟�𝑤�2(0)� > 0                                               (2.20) 
The worker’s decision of whether to quit depends on whether inequality (2.21) is true: 
𝐸[𝑤�2(0)] > 𝜇1 + 𝑘1(𝑡)                                          (2.21) 
Note that MPL2(0) = µ2 = w2(0). Substitute (2.16) and (2.19) into (2.21), then the quit 





                                        (2.22) 
where the right hand side is the reservation wage. 
Jovanovic (1979b)’s derivation of the search model suggests that workers with higher 
productivity on a particular job spend less time searching alternative jobs and also are less 
likely to accept alternative wage offers when they come. It implies that those who 
accumulated more specific human capital through on-the-job training and those who have a 
better job match will be less likely to quit a job. In terms of the relationship between job 
turnover and tenure, the model implies that the separation probability declines with tenure, 
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because of a monotonic decrease in the proportion of the worker’s time spending on 
searching and a monotonic increase of the worker’s reservation wage. 
All of the above economic models do not consider the fact that workers may not make 
decisions on their own situation due to the existence of family. Mincer (1978) focuses 
exclusively on a family context. In his work, he abstracts from the complex reality in a 
simplified analytical model with only two streams of costs and returns, so that 
𝐺𝑓 = 𝐺ℎ + 𝐺𝑤                                                    (2.23) 
where Gf is the present value of the net gain in family’s earnings, and Gh and Gw are present 
values of the net gain in husband and wife’s earnings, respectively. 
The family, as a unit, will move if the family’s net gains are positive: 
𝐺𝑓 = 𝐺ℎ + 𝐺𝑤 > 0                                             (2.24) 
That inequality (2.24) is satisfied does not always mean the private incentives of each family 
member are also positive, such that Gh > 0 and Gw > 0 is satisfied. And in some cases, a 
better-off of a family from a migration may be at the expense of the worse-off of husband or 
wife, making him/her a tied stayer or a tied mover. 
An implication is that families are more likely to work in the place where job 
opportunities are abundant, so that the possibility of sacrificing any family number’s 
condition reduces when the family better-off achieves as a whole. 
Although these theoretical models differ (TABLE 2.1) in their assumptions on 
information, involvement in the analysis of rent-division arrangements in a job-match, and 
their proposed bases for making turnover decisions, overall, they imply that teacher turnover 
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is the result of the interactions of three general groups of factors: individual-related factors, 
job-related factors, and matching-related factors. 
 
TABLE 2.1: Economic Models on Job Turnover 








model Perfect No Net gain 
* Job-related conditions 
* Personal characteristics 
     
On-the-job training 




* Specific training 
* General training 
* Tenure 
* Salary 




symmetric No Reservation wage 
* Quality of match 
* Tenure 
     
Search model Imperfect but symmetric No Reservation wage 
* Effort in searching jobs 
* Specific training 
* Quality of match 
* Tenure 
     
Family as a 
decision- 
making unit model 
Perfect No Net gain * Family-related factors * Location 
Note: author’s synthesis of theoretical models. 
 
2.1.2 Theoretical roles of new-teacher induction programs 
New-teacher induction programs can play two related but distinct roles: specific training20, 
and/or exposure to job-related experiences. Economic theories imply that both specific training 
and job-experience exposure influence teachers’ job turnover. 
If we consider the “job-experience exposure” role of new-teacher induction programs, 
teacher turnover would be first increasing then decreasing with tenure, as job matching model 
                                                          
20 The training could be school-specific, district-specific, or even profession-specific, depending on the scope of the internal 
labor market of interest. 
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predicted. However, if we consider their “specific training” role as well, teacher turnover 
would be monotonically decreasing with tenure, as predicted by search model. Therefore, the 
total impact of new-teacher induction programs on teachers’ turnover during their early years 
of job may represent a balance between two opposite directions, which may be investigated 
empirically. FIGURE 2.1 illustrates the impact. 
 
 
FIGURE 2.1: Mixed Impacts of New-teacher Induction Programs on Turnover 
during Early Period of a Job 
 
2.2 Empirical Studies 
2.2.1 Empirical studies on the effect of new-teacher induction programs 
Studies aiming at evaluating the effects of induction programs are not uncommon. 
However, according to Ingersoll and Kralik’s review (2004) of 150 empirical studies of 






Specific training model & search model 
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who were mentored with those who were not in terms of well-defined, verifiable outcomes 
and using quantitative data. They did find that mentoring programs in general have a positive 
impact on teachers’ retention, but those results were subject to serious limitations. 
Recent studies have put more emphasis on the programs’ components. Smith and 
Ingersoll (2004) focused on a nationally representative sample of beginning teachers drawn 
from the 1999-2000 SASS and 2000-2001 TFS surveys and found that, in contrast to 
participation in more basic packages of induction activities, participation in comprehensive 
packages has a very large and statistically significant positive impact, in the sense of its 
keeping teachers from leaving at the end of their first year.  This study, however, was based 
on observational data, in which the participation in induction activities is not necessarily 
random (one possibility is that states have different policies), even after controlling for 
several school-level characteristics. 
One strategy to deal with this issue is to control those policy factors directly. Smith 
(2007) employed a two-level hierarchical generalized linear model (HGLM) to account for 
state-level policies’ effects on beginning-public-school-teacher turnover. He found that state-
level mandating of new-teacher mentoring is associated with an increased likelihood that new 
teachers are indeed mentored; and yet funding induction at the state level does not increase 
the effectiveness of mentorship in terms of reducing turnover. Still, unobservables might 
prevent HGLM from forming a counterfactual of the treatment group, although it is worth 
noting that this study is the only one that has looked at the state-level policy up to date. 
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Another approach to this endogenous issue is the randomized-controlled experiment. 
Glazerman et al. (2008) conducted a large, and the only randomized-controlled, study done to 
date exploring the effects of comprehensive teacher induction and focusing especially on the 
districts serving low-income students. Although this study found that comprehensive teacher 
induction programs have a positive impact when it comes to teachers’ reports of support 
received, surprisingly there were no impacts revealed on teacher retention. Only after a 
number of similar experiments on other groups of teachers in different settings have been 
conducted will this study’s conclusions be generalizable with confidence. But this will take 
time and financial resources. 
An intermediate approach is to take advantage of a natural experiment, such as a policy 
change. New York City adopted a mentoring program21 in 2004, requiring that all teachers 
with less than a year of teaching experience receive a “mentored experience.” Rockoff (2008) 
compared one-year turnover between novice teachers and their counterparts who have a few 
years of prior experience before and after the implementation of the mentoring policy. He 
also evaluated the impacts of mentoring quality on several teacher and student outcomes, 
including teacher retention. He found strong relationships between measures of mentoring 
quality and teachers’ claims regarding the impact of mentors on their success in the 
classroom, but weaker evidence of positive effects of mentoring on teacher retention. More 
                                                          
21 The program was nationally recognized, and was designed in partnership with the New Teacher Center (NTC) 
based at the University of California at Santa Cruz, which created what is arguably the most widely recognized 
mentoring program in the nation. The only notable departures from the recommended NTC program were that 
NYC didn’t provide a two-year program and had a higher ratio of teachers to mentors due to budgetary 
considerations. Mentors were not randomly assigned, and the program was discontinued after the 2006-07 
school year due to a dramatic change in the organizational structure of the DOE, which gave school principals 
the power to make many financial decisions, including the one of deciding how much money is to be spent on 
mentoring. (Note by Rockoff) 
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importantly, Rockoff noted that retention within a particular school is higher when a mentor 
had previous experience working in that school, suggesting that the provision of school-
specific knowledge plays an important part in mentoring. 
Although there are a number of existing studies on the impact on teacher turnover of the 
new-teacher induction programs, their conclusions are not consistent. The magnitude of the 
estimated programs’ effects varies, as well as the associated statistical significance. There are 
several explanations for the existing discrepancy in the empirical findings. One is the 
criticism of the empirical analytic approaches for not being sufficiently rigorous (Ingersoll & 
Kralik, 2004; Glazerman et al., 2008). The second reason is that the components of the 
programs examined in different studies may differ (Smith & Ingersoll, 2004). A third reason 
is that the quality of each program may also be different (Smith, 2007; Rockoff, 2008). And 
the fourth is that a given program (or program component) may have different effects on 
different groups of teachers, for example, teachers with different experiences, teachers 
working in different conditions (Rockoff, 2008; Glazerman et al., 2008). 
 
2.2.2 Empirical studies on other determinants and costs of teacher turnover 
According to the theoretical models, job-related factors, individual-related factors and 
matching-related factors are three groups of determinants of teacher turnover. 
Specifically, job-related factors include pecuniary factors and non-pecuniary factors. 
Pecuniary factors are those like salaries (Murnane and Olsen, 1989, 1990; Murnane et al., 
1989; Stinebrickner, 1998; Imazeki, 2005), wage differentials (Baugh and Stone, 1982; 
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Rickman and Parker, 1990; Theobald and Gritz, 1996; Hanushek et al., 2004; Imazeki, 2005), 
expectation of future salaries (Imazeki, 2005; Brewer, 1996), a school district’s spending 
(Gritz and Theobald, 1996), while non-pecuniary factors include school district 
characteristics (Theobald, 1990; Murnane and Olsen, 1989, 1990; Ingersoll, 2001; Imazeki, 
2005), school and class characteristics (Ingersoll, 2001; Grissmer & Kirby., 1991; 
Stinebrickner, 1998; Hanushek et al., 2004; Scafidi et al., 2007), subject specialty (Murnane 
and Olsen, 1989, 1990; Murnane et al., 1989; Ingersoll, 2001), and principal’s administrative 
style (Bempah et al., 1994), etc. 
Individual-related factors include demographic factors and qualifications. For example, 
gender (Rickman and Parker, 1990; Brewer, 1996; Stinebrickner, 2001; Adams, 1996; 
Stinebrickner, 1998; Borman and Dowling, 2008), entering age (Imazeki, 2005), marital 
status (Stinebrickner, 1998), race and ethnicity (Murnane and Olsen, 1989; Adams, 1996; 
Imazeki, 2005) are good examples of demographic factors, while having an advanced degree 
(Adams, 1996; Imazeki, 2005; Goldhaber et al., 2007; Mont and Rees, 1996; Stinebrickner, 
1998; Imazeki, 2005), graduated from college selectivity (Podgursky et al., 2004; Goldhaber 
et al., 2007), academic ability (Stinebrickner, 1998; Stinebrickner, 2001; Stinebrickner, 2002; 
Podgursky et al., 2004; Murnane et al., 1989; Murnane and Olsen, 1990; Goldhaber et al., 
2007), certification (Smith and Ingersoll, 2004; Goldhaber et al., 2007), and class-room 
performances (Hanuskek et al., 2005; Krieg, 2006; Goldhaber et al., 2007; Boyd et al., 2008) 
are examples of qualifications. 
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Matching-related factors include job-match length and job-match quality. Tenure 
(Stinebrickner, 1998, 2001, 2002) measures the length of a job-match. Job match quality is a 
special type of specific human capital. Although it is not easy to measure, empirical studies 
have attempted to discuss the effects on turnover of academic (Podgursky et al., 2004; Boyd 
et al., 2005), ethnical (Boyd et al., 2005; Imazeki, 2005), and geographical (Boyd et al., 2003, 
2005) match between young teachers and their jobs. 
The relationships between the above-mentioned factors and teachers’ exit and transfer 
turnovers are summarized in TABLE 2.2. 
Different from the research on the determinants of teacher turnover, educational research 
has only recently paid attention to the costs of teacher turnover. According to the Barnes et al. 
(2007), most studies on the costs of teacher turnover either borrow industrial models or use 
no actual data on costs, and thus have little practical utility. From the perspective of a school 
district, Barnes et al. (2007) illustrates eight categories of costs that may be associated with 
teacher turnover, including the costs on recruitment, hiring, administrative processing, 
induction, orientation, professional development, learning curve22, and transfer23. Based on 
the real cost data collected from five rural and urban school districts, Barnes et al. (2007) 
conclude that the costs of recruiting, hiring, and training a replacement teacher for the teacher 
who leaves a district are substantial24. Particularly, turnover costs are higher in schools that 
have high poverty, high minority, and/or low performing students. 
                                                          
22 Loss of productivity. 
23 It refers to transfer within a school district. 
24 The costs range from $8,000 to $13,650 per leaver for a school, and from $76 to $128 million for a school district. The 
costs do not include the cost due to loss of productivity, since there are no relevant data on this category. However, this 




TABLE 2.2: Empirical Findings on the Factors Affecting Teachers’ Turnover 



















Salary - - 
Wage differentials Negative differentials + + 
Expected salary - - 




Urban & Suburban + + 
District size or enrollment + - 
Assessed value per pupila + 
Working conditions 
Small school + + 
Student-teacher ratio + Unknown 
Class size Mixed Mixed 
Higher proportion of 
poverty students + + 
Higher proportion of low-
achieving students + + 
Higher proportion of 
minority students + + 
Subject specialty 
Secondary and high 
school teachers + Unknown 
Math and science teachers Mixed Mixed 




style: more democratic Unknown - 
More administrative 
supporta - 




Lower level of student 


























Gender Male - Unknown 
Entering age 
Late entering female - - 
Late entering male + - 
Marital statusb Mixed Mixed 
Contribution of a married teacher to the total 
family income + Unknown 
Homeownership Unknown - 
Race and ethnicity Minority Mixed - 
Teacher's quality 
Advanced degree Mixed Mixed 
College selectivity + Unknown 
Academic ability + Unknown 
Certification 
State and NBPTS certified 
teachers - Unknown 
Traditionally certified 
teachers - + 
Teacher's 
performance 
Effectiveness evaluated by 
principal + Unknown 
















s Job-match length Tenure - - 
Job-match quality 
Ethnical match - - 
Academic match - - 
Geographical match - - 
 
Source: My literature review paper on teacher turnover (You, 2010). 
Notes: 
a. Including the impacts of both kinds of turnover but not differentiating between them. 





2.3 Methodology Review 
Research on teachers’ turnover itself is a process with constant methodological 
adjustments and improvements. Only quantitative studies using multivariate techniques are 
included in the review. The review presents the evolution of research methods employed in 
the existing studies on teachers’ turnover, with particular emphases on the gradual change in 
methods from answering “whether” questions to answering “when” questions, and from 
providing relatively more descriptive evidence to providing relatively more causal evidence 
in answering each group of questions. 
Before the appearance of longitudinal datasets, studies had already attempted to explore 
whether young teachers change their jobs or not (“whether” questions) based on cross-
sectional datasets. Linear Probability Models (LPM) based on OLS techniques (Greenberg 
and McCall, 1974) were first applied due to their low computational costs compared with 
other non-linear techniques at that time25. However, LPM models are now not preferred in 
most empirical studies, because researchers are well aware of their limitations when the 
dependent variable has qualitative outcomes. OLS could produce fitted values of y outside 
the range between 0 and 1, and the error term 𝑒 is necessarily heteroskedastic26. To account 
for these attributes of the dependent variables in the studies of young teachers’ turnover, 
Probit models consider a scheme with latent variables behind teachers binary stay/leave 
behaviors. Based on utility maximization theory, empirical studies with Probit models treat 
teachers’ decisions (binary variable) as a comparison between the utilities (continuous latent 
                                                          
25 Today there should be no such concerns due to the developments of statistical software. 
26 Nevertheless, these criticisms are not fatal, because fitted values of  y  close to the mean of the data are unlikely to be 




variable) of alternative job opportunities (Theobald, 1990). Different from LPM, Probit 
models assume that the error term in the model with continuous latent dependent variable, 
rather than in the model with the binary variable for stay/leave decision, follows a normal 
distribution. Similar with Probit models, a binary Logit model is another technique to account 
for the attributes of the binary dependent variable. Different from Probit models, Logit 
models assume that the error term follows a logistic distribution instead of a normal 
distribution for computational convenience. And it is popular in empirical studies (Murnane, 
1981; Baugh and Stone, 1982; Rickman and Parker, 1990; Krieg, 2006) due to its simplicity 
and richness in developing useful variants as well. However, one of the problems with the 
binary discrete choice model, either Probit or Logit, is that they are still not good at modeling 
choices among more than two alternatives, which is, however, very common in young 
teachers’ turnover studies. Suppose a teacher terminates his/her teaching job in a particular 
school, he/she faces several other options, for example, teaching in another school in the 
same school district, teaching in a different school district, or leaving teaching, etc. In this 
multi-choice situation, a Multimonial Logit Model, which allows for more than two discrete 
outcomes in its dependent variable, is obviously more suitable (Hanushek et al., 2004; Smith 
and Ingersoll, 2004; Boyd et al., 2008). Another problem with standard discrete choice 
models is that they ignore the fact that teachers are actually nested in the schools or school 
districts. To differentiate the between-group variation from the within-group variation in 





However, the above-mentioned “whether”-question models are inevitably subject to 
several problems caused by potential endogenous (non-random) explanatory variables 
(treatment variable and covariates). For example, it is very likely that some important 
determinants (e.g., personnel policy, idiosyncratic gains from treatment) of turnover behavior 
are not included in the model27, and omission of such variables, particularly when they are 
also correlated with included explanatory variables (e.g., wages, class size, participation in 
programs, etc), will cause bias in identifying the link between probability of turnover and 
included variables. If studies do not take into account of these possibilities, their findings will 
be problematic, in that they can only be viewed as descriptive evidence. With the increasing 
interest in causal evidences, several strategies are applied in dealing with those omitted-
variable-induced problems in empirical studies. 
One strategy is to employ fixed-effects (FE) models (a common generalization of basic 
difference-in-differences setup, or DID). Hanushek et al. (2004) and Boyd et al. (2008) take 
advantage of the longitudinal datasets and employ fixed-effects specifications in multinomial 
logit models to eliminate unobserved school district/school characteristics. However, due to 
the correlation of outcomes within each cell, fixed-effects specification may limit the 
variation in regressors and thus cause incorrect (larger) standard errors28. Rockoff (2008) 
corrects this problem in OLS models with a two-step procedure, in which he regresses 
estimated group fixed effects in a DID specification and uses standard errors of group fixed 
effect estimates as regression weights. Nonetheless, it is worthy to note that one limitation of 
                                                          
27 It is always difficult for researchers to get information on such variables. 
28 Serial correlation may also cause incorrect standard errors (Bertrand et al., 2004), but no studies so far attempt to deal 




the fixed-effects model is its inability in accounting for the influences of time-varying 
unobserved changes that have effects on both transition probabilities and included covariates. 
Existing empirical studies also employ the instrumental variable (IV) method to deal 
with the endogeneity problem. For example, Rockoff (2008) points out that measuring 
mentoring quality with hours of mentoring or mentee’s evaluation of his/her mentor’s 
performance may induce bias in estimates because these variables may be endogenous29. 
Rockoff, therefore, uses average hours or evaluation among teachers who were assigned the 
same mentor as instrumental variables for mentoring quality. Another example is a study of 
the effect of class size on teacher attrition by Isenberg (2010). She deals with endogenous 
class size by using number of teachers the district requested for each school grade level as the 
instrumental variable for class size. Although the instrumental variable method attempts to 
solve directly the selection-on-unobservables problem by inducing an exogenous variation, 
this method has limitations as well: it is difficult to find a good instrumental variable, which 
needs to be strong in prediction of assignment variable while influencing the outcome 
variable only through the effect of assignment variable; and, the identification relies on one 
additional assumption that there are no heterogeneous treatment effects (no selection on the 
idiosyncratic gains). 
The regression discontinuity (RD) method has been adopted to evaluate the effect on 
teachers’ retention of passing the exam of National Board of Professional Teaching Standards 
(NBPTS) Certification in the study by Goldhaber and Hansen (2009). They take advantage of 
                                                          
29 For example, mentors may have allocated more hours to teachers who are struggling, and teachers who perform poorly 




the random error associated with the score on each sub-assessment that determines the overall 
score, and consider passing in the exam a random event in the neighborhood of the cutoff 
point, although the performance on the exam is generally not a random event due to 
unobservables. Goldhaber and Hansen employ a sharp RD design with comparison of the 
probabilities of exiting a given assignment between teachers whose score is just above and 
below 275 within a specified time period, ranging from one to four years, after obtaining 
certification. A drawback of RD lies in its reliance on discontinuous changes of outcome at a 
local range around a threshold. Therefore, similar to IV, RD identifies only the local average 
treatment effect (LATE). 
Furthermore, Bempah et al. (1994) tried a simultaneous equation model based on a small 
sample to account for the self-selectivity problem in new teachers’ migration decision 
process. The wage variable is truncated, since migrants’ wages can only be observed when 
teachers migrate, while stayers’ wages can only be observed when teachers stay. In their 
model, they estimate simultaneously a probit model indicating whether a teacher moves or 
not and two OLS models of wages with weight. Bempah et al. (1994)’s simultaneous 
equation model tried to deal with selection directly by controlling the selection process, and it 
could be applied to fuller datasets. However, a drawback of simultaneous equation models 
lies in the complexity with regard to the assumptions on covariance matrix as well as the 
complexity in selecting the criteria to assess a model’s goodness-of-fit. 
Thanks to the accrual of longitudinal datasets and the developments in statistical 




makes over time, or “when”. Stinebrickner (2001) uses a dynamic discrete choice model30 to 
estimate teachers’ decision-making process concerning job and profession choices. The 
dynamic model is able to incorporate time-varying covariates (TVC); however, it has to 
assume that no observations are censored31. However, there are abundant reasons for us to 
believe that censored observations are common in observational studies and they are 
systematically different from uncensored ones. Being aware of the potential bias that may be 
induced by censored observations in OLS models, Murnane (1984) employ a tobit model in 
his analysis of the relationship between teachers’ productivity and their employment duration. 
However, a tobit model cannot incorporate the influences of time-varying covariates, which 
further motivates the applications of various survival models. 
The advantages of survival models lie in their ability in controlling both the occurrence 
of the event (e.g., turnover behavior) and the history leading up to the event’s occurrence 
(Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004). In other words, both timing and change are accounted 
for in survival models. Survival models focus on the hazard rate of each observation, the risk 
of experiencing an event conditional on having not experienced this event, for a period of 
time, and explain the hazard rate with a set of covariates. In practice, the survival models for 
discrete-time data are more widely used by social scientists32. 
                                                          
30 In a dynamic discrete choice model, Stinebrickner (2001) accounts for serial correlation by assuming the unobservable in 
teaching wage equation follows an autoregressive (1) (AR[1]) process across years in a particular teaching job. 
31 Researchers cannot observe the value of a variable when it is above (right-censoring) or below (left-censoring) certain 
values. 
32 The distinction between discrete and continuous-time models is not that clear. In practice, researchers may have data at 
discrete observation points (e.g., month, year, etc.), while the processes conveyed by the data are continuous in nature. In 
addition, when models for continuous-time data are not good at dealing with ties of observations in terms of failure time, 




One group of survival models used in empirical studies is called parametric survival 
models, in that they attempt to parameterize fully the hazard rate and its shape of duration 
dependency (Murnane and Olsen, 1989, 1990; Murnane et al., 1989; Brewer, 1996; Gritz and 
Theobald, 1996; Mont and Rees, 1996). While the parametric models are desirable if there is 
a theoretical basis to expect a particular shape of the duration dependency, the choice of a 
specific parametric form is sensitive to the model specification. In addition, the duration 
dependency in practical is always treated as nuisance compared with the estimates of 
covariates of interests. Therefore, an alternative group of modeling strategy, Cox proportional 
hazards model and its variants (Cox model), is actually more popular in empirical studies 
(Adams, 1996; Stinebrickner, 1998; Podgursky et al., 2004). The Cox model is a semi-
parametric model, because although the hazard rate is parameterized with covariates in the 
model, the specific shape of baseline hazard’s durance dependency is left unspecified33. And 
the Cox model follows the proportional hazard assumption, which refers that hazard ratio of 
two hazards is a fixed proportion at any time point in the process that the value of covariates 
changes. While this assumption enables the Cox model to estimate the relationship between 
hazard rate and covariates without making any assumptions about the ancillary parameters, 
the proportional hazard assumption itself needs to be tested. 
The survival models to this point are still limited to modeling a singular event of 
interest. However, in teacher turnover studies, teachers may end up with different kinds of 
states, or experience different kinds of events, and these events may be not independent. In 
this multi-state process, a competing risk model is more suitable (Stinebrickner, 2002; Boyd 
                                                          




et al., 2005; Imazeki, 2005; Goldhaber et al., 2007; Scafidi et al., 2007), in that this model 
treats those events as inter-related and estimates them jointly. Hazard rates in competing risk 
models are conditional on having not experienced any kind of events, rather than one 
particular kind of event. Another possibility is that teachers may have turnover behavior 
repeatedly, which is a situation that the usage of repeated events models is more desirable. 
Nevertheless, to date no empirical studies on this topic account for this situation yet. 
Survival models are powerful in answering “when” questions in that they can account 
for censored observations and incorporate time-varying covariates to examine change. 
Admittedly, however, covariates still need to be exogenous for the interpretations of survival 
models to be causal. One violation of this exogeneity assumption is manifest by the existence 
of unobserved heterogeneity due to omission of any time relevant covariates. Unobserved 
heterogeneity may causes parameters to be inconsistent, standard errors to be wrong, and 
estimates of duration dependency to be misleading (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004). 
However, in the studies on teacher turnover, only a few have considered unobserved 
heterogeneity issues in their survival models34 (Murnane and Olsen, 1989, 1990; 
Stinebrickner, 1998, 2002; Boyd et al., 2005). Among them, Murnane and Olsen (1989, 
1990) incorporate district-specific unobserved heterogeneity, Stinebrickner (2002) and Boyd 
et al. (2005) allow for individual unobserved heterogeneity, while Stinebrickner (1998) take 
account of both school-specific and individual unobserved hetergoneity in one model. 
Another issue with regard to endogeneity arises when time-varying covariates included 
and the hazard rate show a simultaneous relationship. However, the methods dealing with 
                                                          




endogeneity issues in the context of survival models are still nascent (Box-Steffensmeier and 
Jones, 2004); there are only two program evaluation studies (Clotfelter et al., 2008; 
Goldhaber and Hansen, 2009), which attempt to incorporate a variant of DID35 design and 
RD design, respectively. And this is no doubt a promising direction that future studies could 
explore. 
The analytical models used in empirical studies of teachers’ turnover have developed 
from discrete-choice models for simple “whether” questions to survival models for “when” 
changes will be experienced and the relevant history leading up to those changes. No matter 
which analytical models are used, empirical studies have to consider potential endogeneity 
issues, or risk not being able to achieve causal inferences. TABLE 2.3 lists existing analytical 
models employed in the empirical studies on young teachers’ turnover with particular 
emphasis on their advantages, limitations, and possible strategies in dealing with endogeneity 
issues. One thing to note is that the list is by no means complete. For example, the propensity 
score matching method has never been used in existing studies on teachers’ turnover. Overall, 
it is particularly true that the strategies to deal with endogeneity issues are still far from 
satisfactory, and more theoretical and empirical work is needed to fill the gaps. 
 
 
                                                          






TABLE 2.3: Summary of Existing Analytic Approaches Employed in Empirical Studies  
(to be continued) 
 
Analytical model Structure of data Advantage Limitation Strategy for endogeneity issue 
LPM Cross-sectional * Low computational cost * Fitted value out of range * Heteroskedastic error term 
* FE/DID with longitudinal data 
* IV 
* RD 
Probit Cross-sectional * Compatible with binary dependent variable 
* Not easy to develop variants 
* Not good at modeling more than two 
choices 
* Not able to account for the nested structure 
* Not able to account for censored 
observations 
* Not able to incorporate TVC 
* IV 
Logit Cross-sectional 
* Compatible with binary 
dependent variable 
* Simplicity in developing 
variants 
* Not good at modeling more than two 
choices 
* Not able to account for the nested structure 
* Not able to account for censored 
observations 
* Not able to incorporate TVC 




* Good at differentiating more 
than two choices 
* Not able to account for the nested structure 
* Able to account for censored observations 
* Not able to incorporate TVC 











model Cross-sectional * Able to account for nested structure 
* Not able to capture the decision-
making process 




choice model Longitudinal 
* Able to capture the decision-making 
process 
* Able to incorporate TVC 
* Not able to account for censored 
observations NA 
Tobit Longitudinal * Able to account for censored observations * Not able to incorporate TVC NA 
Parametric survival 
model Longitudinal 
* Able to account for censored observations 
* Able to incorporate TVC 
* Has to assume for specific shape of 
distribution of hazard rate 
* DDD 
* Frailty models for 
unobserved heterogeneity 
Cox model Longitudinal 
* Able to account for censored observations 
* Able to incorporate TVC 
* No need to assume for specific shape of 
distribution of hazard rate 
 
* Has to assume hazards ratio is a 
fixed proportion 
* DDD 




* Able to account for censored observations 
* Able to incorporate TVC 
* Able to account for multi-state events 
NA 
* RD 






2.4 Summary and Gaps in Knowledge 
In summary, this chapter reviews previous literature on theories and empirical studies of 
teachers’ job turnover. Five theoretical models that are related to job turnover are illustrated; 
their assumptions, mechanisms, and implications on teacher turnover research are summarized. 
In terms of the implications on teacher turnover research, individual teacher and his/her family 
characteristics, job/school characteristics, salary, general and specific training, tenure and quality 
of job match are all theoretical factors that influence teacher job turnover. Based on the review of 
theoretical models on job turnover, this chapter also summarizes two theoretical roles that new-
teacher induction programs may play: the “specific training” role and the “job experience 
exposure” role. These two roles may influence teacher turnover in opposite directions during a 
teacher’s early period on a job. In addition to review of relevant theories, this chapter also 
reviews empirical studies including the ones that evaluate effects of new-teacher induction 
programs on turnover and the ones explore determinants and costs of teacher turnover, as well as 
the quantitative methods used in these empirical studies. Review of empirical studies finds that 
costs of teacher turnover are substantial and job-related factors, individual teacher factors, and 
teacher-job-match factors are three sets of determinants explored in empirical studies. In terms of 
the effects of new-teacher induction programs on teacher turnover, this review finds that 
previous studies differ in terms of the estimated program effects. Four possible explanations are 
illustrated for this empirical inconsistency, including difference in analytical methods, difference 
in program components, difference in program quality, and heterogeneous program effects on 
different groups of teachers. Finally, quantitative methods employed in previous empirical 




studies ask “when” teachers leave rather than just ask “whether” they leave; more studies attempt 
to answer causal questions rather than only provide descriptions of correlational relationships; 
modeling techniques are more and more incorporated with identification strategies in answering 
causal questions. 
There are several knowledge gaps in the literature regarding new teacher turnover and new-
teacher induction programs’ effect are illustrated. First, estimated new-teacher programs’ effect 
on teacher turnover is inconsistent in existing literature; however, very few studies have devoted 
to empirical examinations of potential reasons. Particularly, in terms of analytical methods, 
previous studies each employs one single method, which makes it difficult to distinguish whether 
it is the analytical method employed rather than the data or any other aspects of a study that 
matters. 
Second, although new-teacher induction program participation that cannot be manipulated 
in observational studies, few studies have developed rigorous analytical methods that take 
account of this potential endogeneity issue in the estimation of new-teacher induction programs’ 
effect. Particularly, in the few studies that employ identification strategies (e.g., instrumental 
variable, difference-in-differences) to account for potential endogeneity issues, those 
identification strategies are only applied with linear models. However, it is noted that nonlinear 
models such as Probit and survival models are more appropriate for teacher turnover outcomes, 
and no studies have attempted to incorporate nonlinear models with identification strategies in 
estimating new-teacher induction programs’ effect. 
Third, only one previous study has tried to link new-teacher induction programs to the 
broader background of state legislation or local education policy. This study is a cross-sectional 




requires mandatory induction in 1999. However, no empirical studies have ever done a 
comprehensive research on legal provisions of all 50 states and District of Columbia and linked 
the timing variation of mandatory induction legislation/policy to induction participation. 
Fourth, in terms of other determinants of teacher turnover, directions of some determinants’ 
estimates are mixed in previous literature. Teachers’ subject specialty, race and ethnicity, 
education degree and certification are some cases in point. 
Fifth, theories have suggested two roles of new-teacher induction programs; however, no 
studies have ever attempted to examine these roles empirically. 
Lastly, most studies distinguish teacher turnover into transfer turnover and exit turnover, 
given that this distinction may be of policy interests of different level of education agencies (e.g., 
schools, districts, states, teaching profession). Other distinctions of teacher turnover (e.g., lateral 
turnover vs. vertical turnover), despite its potential policy implications, are rarely used. 
Given these knowledge gaps in literature on teacher turnover and new-teacher induction 
programs’ effect, some possible areas for future research are illustrated. First, multiple analytical 
methods may be used for the same data to examine whether analytical methods matter in the 
estimation of new-teacher induction programs’ effect on teacher turnover. Second, identification 
strategies that account for endogeneity issues of induction program participation may be 
employed, and these identification strategies can also be applied with nonlinear models. Third, a 
comprehensive legal research can be conducted and new-teacher induction programs can be 
interpreted under a broader legislation or policy background. Last, other determinants of teacher 
turnover can also be examined to contribute one more piece of information for future synthesis 
research of primary studies as well as to control for potential confounding variables of teacher 
turnover in the estimation of new-teacher induction programs’ effect. 
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CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter states the key research questions and describes the methods employed to 
answer these questions. Specifically, section 3.1 asks three key research questions and explains 
the importance of and relationship among these questions. Section 3.2 presents a conceptual 
framework. Section 3.3 explains in detail the statistical methods used to answer the key research 
questions. Section 3.4 describes three sources of data, and Section 3.5 provides a summary of the 
chapter. 
 
3.1 Key Research Questions 
According to the literature review in previous chapter, existing literature does not have a 
consistent estimate of new-teacher induction programs’ effect on teacher turnover. One of the 
potential explanations for this inconsistency is that most previous studies do not employ rigorous 
analytical methods that take account of the potential endogeneity problem of induction program 
participation. Although new-teacher induction programs’ implementation in the United States 
has a broader legislation/policy background, previous literature provides little evidence on how 
legislation/policy is linked with new-teacher induction programs’ participation as well as teacher 
turnover. 
The goal of this study is to evaluate the effects of new-teacher induction programs on 
teacher turnover.  Teacher turnover is the outcome variable of interest, given the substantial costs 
turnover is associated. This study attempts to answer the following three key research questions: 
(1) What are the determinants of new teachers’ turnover? 
(2) Do new-teacher induction programs have effects on reducing new teachers’ turnover? 
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(3) Do state mandatory induction laws and/or local mentoring policy have effects on 
reducing new teachers’ turnover? 
In terms of measures of teacher turnover, this study explores the determinants of and/or the 
effects on one-year teacher turnover as well as time to teacher turnover.  Moreover, not only an 
overall measure of teacher turnover is examined, teacher turnover is also considered separately 
as transfer turnover and exit turnover. 
Specifically, the first key research question is to understand what factors affect teacher 
turnover. This is important for the estimation of effects of induction programs because in a real 
world factors that influence teacher turnover usually function together and confound each other, 
and it is hard to estimate the effects of a program without controlling for or excluding the effects 
of confounding factors. 
The second key research question is this study’s core research question, which tackles 
directly the problems of estimating the effect of new-teacher induction programs on teacher 
turnover. To answer this question, this study examines not only the participation in an induction 
program, but also participation in components and level of induction services. In addition, 
multiple statistical methods and identification strategies are used. 
The third key research question is closely related to the second key research question. This 
question links new-teacher induction programs to the relevant legislation and policy 
backgrounds, and explores how much increase in participation of induction programs is triggered 
by mandatory requirements and how this triggered increase in induction participation in turn 
affects teacher turnover. 
For the second and third key research questions, potential heterogeneous effects on different 




3.2 Conceptual Framework 
To provide a standpoint of the current study, FIGURE 3.1 illustrates a conceptual 
framework about interactions among several education agents and elements. This framework is a 
common way of relating education agents, and is conceptualized based on author’s 
understanding of previous studies. There are three main types of education agents, including 
schools, teachers and students. Each of these agents has characteristics that are distinguished 
from one and other and these characteristics are called elements. For example, schools have 
demographic characteristics (e.g., school type, location, enrollment), curriculum and program 
(e.g., academic vs. occupational, Montessori), and administration (e.g., leadership); teachers 
have demographic characteristics (e.g., gender, race and ethnicity) and qualification 
characteristics (e.g., education, experience); and students have demographic characteristics and 
achievement characteristics (e.g., interests, specialty, test scores). These three types of agents 
interact with each other. For example, teachers and their schools create a working environment 
together, agree on salaries and benefits, and invest on and benefit from on-the-job trainings; 
schools and students create a learning environment together; and teachers and their students 
interact through teaching and learning processes. Dashed arrows between elements illustrate the 
directions of influences among education elements. Directions of arrows are all two ways, 
indicating that one element influences and be influenced by another element. All agents act 
according to rules (e.g., education laws, policies), and at the same time their characteristics and 
interactions in turn influences the evolution of rules. Teacher turnover is an element that locates 
at the center, because it maintains the dynamics of the system. Simultaneously, teacher turnover 
is influenced by all education elements. 
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One focus of this study is the arrows pointing toward teacher turnover, in other words, the 
determinants of teacher turnover. The other focus of this study is one of the rules that regulate 
teachers and schools (e.g., mandatory induction laws and/or local mentoring policy) and the 
impacts on interaction of teachers and schools (e.g., induction programs) as well as on teacher 
turnover. 
Particularly, rules that are of interests in this study refer to state legislation of mandatory 
induction and/or local education policy that requires mandatory mentoring for new teachers. 
Since late 1980s, states have been active in legislation to mandate that public school new 
teachers participate in new-teacher induction programs. Arguably motivated by New York 
State’s passage of a mandatory induction law, in 2004 New York City Department of Education 
implemented a local education policy, according to which new teachers are required to 






































3.3 Statistical Methods 
The basic assumption of most previous literature evaluating the effects of new-teacher 
induction programs is that induction participation is an exogenous variable. Based on this 
assumption, the effects of new-teacher induction programs on teacher turnover are estimated 
according to equation (3.1): 
𝑓(𝑌𝑖𝑐𝑠) =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑐𝑠 + 𝑓𝑠 + 𝑓𝑐 + 𝛼2𝑿𝑖𝑐𝑠 + 𝜖𝑖𝑐𝑠                           (3.1) 
where 𝑓(. ) denotes a generic function form, e.g., linear, Probit; Y denotes a teacher turnover 
outcome, including overall measure of turnover, transfer turnover, exit turnover, and time to all 
these types of turnover; IND denotes the treatment variable, induction participation; vector X 
denotes a set of teacher and school characteristics; and fs and fc denote a set of state and cycle 
dummy variables. INDics equals 1 if a new teacher i in state s during the SASS/TFS cycle c 
participated an induction program. The set of cycle fixed effects variables fc ’s indicate 
separately for different cycles of SASS/TFS, in other words,  fc equals 1 if a teacher is surveyed 
in the cycle c of SASS/TFS. The current study also begins by applying the regression model 
(3.1) in order to 1) examine determinants of types of teacher turnover and time to these types of 
turnover, and 2) provide preliminary estimates of the effects of new-teacher induction programs 
on turnover outcome variables. The regression method shown in model (3.1) is a control strategy 
in the estimation of the effects of new-teacher induction programs. Since the estimated program 
effects (𝛼1) can be interpreted causally only when the induction participation is an exogenous or 
a conditionally exogenous variable, regression method tries to control as many as possible of the 
observed/measurable confounding variables (e.g., other determinants of turnover outcome 
variables) so as to make this conditional exogeneity assumption valid. 
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Another control strategy is propensity-score matching (PSM) method (Gelman and Hill, 
2007; Angrist and Piscchke, 2009), which controls only a propensity score or probability of a 
teacher’s participation in induction programs, instead of many confounding variables. PSM as a 
control strategy is superior to regression method because it does not have to specify the multi-
dimensional relationship between explanatory variables and the outcome variable parametrically 
and thus does not need to worry about model specification assumptions (e.g., linearity). 
Therefore, in addition to the regression method illustrated above, the current study also applies 
PSM to estimate the effects of new-teacher induction programs on turnover outcomes. 
Specifically, the following five steps are conducted (Gelman and Hill, 2007; Angrist and 
Piscchke, 2009). The first step is to define a set of important covariates, such as teacher 
demographic and qualification characteristics, teaching assignment and salaries, as well as 
school characteristics. The second step is to compute propensity scores using Probit or logit 
models according to equation (3.2). 
𝑃𝑟(𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑐𝑠 = 1|𝑿) =  𝐺(𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑿𝑖𝑐𝑠)                                           (3.2) 
where 𝐺(. ) is a function taking on values strictly between zero and one, e.g., Probit or logit; IND 
denotes the treatment variable, induction participation; vector X denotes a set of pretreatment 
variables, variable transformations, as well as their interactions. In this step, multiple models 
with different specifications (e.g., by adding, removing, or transforming the variables, their 
interactions, or squared terms) are performed. The third step is matching, which is to reduce the 
full dataset to a sample that includes only the treated observations and only those control 
observations that have similar propensity scores as the treated observations. The fourth step is to 
check the overlap and balance in distributions across treated and control groups, and choose a 
propensity score model that achieves the best possible balance. Based on the propensity scores 
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calculated in step two using different model specifications, the overlap is checked by plotting 
and comparing the histograms for the propensity scores of treated and control groups, and the 
balance is tested by comparing the treated group and the selected control group in terms of the 
distributions of the important covariates. The model that achieves the best possible balance is the 
one that has the least number of statistically significant different covariates. The fifth step is to 
apply a regression model (3.1) with appropriate weight to the reduced and matched sample, 
which excludes observations that do not have matched propensity scores. The weight equals the 
number of times each observation is used in the matching, since the observations in a matched 
sample are no longer independent. Estimated 𝛼1 is a PSM estimator and is the treatment effect on 
the treated36 (TOT) of the new-teacher induction programs on turnover outcomes. 
As stated earlier, as control strategies, both regression and propensity-score matching 
assume (conditional) exogeneity of the treatment variable. However, this assumption may not 
hold even after controlling for observed covariates, since teachers may select themselves into 
participation based on unobserved characteristics (e.g., ability, potential benefits). If those 
unobservables are also correlated with outcome variables of interests (e.g., turnover), then 
estimates of the effects of new-teacher induction programs are biased. Although this assumption 
is not directly testable, one way to assess how sensitive PSM estimates are subject to those 
unobserved confounding variables is to perform sensitivity analysis, which addresses how much 
the hidden bias (or the unmeasured covariate) would have to be able to alter the conclusions 
(Rosenbaum, 2002, 2005). A measure of sensitivity to hidden bias is 𝛤, which indicates that the 
odds of one subject receiving the treatment is 𝛤 times larger than that of another paired subject 
due to the unmeasured covariates (Rosenbaum, 2002, 2005). 
                                                          




In addition to the sensitivity analysis, another way, which is also a direct way, to address the 
exogeneity assumption is to find an exogenous source of variable as the instrument for the 
potential endogenous treatment variable. Particularly, the current study attempts to employ the 
variation in the timing of state legislation of mandatory induction requirements as the 
instrumental variable for the endogenous induction participation variable, and to identify the 
effects of new-teacher induction programs through isolating the covariation in the endogenous 
induction participation variable and turnover outcome variables. Three important assumptions 
have to be made for an instrumental variable (IV) estimate to identify a causal relationship 
between induction participation and turnover outcomes (Gelman and Hill, 2007; Angrist and 
Piscchke, 2009). 
One assumption is that the instrumental variable has to be ignorable (or exogenous). The 
variation in the timing of mandatory induction legislation may serve as a natural experiment (or 
exogenous variation) to explore the effect of new-teacher induction programs only when the 
timing of legislation does not reflect previous existing differences in state-level characteristics. If 
some state-level characteristics do statistically significantly predict the timing of state mandatory 
induction legislation, then state and cycle fixed effects can be further controlled to make the 
ignorability assumption of the instrumental variable more valid through differencing out the 
previously existing differences that are time-invariant. This is the identification strategy 
incorporating instrumental variable method within a difference-in-differences framework. 
Another assumption is that there has to be a non-zero correlation between IV and induction 
participation. Specifically, this assumption will be examined in the first-stage regressions by 
looking at whether and how much a state’s adoption of the mandatory induction requirements 
increased its new teachers’ participation in induction programs according to equation (3.3): 
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𝑓(𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑐𝑠) =  𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐿𝐴𝑊𝑐𝑠 + 𝑓𝑠 + 𝑓𝑐 + 𝛾2𝑿𝑖𝑐𝑠 + 𝜖𝑖𝑐𝑠                              (3.3) 
where LAWcs denotes the mandatory induction legislation, with 1 indicating state s had a 
mandatory induction law in cycle c, and 𝛾1 is the estimate of the percentage of compliers in the 
IV literature and is usually used to evaluate the strength of the instrumental variable. 
After testing the two assumptions mentioned above, this study compares the differences in 
teacher turnover between teachers in states that adopted such requirements and teachers in states 
that did not adopt before and after the adoption of the requirements according to equation (3.4): 
𝑓(𝑌𝑖𝑐𝑠) =  𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝐿𝐴𝑊𝑐𝑠 + 𝑓𝑠 + 𝑓𝑐 + 𝛿2𝑿𝑖𝑐𝑠 + 𝜖𝑖𝑐𝑠                           (3.4) 
where 𝛿1 is the difference-in-differences (DID) estimator of the effect of mandatory law on 
teacher turnover. This difference-in-differences estimator is often referred to in literature as the 
“Intention to Treat” (ITT) effect, and does not yet capture the effect of actually participating in 
an induction program. Therefore, the next step is to scale the estimate of the ITT effect (𝛿1) by 
dividing by the increased percentage of new teachers’ participation in an induction program due 
to the adoption of the requirement (or percentage of compliers, 𝛾1), which will thus yield the 
estimate of the effect of an induction program on teacher turnover. IV-DID estimator can also be 
obtained through a two-stage procedure which substitutes the predicted IND from equation (3.3) 
for IND in equation (3.1). In this two-stage procedure, the adjusted 𝛼1 is the IV-DID estimate of 
the effects of new-teacher induction programs on turnover. It is a procedure that is equivalent to 
previous one that scaling up the ITT-DID estimate (Gelman and Hill, 2007; Angrist and 
Piscchke, 2009). 
The last step is to adjust the standard errors of this estimate by collapsing the data to a 
higher level of aggregation. Because teachers in each state-year cell are subject to the same 
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change in legislation and thus these teachers may have correlated outcomes due to other 
unobserved factors they have in common (Bertrand, et al., 2004; Rockoff, 2008). Moreover, 
since state legislation and teacher turnover change over time, both changes may also be serially 
correlated in the difference-in-differences estimation (Bertrand et al., 2004). Therefore, the 
standard errors will be subject to underestimation unless correctly adjusted. 
Since most of outcome variables of interest in this study (e.g., turnover) are binary 
variables, in addition to the linear version of all models, the Probit version of corresponding 
models is also performed for consistency checks of estimates.37 It is noted that the difference-in-
differences framework requires linearity assumption to estimate ITT and IV estimators.38 In 
nonlinear models, such as Probit models, this linearity assumption does not hold. Nevertheless, 
the sign of the treatment effect in a nonlinear difference-in-differences model39 is equal to the 
sign of the coefficient of the interaction term (Puhani, 2012). The magnitude of treatment effect 
can be obtained by calculating the cross difference of the conditional expectation of the observed 
outcome minus the cross difference of the conditional expectation of the potential outcome 
without treatment (Puhani, 2012), and bootstrap can be applied to the nonlinear difference-in-
differences estimate to obtain corresponding standard error (Puhani, 2012). 
Finally, the third assumption of instrumental variable is the exclusion restriction 
assumption, which says that the IV does not influence teacher turnover through channels other 
than its impact on induction program participation. Although this assumption is not directly 
                                                          
37 Some Probit version of models dos not have STATA command available directly, and limited amount of 
programming is performed. Given that Probit version of models gives similar trends as linear version of models, 
the latter is used for inference due to its simplicity and consistency. 
38 Given linearity assumption, cycle effects and state effects are constant, and thus are able to be differenced out 
to obtain DID estimators. 




testable, the ITT effect on teacher turnover for new teachers who have more than one year of 
prior teaching experience will be performed as an indirect test. The rationale is that most state 
mandatory laws require novice teachers who have less than one year of teaching experience to 
participate in induction programs, and thus teachers who have more than one year of prior 
teaching experience should not be affected by mandatory laws. 
The above mentioned procedures apply to the outcome variables of different types of 
turnover, as well as the time to these turnover events. However, it is noted that when time to 
turnover is used as the dependent variable, there is always an analytical problem of time 
censoring. In other words, researchers may not know the exact time to turnover for each 
observation. One reason for censoring is that the observation period ends before some turnover 
occurs. In this case, some teachers’ time to turnover is right-censored, and the survival model is a 
better tool to accommodate censored time. The following methods are developed for data that 
contain longitudinal information on teachers’ change of employment status and illustrate the 
estimation of a mentoring policy’s effect on teachers’ time to turnover. 
There are two general types of survival models, proportional hazard (PH) models and 
acceleration failure time (AFT) models (Kleinbaum and Klein, 2005). To estimate mentoring 
policy’s effect on a teacher’s time to turnover, both PH models and AFT models can be used. 
However, PH models compare the hazards, assuming the effect of covariates is multiplicative 
(proportional) with respect to hazard, whereas AFT models compare the survival times, 
assuming the effect of covariates is multiplicative with respect to survival time. In the form of 
PH models, the estimation is shown in equation (3.5): 
ℎ�𝑡𝑖𝑗 ,𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝐶𝑌𝑗,𝐗𝑖𝑗� = ℎ0�𝑡𝑖𝑗�𝑒𝜃1𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝐶𝑌𝑗+𝜃2𝐗𝒊𝒋                                      (3.5) 
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where ℎ(. ) is the hazard function; ℎ0(. ) is baseline hazard function, which includes only time 
information; 𝑡𝑖𝑗 is the survival time of teacher i in period j; 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝐶𝑌𝑗 is mentoring policy status, 
with 1 indicating that there is a mentoring policy in period j; 𝐗𝑖𝑗 is a vector of additional 
covariates; 𝑒𝜃1 is the parameter of interest, indicating the difference in a teacher’s hazard of 
turnover with and without a mentoring policy; 𝑒𝜃2’s are also parameters of interest and are 
determinants of hazard of turnover. In model (3.5), ℎ0�𝑡𝑖𝑗� can be parameterized using different 
models based on different assumptions of survival time distribution (e.g., exponential, Weibull), 
or it does not necessarily need to be parameterized (e.g, Cox proportional hazard model), given 
that the baseline hazard is usually not the primary parameter of interest. 
In the form of AFT models, the estimation of a mentoring policy’s effect is shown in 
equations (3.6) and (3.7): 
𝑇�𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝐶𝑌𝑖𝑗,𝐗𝑖𝑗� = 𝑒𝜌0+𝜌1𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝐶𝑌𝑗+𝜌2𝐗𝒊𝒋+𝜎𝜖𝑖𝑗 = 𝑇0𝑒𝜌1𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝐶𝑌𝑗+𝜌2𝐗𝒊𝒋             (3.6) 
𝑇0 = 𝑒𝜌0+𝜎𝜖𝑖𝑗                                                 (3.7)                                         
where T(. ) is the survival time; 𝑇0 is the survival time when 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝐶𝑌𝑗 and other covariates 𝐗𝑖𝑗 
all equal zero; 𝑒𝜌1 is the parameter of interest, and the product of 𝑒𝜌1 and 𝑇0 is the acceleration 
factor of survival time, with 1 indicating that a teacher’s survival times to turnover with and 
without a mentoring policy are comparable; 𝑒𝜌2’s are also parameters of interest and represent 
other determinants of survival time to turnover. All AFT models are parametric models. They are 
parameterized using survivor function (𝑆(𝑡)) or hazard function (ℎ(𝑡)) 40 based on different 
assumptions of survival time (e.g., exponential, Weibull, Log-logistic, Log-normal), and 𝜎 is the 
                                                          
40 The survivor function S(t) gives the probability that the random variable of survival time T exceeds the specified 
time t; the hazard function h(t) gives the instantaneous potential per unit time for turnover to occur, given that the 
teacher has survived up to time t. There is a clearly defined relationship between these two functions, in the sense 
that if one of these two functions is known, then the other one can be derived. 
55 
 
additional shape parameter, which determines the specific parametric form of an AFT model and 
is usually not the primary parameter of interest. In addition to parametric assumption of survivor 
or hazard function form, the exponential models and Weibull models also assume proportional 
hazards (PH); Log-logistic models also assume proportional odds (PO). These assumptions are 
examined graphically in this study before an appropriate model is chosen for inference. 
Specifically, log-log approach and the observed versus expected approach of graphical 
examinations are used to test the PH assumption, and log-odds approach of graphical 
examinations are used to test the PO assumption. These examinations are based on Kaplan-Meier 
estimates.41 In addition, the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) is employed to compare the fit 
of different models. AIC is a measure of the relative goodness of statistical models. Specifically, 
𝐴𝐼𝐶 = 2𝑘 − 2ln (𝐿), where k is the number of parameters in a statistical model, and L is the 
maximized value of the likelihood function for the estimated model. As illustrated, in addition to 
rewarding goodness of fit, AIC includes a penalty that is an increasing function of the number of 
estimated parameters. Given a set of candidate models, the one with minimum AIC value is 
preferred. 
As for other regression models, survival models are also subject to omitted variable bias 
and/or selection bias in the estimation of a treatment program or policy’s effect, if the treatment 
variable is not conditionally exogenous. Particularly, when a policy change affects all teachers in 
a local area after a certain point of time, there is not a comparable group of teachers for those 
teachers being subject to policy impact, because of the policy variable does not vary among those 
teachers. In other words, a policy’s effect is not distinguishable from a year’s effect. Therefore, 
                                                          




as for estimation of a policy’s effect with survival models, this study also attempts to incorporate 
a difference-in-differences framework, and tries to difference out the pre-existing differences 
between two comparison groups. In the context of NYC, from 2004-05 to 2006-07 school years, 
NYC implemented a mentoring policy requiring all the new teachers who have less than 1 year 
of prior teaching experience to participate in an citywide mentoring program. According to an 
empirical study conducted by Rockoff (2008), newly hired teachers who are hired on-time have a 
higher rate of participation in the mentoring program, compared with their counterparts who are 
hired late. In addition, since the program was not implemented strictly according to the criterion 
of less than 1 year of prior teaching experience, it is found that novice teachers who have less 
than 1 year of teaching experience have a higher rate of participation in the program, compared 
with newly hired teachers who have more than 1 year of prior teaching experience (Rockoff, 
2008). 
Specifically, given that newly hired teachers who are hired on-time are more subject to a 
policy change compared with their counterparts who are late hires, the first difference-in-
difference framework this study incorporated adds into the explanatory variables of survival 
models an interaction term between variable of hired on-time and variable of mentoring policy in 
order to capture the policy’s effect. It compares survival times of on-time hires and late hires 
before and after implementation of mentoring policy in 2004. This identification strategy works 
by subtracting out potential unobserved time-invariant preexisting difference between these on-
time hires and late hires, given that this preexisting difference may confound the mentoring 
policy’s effect on teachers’ survival times. Specifically,  
𝑇�𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝐶𝑌𝑖𝑗,𝑂𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑗,𝐗𝑖𝑗� = 𝑇0𝑒𝜏1𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝐶𝑌𝑗+𝜏2𝑂𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑗+𝜏3𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝐶𝑌𝑗∗𝑂𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑗+𝜏4𝐗𝒊𝒋                        (3.8) 
𝑇0 = 𝑒𝜏0+𝜎𝜖𝑖𝑗                                                                    (3.9)  
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where 𝑂𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑗 is dummy variable, with 1 indicating a teacher is hired on-time; 𝑒𝜏3 is the 
parameter of interest.42 
Similarly, the second difference-in-difference framework incorporated adds an interaction 
term between variable of novice teacher and variable of mentoring policy, instead of the previous 
interaction term between variable of variable of hired on-time and variable of mentoring policy. 
Adding the interaction term between mentoring policy and novice teacher variables is to identify 
the policy’s effect. It compares survival times of novice and experienced new hires before and 
after implementation of mentoring policy. Equations (3.10) and (3.11) are corresponding 
statistical models. 
𝑇�𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝐶𝑌𝑖𝑗,𝑁𝑂𝑉𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑗,𝐗𝑖𝑗� = 𝑇0𝑒𝜑1𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝐶𝑌𝑗+𝜑2𝑁𝑂𝑉𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑗+𝜑3𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝐶𝑌𝑗∗𝑁𝑂𝑉𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑗+𝜑4𝐗𝒊𝒋      (3.10) 
𝑇0 = 𝑒𝜑0+𝜎𝜖𝑖𝑗                                                                    (3.11) 
where 𝑁𝑂𝑉𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑗 is dummy variable, with 1 indicating a teacher is novice teacher; 𝑒𝜑3 is the 
parameter of interest.43 
So far, the above two difference-in-differences survival models try to capture the policy’s 
effect by subtracting out potential unobserved time-invariant preexisting differences between on-
time new hires and late new hires and between novice new hires and experienced new hires, 
separately. However, these two sets of models do not account for the preexisting differences 
simultaneously. Therefore, a difference-in-differences-in-differences (DDD) framework is 
employed to account for the potential unobserved preexisting differences between novice new 
hires and experienced new hires between on-time hires and late hires before and after the 
                                                          
42 The estimate of the interaction term does not represent the policy’s effect directly in nonlinear difference-in-
differences models. 




implementation of the mentoring policy. This triple differences framework is expressed in 
statistical models by adding in the interaction terms between policy and on-time hire, between 
policy and novice, between on-time hire and novice, and among policy, on-time hire and novice, 
as shown in equations (3.12) and (3.13). 
𝑇�𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝐶𝑌𝑖𝑗,𝑂𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑗,𝑁𝑂𝑉𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑗,𝐗𝑖𝑗� = 𝑇0𝑒𝜔1𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝐶𝑌𝑗+𝜔2𝑂𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑗+𝜔3𝑁𝑂𝑉𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑗+𝜔4𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝐶𝑌𝑗∗𝑂𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑗 
         𝑒𝜔4𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝐶𝑌𝑗∗𝑁𝑂𝑉𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑗+𝜔5𝑂𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑗∗𝑁𝑂𝑉𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑗+𝜔6𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝐶𝑌𝑗∗𝑂𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑗∗𝑁𝑂𝑉𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑗+𝜔7𝐗𝒊𝒋     (3.10) 
𝑇0 = 𝑒𝜔0+𝜎𝜖𝑖𝑗                                                                    (3.11) 
where 𝑒𝜔6 is the parameter of interest.44 
Recall that in nonlinear difference-in-differences models, since the linearity assumption 
does not hold, and the product of the parameter of interest and 𝑇0 cannot be not directly 
interpreted as an acceleration factor indicating the policy effect on time to turnover. As 
difference-in-differences Probit models, the policy effect in difference-in-difference survival 
models is again obtained by calculating the cross difference of the conditional expectation of the 
observed time to turnover minus the cross difference of the conditional expectation of the 
potential time to turnover without treatment45 (or a cross difference between two cross 
differences), and the policy effect in difference-in-difference-in-differences survival model is 
obtained by calculating a cross difference between two cross differences between two cross 
differences (or the three differences analog of a cross difference between two cross differences). 
The corresponding standard errors are obtained by bootstrapping. 
 
 
                                                          
44 The estimate of the interaction term does not represent the policy’s effect directly in nonlinear difference-in-
differences models. 




Main data used for this study include the School and Staffing Survey (SASS)/the Teacher 
Follow-up Survey (TFS), NYC administrative data, and the author’s legal research of education 




The Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS) and its supplement the Teacher Follow-up Survey 
(TFS) are a series of cross-sectional surveys conducted by National Center for Education 
Statistics (NCES) concerning America’s elementary and secondary schools and school 
personnel. SASS/TFS is the nation’s largest sample survey concerning this topic. SASS/TFS has 
been conducted for six cycles since 1987. Originally, SASS was conducted once every three 
years, and since 1999-2000 school year, the cycle has changed to every four years. SASS 
includes four core components: the School Questionnaire, the Teacher Questionnaire, the 
Principal Questionnaire, and the School District Questionnaire. TFS is administered in the year 
following SASS, particularly for the purpose of tracking teacher turnover. SASS/TFS samples 
are nationally representative. 
The population of this study’s primary interest is first-year new teachers. Sample sizes for 
first-year new teachers in each cycle’s SASS and TFS surveys are shown in TABLE 3.1. All 
numbers of observations are rounded to the nearest ten for results based on SASS/TFS data, 





TABLE 3.1: Number of First-year Public School Teachers in SASS/TFS Surveys 
Cycle SASS TFS 
2007-2009 2100 1790 
2003-2005 2000 450 
1999-2001 2590 570 
1993-1995 2200 530 
1990-1992 1900 550 
1987-1989 1260 410 
Total 12040 4290 
 
3.4.1.2 Sampling procedure and sampling weights 
SASS employs a stratified probability sample design. School is the primary sampling unit. 
Specifically, SASS sampling procedures for public schools46 include the following steps. The 
first step is to build the school sampling frame based on previous year’s Common Core of Data 
(CCD).47 The second step is to divide schools into strata based on certain school characteristics, 
and then within each stratum randomly select schools into the sample according to the stratum’s 
selection probability. The third step is to contact the sample schools and ask for filling out the 
Teacher Listing Form (TLF), which serves as the SASS teacher sampling frame. And the last 
step is to divide teachers into strata based on certain teacher characteristics, and within each 
stratum randomly select teachers into the sample according to the stratum’s selection probability. 
TFS uses all eligible teachers who responded to the SASS Teacher Survey in the previous 
year as its sampling frame. Similar to the stratification and sampling procedure of SASS 
teachers, teachers who responded to SASS are also divided into strata based on certain teacher 
characteristics, and then within each stratum are randomly selected into the TFS teacher sample. 
                                                          
46 Public schools include traditional public schools and charter schools. Sampling frame for other types of schools 
(e.g., private schools) is different from that of public schools. 
47 CCD is a universe survey of all elementary and secondary schools in the United States. CCD frame is modified to 
meet the needs of SASS prior to stratification and sampling. 
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In general, for the school and teacher samples, SASS/TFS uses stratified probability 
proportional to size (PPS) sampling. However, schools and teachers with certain characteristics 
may be oversampled due to other considerations. For example, all public school first-year 
teachers were sampled in TFS of the 2007-2009 cycle. 
Sampling weights are used to make the SASS/TFS samples representative for the 
population.  For every teacher in each cycle of SASS and TFS teacher samples, there are a final 
teacher weight and a set of teacher replicate weights, respectively. The final teacher weight takes 
into account the sampled schools’ and teachers’ selection probability and nonresponse; therefore 
applying the final teacher weight will produce an unbiased estimate for the population. Teacher 
replicate weights allow researchers to calculate the valid standard errors of estimates for surveys 
using the complex sample design without knowing the specific sample design information.48 
Thus, replicate weights should be applied to improve the precision of sample estimates whenever 
possible.49 
As TABLE 3.2 shows, for the SASS/TFS surveys in 1999-2000, 2003-2005, and 2007-2009 
cycles, each survey has one final teacher weight and 88 teacher replicate weights, while for the 
SASS/TFS surveys in 1987-1989, 1990-1992, and 1993-1995 cycles, each survey has one final 
teacher weight and 48 teacher replicate weights. 
 
TABLE 3.2 Number of Sampling weights in SASS and TFS surveys 
Cycle 
SASS TFS 
No. of Final Teacher 
Weight 
No. of Teacher 
Replicate Weights 
No. of Final Teacher 
Weight 
No. of Teacher 
Replicate Weights 
                                                          
48 The specific sample design information is not available to restricted-data users, since this information may 
jeopardize survey respondents’ privacy and data confidentiality. 
49 In STATA, the ‘svy’ survey command handles complex sample survey data; however, not every STATA routine is 
accommodated with the survey command. 
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2007-2009 1 88 1 88 
2003-2005 1 88 1 88 
1999-2001 1 88 1 88 
1993-1995 1 48 1 48 
1990-1992 1 48 1 48 
1987-1989 1 48 1 48 
 
Since each cycle of SASS/TFS surveys are based on separate sampling procedures, 
sampling weights should be combined when making inferences based on the pooled sample from 
multiple cross-sectional surveys. Combined statistical weights are created for the pooled sample 
of SASS surveys and the pooled sample of TFS surveys separately. 
According to Lee et al. (2007), a set of new statistical weights for the combined data file is 
created as shown in TABLE 3.3. For the combined data file with six cycles of SASS/TFS 
surveys, there are 409 weights, including one final weight and 408 replicate weights. The 
combined statistical weights are labeled as cfw0 and crw1 to crw408, respectively. The combined 
final weight is created by using the final weight (F0) from the respective surveys. For the first 88 
combined replicate weights (crw1, …, crw88), replicate weights (R1, …, R88) for 2007-2009 
cycle (cycle 1) and final weights (F0, …, F0) for the other cycles are used. Similarly, for the 
second 88 combined replicates weights (crw89,…, crw176), replicate weights (R1, …, R88) for 
the 2003-2005 cycle (cycle 2) and final weights (F0, …, F0) for the other cycles are used. The 
rest combined replicate weights are created following the same logic. The order of cycle 1 to 
cycle 6 does not matter. I use reverse chronological order only for the purpose of convenience, 
since sometimes I only work on the latest several cycles of surveys.50
                                                          
50 For example, 1987-1988 SASS teacher questionnaires have no questions about teacher induction program 
participation, and I then use only combined final weight and combined replicate weight 1 to combined replicate 
weight 360 for my analysis with regard to teacher induction program participation. Another example is that only 
the recent three cycles of SASS asked questions about detailed components of an induction program, and thus I 
use combined final weight and combined replicate weight 1 to combined replicate weight 264 for analyzing 
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3.4.1.3 Measures of key variables 
TABLE 3.3 illustrates teacher- and school-level key variables available in SASS/TFS 
surveys and used in my studies. Column 2 defines how these variables are measured. Some of 
these variables may be combined with each other in statistical models; despite this they are listed 
separately in the table. For example, the three dichotomous teacher turnover variables (turnover, 
mover, and leaver) may be combined into one three-categorical variable with 0 indicating stayer, 
1 indicating mover, and 2 indicating leaver, in order to be used in multinomial models. Another 
example is that the six dichotomous variables measuring the highest degree a teacher earned may 
be combined into one three-categorical variable with 0 indicating less than a bachelor’s degree, 1 
indicating a bachelor’s degree, and 2 indicating master’s degree and above, because there are 
only a relatively small number of teachers whose highest degree is not bachelor’s or master’s. 
TABLE 3.4 shows the unweighted descriptive statistics for key variables. The unweighted 
means in the table can only represent the sample and cannot be used to make inference in the 
population. Some observations may be outliers. For example, first-year new teachers’ ages range 
from 20 to 87. Although age of 87 is a legitimate value, being 87 years old as a new teacher 
should be considered as an outlier. This study will perform consistency checks and compare the 
results with and without those outliers. 
 
TABLE 3.4 Measures of Key Variables Used in the Analysis 
Variable Measure 
Teacher turnover  
  Turnover A dichotomous variable: 1=turnover/not teaching in the same school 
one year after; 0=stayer/teaching in the same school one year after. 
  Mover A dichotomous variable: 1=mover/teaching in a different school one 
year after; 0=others. 
  Leaver A dichotomous variable: 1=leaver/not teaching one year after; 
0=others. 






0=indicated by principal as stayer. 
  Principal-reported mover A dichotomous variable: 1=indicated by principal as mover; 
0=indicated by principal as others. 
  Principal-reported leaver A dichotomous variable: 1=indicated by principal as leaver; 
0=indicated by principal as others. 
Induction program  
  Induction A dichotomous variable: 1=participated in an induction program; 
0=not participating in an induction program. 
  Mentor A dichotomous variable: 1=having a mentor; 0=not having a mentor.  
  Collaboration or planning time A dichotomous variable: 1=had common planning time with teachers 
in the same subject, or regularly scheduled collaboration with other 
teachers on issues of instruction; 0=others. 
  Seminars or classes A dichotomous variable: 1=participated in seminars or classes for 
beginning teachers; 0=others. 
  Supportive communication A dichotomous variable: 1=had regular supportive communication 
with the principal, other administrators, or department chair; 0=others. 
  Extra assistance A dichotomous variable: 1=had extra classroom assistance (e.g., 
teacher aide); 0=others. 
  Reduced schedule or preparations A dichotomous variable: 1=had a reduced teaching schedule or a 
reduced number of preparations; 0=others. 
Teacher characteristics  
  Male A dichotomous variable: 1=male teachers; 0=female teachers. 
  Age A continuous variable: measures teachers’ age in the survey year, 
calculated as the year of each cycle of SASS minus year of birth. 
  Married A dichotomous variable: 1=married teachers; 0=others. 
  White A dichotomous variable: 1=white teachers; 0=others. 
  Black A dichotomous variable: 1=black teachers; 0=others. 
  Hispanic A dichotomous variable: 1=Hispanic/Latino teachers; 0=others. 
  Other race or ethnicity A dichotomous variable: 1=non-black and non-Hispanic/Latino 
minority teachers; 0=others. 
  Regular full-time A dichotomous variable: 1=regular, full-time teachers; 0=regular, 
part-time teachers, itinerant teachers, or long-term substitutes. 
  Union member A dichotomous variable: 1=teachers who belong to a teacher union 
organization; 0=others. 
  Math/Science A dichotomous variable: 1=teachers whose main teaching assignment 
is math or science; 0=others. 
  Special education A dichotomous variable: 1=teachers whose main teaching assignment 
is special education; 0=others. 
  ESL A dichotomous variable: 1=teachers whose main teaching assignment 
is bilingual education or English as a second language. 
Teacher qualifications  
  No degree A dichotomous variable: 1=teachers whose highest degree earned is 
no post-secondary degree; 0=others. 
  Associate's degree A dichotomous variable: 1=teachers whose highest degree earned is 
Associate’s degree; 0=others. 
  Bachelor's degree A dichotomous variable: 1=teachers whose highest degree earned is 
Bachelor’s degree; 0=others. 
  Master's degree A dichotomous variable: 1=teachers whose highest degree earned is 
Master’s degree; 0=others. 
  Graduate level certificate A dichotomous variable: 1=teachers whose highest degree earned is 
graduate level certificate; 0=others. 
  Doctorate degree A dichotomous variable: 1=teachers whose highest degree is doctorate 
degree; 0=others. 







  Partial state certificate A dichotomous variable: 1=teachers who have partial state teaching 
certificate (e.g., probationary, temporary, provisional, or emergency 
certificate); 0=others. 
  Full state certificate A dichotomous variable: 1=teachers who have full state teaching 
certificate (e.g., regular or standard state certificate or advanced 
professional certificate); 0=others. 
  Alternative certification program A dichotomous variable: 1=teachers who enter teaching through an 
alternative certification program; 0=others. 
  Barron’s college selectivity index A categorical variable: measures the selectivity of the undergraduate 
institution attended by a teacher. 1=most competitive; 2=highly 
competitive; 3=very competitive; 4=competitive; 5=less competitive; 
6=noncompetitive; 7=special. 
  Total years of teaching experience A continuous variable: measures teachers’ total years of teaching 
experience, calculated as the current year of teaching experience plus 
any prior full-time and/or part-time teaching experience in public 
and/or private schools. 
  Preparation index A continuous variable: measures teachers’ feeling or well 
preparedness, the index is calculated as the sum of responses of six or 
seven four-point Likert scale questions divided by the total number of 
questions. 
Earnings(in thousand)  
  Total earnings A continuous variable: measures teachers’ total yearly earnings, 
calculated as the sum of school-related earnings and non-school 
earnings divided by 1000. 
  School-related earnings A continuous variable: measures teachers’ yearly earnings from all 
school-related jobs, calculated as the amount divided by 1000. 
  Non-school earnings A continuous variable: measures teachers’ yearly earnings from all 
non-school jobs, calculated as the amount divided by 1000. 
School characteristics  
  Charter school A dichotomous variable: 1=public charter; 0=others. 
  Urban A dichotomous variable: 1=large or mid-size central city; 0=others. 
  Rural A dichotomous variable: 1=small town/rural; 0=others. 
  Suburban A dichotomous variable: 1=urban fringe of large or mid-size city; 
0=others. 
  Elementary A dichotomous variable: 1=school having any of grades K-6 and none 
of grades 9-12; 0=others. 
  Secondary A dichotomous variable: 1=school having any of grades 7-12 and 
none of grades K-6; 0=others. 
  Combined A dichotomous variable: 1=school in which the grade structure 
crosses a boundary between elementary and secondary schools; 
0=elementary or secondary school. 
  Enrollment A continuous variable: measures total number of students in grades K-
12 enrolled in a school.  
  Small A dichotomous variable: 1=enrollment of a school is less than 350; 
0=others. 
  Large A dichotomous variable: 1=enrollment of a school is more than 1,000; 
0=others. 
  % Poverty enrollment A continuous variable: measures a school’s percentage of students 
approved to receive free or reduced-price lunches through the 
National School Lunch Program. 
  % Minority enrollment A continuous variable: measures a school’s percentage of students 
whose race and ethnicity are not non-Hispanic white. 






have an Individualized Education Program because they have 
disabilities or is a special education student are taught by a teacher. 
  % LEP enrollment (of a teacher) A continuous variable: measures what percentage of students taught 
by a teacher who are of limited-English proficiency is taught by a 
teacher. 
  % Minority teachers A dichotomous variable: measures a school’s percentage of teachers 
whose race and ethnicity are not non-Hispanic white. 
  Student-teacher ratio A continuous variable: measures number of students per full-time 
equivalent teacher in a school. 
 
 
TABLE 3.5 Descriptive Statistics for Key Variables (Unweighted, Pooled) 
Variable  Obs.a Meanb Std. Dev.c Min. Max. 
Teacher characteristics      
  Male 12040 0.317  - 0 1 
  Age 12040 29.904  8.185  20 87 
  Married 8160d 0.520  - 0 1 
  White 12040 0.820 - 0 1 
  Black 12040 0.065 - 0 1 
  Hispanic 12040 0.059 - 0 1 
  Other race or ethnicity 12040 0.056 - 0 1 
  Regular full-time 12040 0.865  - 0 1 
  Union member 8890e 0.580  - 0 1 
  Math/Science 12040 0.143  - 0 1 
  Special education 12040 0.108  - 0 1 
  ESL 12040 0.009  - 0 1 
Teacher qualifications      
  No degree 12040 0.017  - 0 1 
  Associate's degree 12040 0.008  - 0 1 
  Bachelor's degree 12040 0.820  - 0 1 
  Master's degree 12040 0.134  - 0 1 
  Graduate level certificate 12040 0.014  - 0 1 
  Doctorate degree 12040 0.007  - 0 1 
  No state certificate 12040 0.183  - 0 1 
  Partial state certificate 12040 0.263  - 0 1 
  Full state certificate 12040 0.516  - 0 1 
  Alternative certification program 8890e 0.153  - 0 1 
  Barron’s college selectivity index 9260f 4.110  - 1 7 






  Preparation index 6690g 0.640  0.192  0 1 
Earnings ($ thousands)      
  Total earnings 12040 29.631  11.473  0.5 193 
  School-related earnings 12040 26.860  8.872  0 126 
  Non-school earnings 12040 2.771  6.725  0 160 
School characteristics      
  Charter school 6690g 0.096  - 0 1 
  Urban 11980h 0.246  - 0 1 
  Rural 11980h 0.408  - 0 1 
  Suburban 11980h 0.345  - 0 1 
  Elementary 11770i 0.372  - 0 1 
  Secondary 11770i 0.505  - 0 1 
  Combined 11770i 0.123  - 0 1 
  Enrollment 11770i 726.550  614.427  0 5804 
  Small 11770i 0.288  - 0 1 
  Large 11770i 0.256  - 0 1 
  % Poverty enrollment 4100j 42.808  28.203  0 100 
  % Minority enrollment 11740h 36.476  34.656  0 100 
  % IEP enrollment (of a teacher) 6690g 12.797  21.974  0 100 
  % LEP enrollment (of a teacher) 6690g 5.165  15.637  0 100 
  % Minority teachers 11550h 15.656  22.633  0 100 
  Student-teacher ratio 6470k 15.122  5.250  0.2045 137.5 
Induction program      
  Induction 10780l 0.593  - 0 1 
  Mentor 6690g 0.706  - 0 1 
  Collaboration or planning time 6690g 0.459  - 0 1 
  Seminars or classes 6690g 0.634  - 0 1 
  Supportive communication 6690g 0.841  - 0 1 
  Extra assistance (e.g., teacher aide) 6690g 0.306  - 0 1 
  Reduced schedule or preparations 6690g 0.164  - 0 1 
  Number of induction components 6690g 3.110  1.405  0 6 
  Basic package 6690g 0.008  - 0 1 
  Intermediate package 6690g 0.309  - 0 1 
  Comprehensive package 6690g 0.365  - 0 1 
Teacher turnover      
  Turnover 4290m 0.458  - 0 1 
  Mover 4290m 0.293  - 0 1 
  Leaver 4290m 0.166  - 0 1 
  Principal-reported turnover 6650n 0.280  - 0 1 






  Principal-reported leaver 6650n 0.143  - 0 1 
Notes:  
a. This sample includes only novice (first-year) public-school teachers. Observations are drawn from all six 
cycles of SASS surveys. 
b. Means are unweighted. 
c. Standard deviations are not calculated for binary variables. 
d. In 1999, 2003 and 2007 cycles, marital status was asked in TFS questionnaires, rather than in SASS 
questionnaires. 
e. Corresponding questions are not available in 1987 and 1990 SASS. 
f. Corresponding questions are not available in 1990 SASS, and some college or universities have no matches 
in Barron’s college selectivity data. 
g. Corresponding questions are not available in 1987, 1990 and 1993 SASS. 
h. Some schools did not report their school characteristics in 1987 SASS, and 1987 SASS did not impute the 
data. 
i. Some schools did not report their school characteristics in 1987, 1990, and 1993 SASS, and 1987, 1990, and 
1993 SASS did not impute the data. 
j. Corresponding questions are only available in 2003 and 2007 SASS. 
k. Corresponding questions are not available in 1987, 1990 and 1993 SASS, and 1999 SASS has some missing 
values. 
l. Corresponding questions are not available in 1987 SASS. 
m. Observations are drawn from all cycles of TFS surveys. 
n. Corresponding questions are available in 1999, 2003 and 2007 SASS. Some observations have missing 
values in the three cycles because principal didn’t report. Thus these observations were not used as the sampling 
frame for TFS survey. 
 
 
3.4.1.4 Missing data 
Since SASS/TFS modify their questionnaires before each cycle of data collection, some 
variables that are available in some cycles of surveys may not be available in other cycles. These 
variables are missing systematically in some cycles of surveys. TABLE 3.5 shows two types of 
missing rates. Missing rate A is calculated based on the pooled first-year new teacher sample of 
all six cycles of SASS, while missing rate B is calculated based on the corresponding sub-sample 
of certain cycles of SASS/TFS surveys that have variables of interest. 
For available variables in each cycle of surveys, SASS/TFS deal with their missing values 
in three stages. The first stage is the internal imputation stage, in which missing values are 
imputed based on other relevant variables within the same questionnaire, relevant data from 






sampling files. The second stage is the “hot-deck” imputation stage, in which missing values are 
imputed by using data from the record of a similar case (or “donor”), or by using the mean or 
mode of data for groups of similar cases (or “donors”).51 The third stage is post-imputation 
review stage, in which imputed missing values are checked for consistency with other values on 
questionnaire. Missing rates before and after SASS/TFS imputation of missing values are shown 
in TABLE 3.5 through TABLE 3.7 for different samples. 
Column 2 of TABLE 3.5 shows that variables that are not available in all cycles of surveys 
have higher missing rates. Therefore, my empirical studies will be based mainly on variables that 
are available in most cycles of surveys. Column 3 shows the rates of missing values for available 
variables before SASS/TFS imputation. Earnings-related variables are shown to have a higher 
proportion of missing values. Rates of missing values for most other variables are below 5%. A 
small number of variables have missing rates that are above 5%, but the rates are all below 10%. 
Columns 4 and 5 show the rates of missing values after SASS/TFS imputation. As shown 
column 4, the missing rates for most variables reduce significantly after SASS/TFS imputation, 
and most of the rates are close to 0. One exception is the variable college selectivity index. On 
the one hand it is because questions that ask the name of undergraduate institution attended by a 
teacher in SASS teacher questionnaires are write-in questions, which are not imputed by 
SASS/TFS. On the other hand, it is because some the undergraduate institutions filled by 
teachers in SASS questionnaires cannot be matched with the Barron’s college selectivity data. 
Therefore, the variable of college selectivity will be used cautiously in my empirical studies with 
comparisons of results with and without further imputation of its missing values. 
                                                          
51 Similar cases refer to individuals who share certain characteristics, e.g., from the same state or a similar group of 
states, same school, same grade level, same gender, same degree earned, same years of experience, etc. These 






TABLE 3.6 and TABLE 3.7 show the rates of missing values for variables in two sub-
samples, on which most of my empirical studies will be based. These two sub-samples are recent 
five cycles of TFS first-year public school teacher sample and recent three cycles of SASS first-
year public school teacher sample, respectively. 
 
TABLE 3.6 Rates of Missing Data for Variables in First-year Public School Teacher Sample 
Variable 









Variables that are available in all six cycles of SASS 
Sample size: 12040 
Male 0.66% 0.66% 0.00% 0.00% 
Age 1.10% 1.10% 0.00% 0.00% 
White 6.27% 6.27% 0.00% 0.00% 
Black 5.95% 5.95% 0.00% 0.00% 
Hispanic 4.59% 4.59% 0.00% 0.00% 
Other Race or Ethnicity 5.95% 5.95% 0.00% 0.00% 
Regular full-time 0.05% 0.05% 0.00% 0.00% 
Math/Science 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Special Education 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
ESL 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
No Degree 0.42% 0.42% 0.00% 0.00% 
Associate's degree 0.42% 0.42% 0.00% 0.00% 
Bachelor's degree 0.42% 0.42% 0.00% 0.00% 
Master's degree 0.42% 0.42% 0.00% 0.00% 
Graduate level certificate 0.42% 0.42% 0.00% 0.00% 
Doctorate degree 0.42% 0.42% 0.00% 0.00% 
No state certificate 4.63% 4.63% 0.00% 0.00% 
Partial state certificate 4.63% 4.63% 0.00% 0.00% 
Full state certificate 4.63% 4.63% 0.00% 0.00% 
Total years of teaching experience 5.37% 5.37% 0.00% 0.00% 
Total earnings 17.96% 17.96% 0.00% 0.00% 
School-related earnings 13.83% 13.83% 0.00% 0.00% 
Non-school earnings 18.20% 18.20% 0.00% 0.00% 
Urban 0.52% 0.52% 0.52% 0.52% 
Rural  0.52% 0.52% 0.52% 0.52% 
Suburban 0.52% 0.52% 0.52% 0.52% 






Secondary 2.31% 2.31% 2.29% 2.29% 
Combined 2.31% 2.31% 2.29% 2.29% 
Enrollment 2.31% 2.31% 2.29% 2.29% 
Small 2.31% 2.31% 2.29% 2.29% 
Large 2.31% 2.31% 2.29% 2.29% 
% Minority enrollment 2.88% 2.88% 2.47% 2.47% 
% Minority teachers 7.37% 7.37% 3.88% 3.88% 
Variables that are available in recent five cycles of SASS 
Sample size: 10780 
Induction 13.33% 3.22% 10.45% 0.00% 
Variables that are available in 1987 and recent four cycles of SASS 
Sample size: 10140 
Barron's college selectivity index 23.14% 8.76% 23.14% 8.76% 
Variables that are available in recent four cycles of SASS 
Sample size: 8890 
Union member 27.40% 1.62% 26.20% 0.00% 
Alternative certification program 27.64% 1.95% 26.20% 0.00% 
Variables that are available in earliest three cycles of SASS and most recent three cycles of TFS 
Sample size: 8160 
Married 33.03% 1.13% 32.26% 0.00% 
Variables that are available in recent three cycles of SASS 
Sample size: 6690 
Preparation index 47.51% 5.54% 44.43% 0.00% 
Charter school 44.43% 0.00% 44.43% 0.00% 
% IEP enrollment (of a teacher) 49.36% 8.86% 44.43% 0.00% 
% LEP enrollment (of a teacher) 46.42% 3.57% 44.43% 0.00% 
Student-teacher ratio 46.68% 4.05% 46.24% 3.26% 
Mentor 46.52% 3.75% 44.43% 0.00% 
Collaboration or planning time 46.47% 3.68% 44.43% 0.00% 
Seminars or classes 46.46% 3.65% 44.43% 0.00% 
Supportive communication 46.49% 3.71% 44.43% 0.00% 
Extra assistance 45.68% 2.24% 44.43% 0.00% 
Reduced schedule or preparations 45.67% 2.23% 44.43% 0.00% 
number of induction components 46.58% 3.87% 44.43% 0.00% 
principal-reported turnover 44.80% 0.66% 44.80% 0.66% 
principal-reported mover 44.80% 0.66% 44.80% 0.66% 
principal-reported leaver 44.80% 0.66% 44.80% 0.66% 
Variables that are available in recent two cycles of SASS 
Sample size: 4100 
% Poverty enrollment 68.40% 7.13% 65.97% 0.00% 
National Board Certificate 68.82% 8.37% 65.97% 0.00% 
Variables that are available in all cycles of TFS 






Turnover 64.38% 0.00% 64.38% 0.00% 
Mover 64.38% 0.00% 64.38% 0.00% 
Leaver 64.38% 0.00% 64.38% 0.00% 
 
TABLE 3.7 Rates of Missing Data for Variables in Recent Five Cycles of TFS First-year Public 
School Teacher Sample 
Sample Size: 3880 Before SASS/TFS Imputation 
After SASS/TFS 
Imputation 
Variable Missing Rate Missing Rate 
Male 0.64% 0.00% 
Age 1.01% 0.00% 
White 5.34% 0.00% 
Black 5.16% 0.00% 
Hispanic 3.27% 0.00% 
Other Race or Ethnicity 5.18% 0.00% 
Regular full-time 0.03% 0.00% 
Math/Science 0.00% 0.00% 
Special Education 0.00% 0.00% 
ESL 0.00% 0.00% 
No Degree 0.59% 0.00% 
Associate's degree 0.59% 0.00% 
Bachelor's degree 0.59% 0.00% 
Master's degree 0.59% 0.00% 
Graduate level certificate 0.59% 0.00% 
Doctorate degree 0.59% 0.00% 
No state certificate 1.50% 0.00% 
Partial state certificate 1.50% 0.00% 
Full state certificate 1.50% 0.00% 
Total years of teaching experience 5.70% 0.00% 
Total earnings 20.50% 0.00% 
School-related earnings 16.32% 0.00% 
Non-school earnings 20.50% 0.00% 
Urban 0.00% 0.00% 
Rural  0.00% 0.00% 
Suburban 0.00% 0.00% 
Elementary 1.52% 1.52% 
Secondary 1.52% 1.52% 
Combined 1.52% 1.52% 
Enrollment 1.55% 1.52% 
Small 1.55% 1.52% 






% Minority enrollment 2.14% 1.86% 
% Minority teachers 6.58% 2.73% 
Induction 3.66% 0.00% 
Barron's college selectivity index 22.10% 22.10% 
Union member 15.52% 14.05% 
Alternative certification program 15.29% 14.05% 
Married 0.72% 0.00% 
Preparation index 31.38% 27.64% 
Charter school 27.64% 27.64% 
% IEP enrollment (of a teacher) 35.22% 27.64% 
% LEP enrollment (of a teacher) 29.01% 27.64% 
Student-teacher ratio 29.22% 28.86% 
Mentor 30.43% 27.64% 
Collaboration or planning time 30.43% 27.64% 
Seminars or classes 30.43% 27.64% 
Supportive communication 30.45% 27.64% 
Extra assistance 29.81% 27.64% 
Reduced schedule or preparations 29.81% 27.64% 
number of induction components 30.48% 27.64% 
principal-reported turnover 28.24% 28.24% 
principal-reported mover 28.24% 28.24% 
principal-reported leaver 28.24% 28.24% 
% Poverty enrollment 46.24% 42.42% 
National Board Certificate 45.31% 42.42% 
Turnover 0.00% 0.00% 
Mover 0.00% 0.00% 
Leaver 0.00% 0.00% 
 
TABLE 3.8 Rates of Missing Data for Variables in Recent Three Cycles of SASS First-year 
Public School Teacher Sample 
Sample Size: 6690 Before SASS/TFS Imputation 
After SASS/TFS 
Imputation 
Variable Missing Rate Missing Rate 
Male 0.96% 0.00% 
Age 1.08% 0.00% 
White 6.58% 0.00% 
Black 5.99% 0.00% 
Hispanic 3.56% 0.00% 
Other Race or Ethnicity 6.01% 0.00% 
Regular full-time 0.09% 0.00% 






Special Education 0.00% 0.00% 
ESL 0.00% 0.00% 
No Degree 0.67% 0.00% 
Associate's degree 0.67% 0.00% 
Bachelor's degree 0.67% 0.00% 
Master's degree 0.67% 0.00% 
Graduate level certificate 0.67% 0.00% 
Doctorate degree 0.67% 0.00% 
No state certificate 0.96% 0.00% 
Partial state certificate 0.96% 0.00% 
Full state certificate 0.96% 0.00% 
Total years of teaching experience 4.04% 0.00% 
Total earnings 16.16% 0.00% 
School-related earnings 12.69% 0.00% 
Non-school earnings 16.16% 0.00% 
Urban 0.00% 0.00% 
Rural  0.00% 0.00% 
Suburban 0.00% 0.00% 
Elementary 0.03% 0.00% 
Secondary 0.03% 0.00% 
Combined 0.03% 0.00% 
Enrollment 0.03% 0.00% 
Small 0.03% 0.00% 
Large 0.03% 0.00% 
% Minority enrollment 1.06% 0.31% 
% Minority teachers 9.15% 3.26% 
Induction 4.98% 0.00% 
Barron's college selectivity index 9.16% 9.16% 
Union member 1.99% 0.00% 
Alternative certification program 0.99% 0.00% 
Married 58.33% 58.06% 
Preparation index 5.54% 0.00% 
Charter school 0.00% 0.00% 
% IEP enrollment (of a teacher) 8.86% 0.00% 
% LEP enrollment (of a teacher) 3.57% 0.00% 
Student-teacher ratio 4.05% 3.26% 
Mentor 3.75% 0.00% 
Collaboration or planning time 3.68% 0.00% 
Seminars or classes 3.65% 0.00% 
Supportive communication 3.71% 0.00% 
Extra assistance 2.24% 0.00% 
Reduced schedule or preparations 2.23% 0.00% 






principal-reported turnover 0.66% 0.66% 
principal-reported mover 0.66% 0.66% 
principal-reported leaver 0.66% 0.66% 
% Poverty enrollment 43.13% 38.77% 
National Board Certificate 43.89% 38.77% 
Turnover 58.06% 58.06% 
Mover 58.06% 58.06% 
Leaver 58.06% 58.06% 
 
3.4.1.5 Analysis of SASS/TFS Data 
SASS/TFS data will be used to address the first two research questions stated in Section 3.1, 
including both the determinants of new teachers’ turnover and new-teacher induction programs’ 
effects on teacher turnover. In addition, SASS/TFS data, together with state legislation data that 
will be described later in Section 3.4.3, will also be used to address the third research question, 
which is the effect of state mandatory induction laws on teacher turnover. Teacher turnover is 
measured as one-year turnover with SASS/TFS data. 
Specifically, OLS, Probit and other qualitative dependent variable models are used to 
examine determinants of new teachers’ turnover and provide preliminary estimates of new-
teacher induction programs’ effect on teacher turnover. To further examine the causal effect of 
new-teacher induction programs on teacher turnover, propensity-score matching (PSM) and 
instrumental variable (IV) are employed. Specifically, legal variable that will described later in 
Section 3.4.3 is used as the instrumental variable for induction program participation. 
Assumptions of instrumental variable are examined, and in order to satisfy certain IV 
assumptions, the instrumental variable method is incorporated with a difference-in-difference 
(DID) framework. Finally, difference-in-difference (DID) method is used to examine the effect 
of state mandatory induction laws on teacher turnover. 







3.4.2 NYC Data 
3.4.2.1 Introduction 
New York City Department of Education (DOE) maintains the human resources (HR) 
payroll system, which provides administrative data containing longitudinal information of all 
full-time teachers working in DOE. Specifically, two types of data files are available for this 
study, including pedagogue data files audited in every October from 2003-04 school year to 
2009-10 school year, as well as the transaction data file recording all changes of employment 
status between Jan 1, 2000 and December 31, 2010. DOE administrative data include 
information concerning teacher demographic characteristics (e.g., age, gender, race and ethnicity, 
subject area), teacher qualification characteristics52 (e.g., years of experience), and teacher 
employment information (e.g., schools in which teachers are employed, time points at which 
teachers begin and end their job in a specific school and/or DOE). 
In addition to individual teacher data, NYC DOE database has information about their 
public schools as well. Particularly, beginning in 2006-07 school year, this database records each 
public school’s annual demographic characteristics, learning environment scores, and progress 
report grade.53 School information is linked to individual teacher through each school’s unique 
DBN code. 
                                                          
52 Qualification characteristics such as education, college selectivity, SAT scores, certification, initial pathway into 
teaching etc. are not available. 
53 2006-07 was the first year of the Progress Report, and no grade was reported for early childhood schools, district 
75 schools/special education schools, and YABC programs before 2007-08 school year, and no grade was reported 
for transfer high school in 2006-07 school year. NYC School Learning Environment Survey was first conducted in 
2007 for the 2006-07 school year. Survey questions assess the community’s opinions on safety and respect, 
communication, engagement, and academic expectations, and the survey results contribute 10%-15% of a school’s 






In this study, only teachers who are newly hired by NYC DOE in each year are the 
population of interest. Newly hired teachers are identified based on information provided by 
NYC DOE administrative data. However, given that NYC DOE administrative data do not have 
a variable indicating directly which teachers are new hires in each year, whether a teacher is a 
new hire in a particular year is identified based on information provided by both pedagogue data 
files and the transaction data file. For example, according to the transaction data file, for those 
teachers who begin a job during the observation period from 2000 to 2010, identify their earliest 
date of beginning a job. However, this date may not be an accurate value for a teacher’s earliest 
date hired my NYC DOE, because a teacher may be hired by DOE prior to 2000, and what the 
transaction data file recorded is his/her switching between schools or changing employment 
status during the observation period. Therefore, a double check of this date is conducted by 
examining the consistency between the transaction data file and pedagogue files recorded every 
year. For example, if the transaction data file records that a teacher begins his/her earliest job in 
September 1, 2004, then if his/her earliest records in pedagogue data files should appear in 
October 31, 2004. Therefore, if there are any records of this teacher in pedagogue files for 2003, 
then this teacher is not considered as a new hire on September 1, 2004. Given that pedagogue 
data files prior to 2003 are not available to this study, whether a teacher is a new hire in years 
prior to 2003 is judged based only on the information provided by the transaction file.54 TABLE 




                                                          
54 Identification based on one source of data file may be inaccurate, and thus results based on data prior to 2003 












By Prior Years of Teaching Experience 
less than 1 yr between 1 & 3 yrs between 3 & 5yrs between 5 & 10 yrs more than 10 yrs 
1999 1257 626 339 125 122 45 
2000 5301 3163 982 623 378 155 
2001 6173 4095 1082 516 321 159 
2002 11425 6929 2728 1089 504 175 
2003 9132 8145 221 456 226 84 
2004 7039 6842 143 24 25 5 
2005 7500 7345 98 29 18 10 
2006 7175 7033 100 16 18 8 
2007 7262 7121 113 16 10 2 
2008 5582 5546 20 5 10 1 
2009 2026 2018 5 1 1 1 
Total 69872 58863 5831 2900 1633 645 
Source: Author’s calculation based on NYC administrative data available to this study. 
 
Given that the numbers of new hires may be inaccurate, particularly for years prior to 2003, 
a comparison of author’s calculation55 of newly hired teachers and official numbers of newly 
hired teachers for each year is shown in FIGURE 3.2. In general, the pattern of author’s 
calculation of the number of newly hired teachers is similar to that of official number in years 
from 2003 to 2007. For other years, author’s calculation is inaccurate due to being lack of 
relevant pedagogue files for those years. 
                                                          







FIGURE 3.2: Comparison of Numbers of Newly Hired Teachers 
Notes: NYC official number of newly hired teachers is calculated based on DOE official website information about 
number of total teachers and number of separations (http://schools.nyc.gov/NR/rdonlyres/5DB97FCD-BC4D-446F-
9896-D45735404367/0/TotalTeachersandAnnualTurnover.pdf). Specifically, number of newly hired teachers in year 
t is calculated using number of total teachers in year t minus number of total teachers in year t-1 and plus number of 
separations in year t-1. 
 
3.4.2.2 Measures of Key Variables and Missing Values 
Based on NYC DOE administrative data, four sets of variables are created, including 
variables of teacher characteristics (e.g., gender, race and ethnicity, age, prior teaching 
experience, subject area), variables of school characteristics (enrollment, school level and type, 
student-body characteristics, progress report grade, and learning environment scores), variable of 
NYC mentoring policy, and teacher turnover variables (e.g., time to turnover, turnover status). 
TABLE 3.10 provides detailed measures of key variables used in this study. Particularly, 
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is less than 1 year. Whether a new hire is hired on-time is defined as 1 if this teacher is hired in 
July, August, and September of each year. Time to turnover is defined as the number of days 
before a new hire leaves his/her first teaching job in DOE, and whether a teacher is a stayer, 
mover, or leaver depends on his/her status of the second job after his/her leaving from the first 
teaching job in DOE. Censored is a variable measuring whether a teacher’s time to turnover is 
censored.56 Since NYC mentoring policy was implemented from 2004 to 2006, the variable of 
mentoring policy equals 1 for years from 2004 to 2006 and 0 for other years. Early childhood, 
elementary, middle, and high schools refer to regular public schools with grades K-357, K-5, 6-8, 
and 9-12, respectively. Transfer schools refer to schools that are small, academic, full-time high 
schools designed to re-engage students who are behind in high school or have dropped out. 
Special education schools are schools that serve students with a range of disabilities. Progress 
report grade is a letter grade for each school based on the school’s student progress (60%), 
student performance (25%), and school environment (15%). School learning environment scores 
represent the community’s opinions58 on four aspects of schools’ learning environment (e.g., 
safety and respect, communication, engagement, and academic expectation) based on NYC 
school survey59 results. In addition to the variables listed in TABLE 3.10, transformation of 
these variables and/or their interactions may be created in later analysis, for example, square 
term of age, interaction terms between teacher race and ethnicity and ethnical composition 
                                                          
56 The observation period (e.g., from 2000 to 2010) is not long enough to observe every teacher’s turnover to 
occur. 
57 It is not clear based on data files from NYC DOE how early childhood school is defined. There are two possibilities: 
K-3, or preK-2. Therefore, elementary school teachers will be used as a baseline group for comparison, and early 
childhood school is added as a dummy variable. 
58 Parents, teachers, and students’ response to survey questions. 






characteristics schools’ student-body, interaction terms between mentoring policy and variables 
such as on-time hires and novice, etc. 
 
TABLE 3.10: Measures of Key Variables 
Variable Measure 
Teacher Characteristics 
  Male A dichotomous variable: 1=male teachers; 0=female teachers. 
  White A dichotomous variable: 1=white teachers; 0=others. 
  Black A dichotomous variable: 1=black teachers; 0=others. 
  Hispanic A dichotomous variable: 1=Hispanic/Latino teachers; 0=others. 
  Asian A dichotomous variable: 1=Asian teachers; 0=others. 
  American Indian A dichotomous variable: 1=American Indian teachers; 0=others. 
  Age A continuous variable: measures teachers’ age when he/she was newly 
hired by DOE, calculated new hire year minus year of birth. 
  Prior teaching experience A continuous variable: measures teachers’ years of teaching experience 
when he/she was newly hired by DOE. 
  Novice A dichotomous variable: 1=teachers whose prior teaching experience is 
less than 1 year; 0=teachers whose prior teaching experience is more 
than 1 year. 
  Math & science A dichotomous variable: 1=teachers whose teaching assignment subject 
is match or science; 0=teachers teaching subjects. 
  Special education (teacher) A dichotomous variable: 1=teachers whose teaching assignment subject 
is special education; 0=teachers teaching subjects. 
  ELL A dichotomous variable: 1=teachers whose teaching assignment subject 
is teaching English for English language learners; 0=teachers teaching 
subjects 
  Hired on time A dichotomous variable: 1=hired in July, August, or September; 
0=hired in other months. 
School Characteristics 
  Total enrollment A continuous variable: measures total number of students in grades K-
12 enrolled in a school.  
  Early childhood A dichotomous variable: 1=early childhood schools; 0=other schools. 
  Elementary A dichotomous variable: 1=elementary schools; 0=other schools. 
  Middle A dichotomous variable: 1=middle schools; 0=other schools. 
  High A dichotomous variable: 1=high schools; 0=other schools. 
  Combined A dichotomous variable: 1=combined schools; 0=other schools. 
  Transfer A dichotomous variable: 1=transfer high schools; 0=other schools. 
  Special education (school) A dichotomous variable: 1=special education schools; 0=other schools. 
  Free lunch % A continuous variable: measures a school's percentage of students who 
receive free lunch. 
  ELL % A continuous variable: measures a school's percentage of students who 
are English learners. 
  Special education % A continuous variable: measures a school's percentage of students who 






  White % A continuous variable: measures a school's percentage of students who 
are white. 
  Black % A continuous variable: measures a school's percentage of students who 
are black. 
  Hispanic % A continuous variable: measures a school's percentage of students who 
are Hispanic origins. 
  Asian % A continuous variable: measures a school's percentage of students who 
are Asian. 
  Female % A continuous variable: measures a school's percentage of students who 
are female. 
  Progress report grade A ordinal variable: measures a school's overall progress grade, based on 
student progress, student performance, and school environment, 0 to 4 
refer to F, D, C, B, and A, respectively. 
  Safety & respect score A continuous variable: measures the community's opinions on a school's 
safety and respect aspect of learning environment, ranges from 0 to 10 
and 10 is the highest score. 
  Communication score A continuous variable: measures the community's opinions on a school's 
communication aspect of learning environment, ranges from 0 to 10 and 
10 is the highest score. 
  Engagement score A continuous variable: measures the community's opinions on a school's 
engagement aspect of learning environment, ranges from 0 to 10 and 10 
is the highest score. 
  Academic expectation score A continuous variable: measures the community's opinions on a school's 
academic expectation aspect of learning environment, ranges from 0 to 
10 and 10 is the highest score. 
Mentoring 
  Mentoring policy A dichotomous variable: 1=year 2004, 2005, or 2006, 0=other years. 
Teacher Turnover 
  Time to turnover A continuous variable: measures number of days before a newly hired 
teacher terminates his/her first job in a NYC public school. 
  Turnover status: Stayer A dichotomous variable: measures the status of a newly hired teacher's 
first job in a NYC public school, 1=on the same job, 0=first job 
terminated. 
                              Mover A dichotomous variable: measures the status after a newly hired teacher 
terminates his/her first job in a NYC public school, 1=switching to 
another NYC public school, 0=other. 
                              Leaver A dichotomous variable: measures the status after a newly hired teacher 
terminates his/her first job in a NYC public school, 1=leaving NYC 
DOE, 0=other. 
  Censored A dichotomous variable: measures whether a teacher's termination of 
first job has been observed; 1=not observed, 0=observed. This variable 
is used to declare censored observations before survival analysis is 
performed. 
 
TABLE 3.11 shows the descriptive statistics of the key variables. As for the age of new 
hires, the average age of new hires is about 30, but the largest age in the record is 79. However, 






statistical models with regard to age outliers are conducted in later analysis (e.g., models using 
categorical variable rather than continuous variable, models with and without age outliers). 
Before data are used for analysis, reviews of errors were performed. First, if records of a 
same teacher’s time-invariant characteristics (e.g., gender, race and ethnicity, date of birth) or a 
school’s time-invariant characteristics (e.g., school level and type) are not consistent in different 
years, values that are most frequently recorded are used. Since school-level variables are only 
available for years from 2006 to 2008, their values for other years are imputed using their mean 
or mode values of the same variable in available years. In addition, if a time-invariant variable 
for one teacher or for one school is missing in one year but are available in other years’ records, 
then other years’ record, which should be consistent after the first step, are used to impute the 
missing value. 
Given that schools’ progress report grade and learning environment scores are not available 
until 2006-07 years, mode value of a school’s progress report grade and mean values of its 
learning environment scores in available years are used to impute the corresponding values for 
the same school in other years. 
After these reviews and initial imputations, missing rates of key variables are displayed in 
the last column of TABLE 3.11. For teacher characteristics and employment status variables, the 
missing rates are all below 1%, which are very low. School variables have higher level of 
missing rates. Specifically, missing rates of variables of school enrollment, school type, and 
learning environment scores range from 4%-6%, and missing rates of variables of school 
student-body characteristics and progress report grade range from 10%-15%. It may be a concern 
if a variable’s missing rate is higher than 15%; therefore, varies missing value imputation 






multiple imputation, are performed when data are analyzed with statistical models and the results 
are compared for consistency checks. 
TABLE 3.11: Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables (Pooled) 
Variable Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max. Missing rate 
Teacher Characteristics 
   Male 69854 0.26  0.44  0 1 0.03% 
  White 69482 0.61  0.49  0 1 0.56% 
  Black 69482 0.18  0.39  0 1 0.56% 
  Hispanic 69482 0.13  0.34  0 1 0.56% 
  Asian 69482 0.07  0.25  0 1 0.56% 
  American Indian 69482 0.00  0.05  0 1 0.56% 
  Age 69811 31.30  9.43  18 79 0.09% 
  Prior teaching experience 69872 0.65  1.92  0 29.98  0.00% 
  Novice 69872 0.84  0.36  0 1 0.00% 
  Math & science 69840 0.15  0.35  0 1 0.05% 
  ELL 69840 0.05  0.21  0 1 0.05% 
  Special education (teacher) 69840 0.18  0.38  0 1 0.05% 
  Hired on time 69872 0.83  0.37  0 1 0.00% 
School Characteristics 
   Total enrollment 66472 934.09  812.33  1 4538 4.87% 
  Early childhood 65519 0.02  0.12  0 1 6.23% 
  Elementary 65519 0.37  0.48  0 1 6.23% 
  Middle 65519 0.22  0.41  0 1 6.23% 
  High 65519 0.21  0.41  0 1 6.23% 
  Combined 65519 0.13  0.34  0 1 6.23% 
  Transfer 65519 0.01  0.09  0 1 6.23% 
  Special education (school) 65519 0.05  0.22  0 1 6.23% 
  Free lunch % 62679 69.96  20.83  1.6 100 10.29% 
  ELL % 62607 13.52  11.92  0 97.9 10.40% 
  Special education % 62679 13.83  6.07  0 100 10.29% 
  White % 62679 10.44  17.10  0 91.4 10.29% 
  Black % 62679 34.16  27.29  0 100 10.29% 
  Hispanic % 62679 43.84  25.58  0 100 10.29% 
  Asian % 62679 10.37  15.16  0 93.1 10.29% 
  Female % 62644 49.01  6.98  0 100 10.34% 
  Progress report grade 58701 2.89  1.12  0 4 15.99% 
  Safety and respect score 65519 7.20  0.82  4.4 9.7 6.23% 
  Communication score 65519 6.56  0.70  4.1 9 6.23% 
  Engagement score 65519 6.58  0.66  3.8 9.2 6.23% 
  Academic expectation score 65519 7.33  0.60  4.5 9.5 6.23% 
Mentoring 
   Mentoring policy 69872 0.31  0.46  0 1 0.00% 
Teacher Turnover 
   Time to turnover 69872 1358.18  981.20  1 3986 0.00% 
  Turnover status 69872 0.95  0.85  0 2 0.00% 






  Mover 69872 0.28  0.45  0 1 0.00% 
  Leaver 69872 0.34  0.47  0 1 0.00% 
  Censored 69872 0.61  0.49  0 1 0.00% 
 
3.4.2.3 Analysis of NYC Data 
NYC data will be used to address the first and third research questions listed in Section 3.1, 
which are determinants of new teachers’ turnover and local mentoring policy’s effect on new 
teachers’ turnover. Teachers’ time to turnover will be used as the measure of teacher turnover. 
Specifically, survival models, including proportional hazard (PH) models and acceleration 
failure time (AFT) models, are employed to examine what are the determinants of new teachers’ 
time to turnover. The survival model that best fits the data is selected as the baseline model. 
Furthermore, the survival model is combined with difference-in-difference identification strategy 
and its variants to examine the local mentoring policy’s effect on teachers’ time to turnover. 
The corresponding findings will be presented in Chapter 5. 
 
3.4.3 Legal Research of States’ Education Laws 
In addition to the above-mentioned national and NYC datasets, another source of data 
comes from author’s research of all 50 states and District of Columbia’s education legal 
provisions. State legal provisions are accessed through databases such as Westlaw and 
LexisNexis. This legal research attempts to identify which states have a mandatory induction law 
requiring new teachers participate in an induction program, and the dates when such a mandatory 
law become effective. Results of this legal research are presented in Chapter 4. In order to be 
used with SASS/TFS data in analysis, whether a state has a mandatory law in a SASS/TFS cycle 
is coded as a dichotomous variable, with 1 indicating a particular state has implemented a 






a state does not have a mandatory induction law at all or a state had not yet implemented a 
mandatory induction law before the start of a particular SASS/TFS cycle. This legal variable is 
combined with SASS/TFS observations using state and cycle identifiers. As previously 
mentioned in Section 3.4.1.5, this legal variable is incorporated with SASS/TFS data and is used 
to serve as an instrumental variable for induction program participation in the analysis. 
 
3.5 Summary 
In summary, this chapter first asks three key research questions, including determinants of 
first-year new teachers’ turnover, as well as the effects of induction programs and mandatory 
induction laws and/or policy on turnover. A conceptual framework is further illustrated to 
display the interactions of schools, teachers and students under education rules such as laws and 
policies, and provide a research standpoint of the key research questions of this study. 
Afterwards, statistical methods used to answer key research questions are elaborated with models 
and equations. OLS, probit, and survival models are proposed as modeling techniques. 
Particularly, propensity-score matching, instrumental variable, and difference-in-differences are 
employed as strategies to identify the causal effects of induction programs and/or relevant 
mandatory laws or policy. And finally, three sources of data used in this study are described in 
detail, including a national sampling survey dataset (SASS/TFS), a local administrative dataset 
(NYC DOE data), as well as author’s legal research data based on all 50 states and District of 
Columbia’s relevant education provisions. 
The following table gives a summary of the research questions, data sources, major 







 TABLE 3.12: Summary of Research Questions, Data Sources, and Major Analysis 
Research Questions Data Sources Major Analysis Chapters 
1. Determinants of new-
teachers' turnover 
* SASS/TFS data 
 
* NYC administrative data 
* OLS/Probit models, etc.                   
 




Chapter 5  
 
2. Effect of new-teacher 
induction programs on 
teachers' turnover 
* SASS/TFS data 
* Legal research data 
* OLS/Probit models 
* OLS/Probit + Propensity-Score 
Matching 




3. Effect of state induction 
laws/policy on teachers' 
turnover    
  a. Effect of state mandatory 
induction laws on teachers' 
turnover 
* SASS/TFS data 
* Legal research data 
* OLS/Probit + Difference-in-
Differences Chapter 4 
  b. Effect of NYC mentoring 
policy on teachers' turnover * NYC administrative data 
* Survival + Difference-in-
Differences 







CHAPTER 4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS BASED ON SASS/TFS 
 
This chapter presents the results of empirical analysis based on SASS/TFS. In section 4.1, 
descriptive statistics are displayed for first-year new public school teachers to show if there are 
any trends over cohort and whether there are differences between first-year new teachers who 
participated in an induction program and those who did not. Section 4.2 tries to answer what are 
the determinants of first-year new teachers’ turnover. Section 4.3 attempts to evaluate whether 
new teacher induction programs on average have effects on reducing first-year new teachers’ 
turnover using three statistical methods, including OLS models with fixed effects (OLS), 
propensity-score matching (PSM), and instrumental variable with the framework of difference-
in-differences (IV-DID). Based on the IV-DID framework, potential heterogeneous effects of 
induction programs are explored for different sub-groups of first-year new teachers in section 
4.4. And section 4.5 summaries the findings. 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
4.1.1 General trends over cohorts 
FIGURE 4.1 gives a general picture of the trends of new teachers’ participation in induction 
programs and their turnover. The proportion of new teachers who participated in induction 
programs has been increasing continuously since 1990.  However, turnover rates, including 
overall turnover rate, transfer turnover rate and exit turnover rate, fluctuate during this period, 


























FIGURE 4.1: Trends of Induction Participation and Teacher Turnover 
Note: Proportions of mover and leaver indicate levels of transfer turnover and exit turnover, respectively. 
 
FIGURE 4.2 and FIGURE 4.3 show the trends with regards to induction components and 
levels. The proportion of teachers who received each of all six components60 of induction 
services has been increasing, especially for the services such as having a mentor, having 
common planning time with teachers in same subject, seminars or classes for new teachers, and 
having supportive communication with administrators. The average number of induction 
components participated by each new teacher has been increasing from 3 to 4. Around 10% of 
new teachers participate in a basic level of induction services, and the proportion is decreasing 
                                                 
60 Recent three cycles of SASS questionnaires ask whether a teacher received the following kinds of support during 
their first year of teaching in addition to induction program participation: a, reduced teaching schedule or number 
of preparations; b, common planning time with teacher in same subject; c, seminars or classes for beginning 
teachers; d, extra classroom assistance (e.g., teacher aides); e, regular supportive communication with principal 




over time. Over 40% and 30% of new teachers participate in an intermediate and comprehensive 
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FIGURE 4.3: Trends of Levels of Induction Program and Number of Components Participated 
Note: Whether induction services are at basic, intermediate, or comprehensive level is defined according to the 
number and type induction services received by new teachers. A basic package consists of two induction 
components: having a mentor and having supportive communication. An intermediate package includes two more 
induction components: participation in a seminar for beginning teachers and having common planning time. A 
comprehensive package has another two more induction components: having reduced number of preparations or 
schedules and having extra classroom assistance. Definitions of a basic, an intermediate, and a comprehensive level 
of induction services are consistent with the definitions of a “basic induction” package, a “basic induction + 
collaboration” package, and a full “basic induction +collaboration + extra resources” package in Smith and Ingersoll 
(2004). 
 
FIGURE 4.4 and FIGURE 4.5 show the trends of the composition change of first-year new 
teacher population in terms of demographic characteristics. The average age of new teachers, the 
proportion of male new teachers, and the proportion of married new teachers are generally 
constant over cohorts. The proportion of white new teachers has been decreasing, although white 
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FIGURE 4.5: Trends of New Teachers’ Component Change in Race and Ethnicity 
 
The vast majority of new teachers are regular full-time teachers, and most new teachers are 
also union members. FIGURE 6 indicates that the proportion of regular full-time new teachers 























FIGURE 4.6: Trends of Proportion of Regular Full-time New Teachers and Union Members 
 
FIGURE 4.7 shows that the proportion of math and science new teachers was increasing. 
FIGURE 4.8 shows that the proportion of new teachers holding the master’s degree has been 
increasing, and in contrast the proportion of new teachers holding the bachelor’s degrees has 
been decreasing, although new teachers holding bachelor’s degree are still the majority. FIGURE 
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4.9 shows that an increasing proportion of new teachers who enter teaching through alternative 
paths, and that there is a decreasing trend of the proportion of new teachers who hold full state 
certificate. FIGURE 4.10 shows that average teacher’s preparation index decreased slightly, 
while the college selectivity index increased slightly, which may imply a slight decrease of 
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FIGURE 4.9: Trends of Proportion of New Teachers by State Certification Status 
 
FIGURE 4.10: Trends of New Teachers’ College Selectivity Index and Preparation Index 
Notes: A teacher’s preparation index is calculated based on his/her responses to a series of four-point Likert items in 
SASS questionnaires about his/her well-preparedness in the first year in terms of a number instruction activities. The 
calculated preparation index ranges from 0 to 1, with 1 indicating very well prepared. SASS questionnaires ask 
about a teacher’s undergraduate college or university attended, which has a corresponding selectivity index 
according to NCES-Barron’s Admissions Competitiveness Index. This index is an integral number from 1 to 7, 
indicating most competitive, highly competitive, very competitive, competitive, less competitive, noncompetitive, 
and special, respectively. 
 
FIGURE 4.11 shows that although new teachers’ nominal school-related earnings and total 
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FIGURE 4.11: Trends of New Teachers’ Earnings 
Note: Earnings in real term are in 1982 US dollars. 
 
FIGURE 4.12 shows that an increasing proportion of new teachers were hired in suburban 
area, while a decreasing proportion of new teachers were hired in rural area. FIGURE 4.13 
shows that the trends of proportion of new teachers hired in different types of schools are 
generally constant. FIGURE 4.14 shows that average school enrollment increase over time. The 
proportion of new teachers who teach in large schools increased slightly, while the proportion of 
those who teach in small schools decreased slightly. FIGURE 4.15 shows that new teachers face 




























































































FIGURE 4.14: Trends of Schools’ Student Enrollment and School Size 
Note: A large school is defined as the school which has an enrollment more than 1000, while a small school is 
defined as the one which has an enrollment less than 350.61 
                                                 
61 The cutoff points are determined roughly based on the 25% and 75% percentiles of the distribution of 





























FIGURE 4.15: Trends of New Teachers’ Student Body Characteristics 
Notes: Poverty students are defined as those who are approved for free or reduced-price lunches. Minority students 
are defined as those who are not non-Hispanic whites. IEP students are those who have an Individualized Education 
Program because they have disabilities or are special education students. LEP students are those who are of limited-
English proficiency. 
 
4.1.2 Difference by induction program participation status 
TABLE 4.1 shows that new teachers who participated in an induction program differ in 
many aspects from those who did not participate in an induction program. Therefore, although 
the mean statistics also show that new teachers who participated in an induction program are 
significantly less likely to turnover and leave teaching than those who did not participate in an 
induction program, one should not conclude there is a relation without controlling for the 
confounding covariates. 
 
TABLE 4.1: Difference by Induction Program Participation Status 
102 
 
  Induction status Difference 
  no yes   
 Mean SD Mean SD  
Male 0.244 0.482 0.267 0.414 -0.023 *** 
 (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.007)  
Married 0.504 0.569 0.508 0.462 -0.003  
 (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.010)  
White 0.791 0.456 0.801 0.374 -0.009  
 (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.007)  
Black 0.082 0.307 0.082 0.257 -0.001  
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004)  
Hispanic 0.087 0.317 0.091 0.269 -0.003  
 (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.005)  
Other race or ethnicity 0.040 0.220 0.026 0.150 0.014 *** 
 (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.003)  
Age 30.424 9.261 29.34 7.875 1.084 *** 
 (0.104)  (0.100)  (0.140)  
Regular full-time 0.822 0.430 0.896 0.286 -0.074 *** 
 (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.005)  
Union member 0.593 0.554 0.682 0.437 -0.089 *** 
 (0.007)  (0.005)  (0.009)  
Math/Science 0.155 0.406 0.152 0.336 0.003  
 (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.006)  
Special education 0.116 0.359 0.113 0.296 0.003  
 (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.006)  
ESL 0.015 0.135 0.009 0.088 0.006 ** 
 (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002)  
       
No degree 0.017 0.146 0.007 0.076 0.011 *** 
 (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001)  
Associate's degree 0.007 0.091 0.003 0.053 0.003 *** 
 (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001)  
Bachelor's degree 0.809 0.441 0.832 0.350 -0.022 *** 
 (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.006)  
Master's degree 0.147 0.397 0.135 0.320 0.012 ** 
 (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.006)  
Graduate level certificate 0.013 0.126 0.016 0.119 -0.004 * 
 (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002)  
Doctorate degree 0.007 0.095 0.007 0.078 0.000  
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
No state certificate 0.217 0.462 0.181 0.36 0.036 *** 
 (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.006)  
Partial state certificate 0.261 0.493 0.292 0.426 -0.031 *** 
 (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.008)  
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Full state certificate 0.481 0.561 0.480 0.468 0.001  
 (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.007)  
Alternative certification program 0.159 0.412 0.178 0.359 -0.019 *** 
 (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.007)  
Barron's college selectivity index 4.023 1.257 3.930 0.987 0.093 *** 
 (0.018)  (0.014)  (0.021)  
Preparation index 0.605 0.228 0.650 0.183 -0.045 *** 
 (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.005)  
       
Total earnings 30.621 13.254 33.842 10.398 -3.221 *** 
 (0.144)  (0.107)  (0.170)  
School-related earnings 27.922 9.878 31.226 8.387 -3.304 *** 
 (0.125)  (0.095)  (0.146)  
Non-school earnings 2.699 8.286 2.615 5.840 0.084  
 (0.079)  (0.052)  (0.093)  
       
Charter school 0.064 0.275 0.018 0.125 0.046 *** 
 (0.004)  (0.001)  (0.004)  
Urban 0.307 0.518 0.293 0.426 0.014 * 
 (0.007)  (0.005)  (0.007)  
Rural 0.325 0.525 0.228 0.393 0.096 *** 
 (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.006)  
Suburban 0.368 0.541 0.479 0.468 -0.111 *** 
 (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.007)  
Elementary 0.607 0.549 0.638 0.45 -0.031 *** 
 (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.006)  
Secondary 0.324 0.526 0.324 0.438 0.000  
 (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.006)  
Combined 0.068 0.284 0.038 0.180 0.030 *** 
 (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002)  
Enrollment 706.841 632.408 820.101 571.698 -113.26 *** 
 (5.685)  (6.782)  (7.570)  
Small 0.234 0.476 0.164 0.346 0.071 *** 
 (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.006)  
Large 0.192 0.442 0.257 0.409 -0.065 *** 
 (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.006)  
% Poverty enrollment 49.152 32.763 44.949 27.907 4.203 *** 
 (0.804)  (0.511)  (0.861)  
% Minority enrollment 42.411 40.977 42.762 32.667 -0.351  
 (0.508)  (0.387)  (0.572)  
% IEP enrollment 11.506 24.259 11.979 20.310 -0.474  
 (0.375)  (0.258)  (0.456)  
% LEP enrollment 5.445 17.126 6.589 16.781 -1.145 ** 
 (0.351)  (0.301)  (0.476)  
% Minority teachers 19.311 28.733 17.559 21.345 1.753 *** 
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 (0.402)  (0.282)  (0.456)  
Full-time equivalent teachers 48.743 39.169 55.795 34.666 -7.052 *** 
 (0.603)  (0.536)  (0.633)  
Student-teacher ratio 15.105 5.079 15.364 3.942 -0.259 *** 
 (0.074)  (0.052)  (0.097)  
       
Turnover 0.281 0.477 0.233 0.409 0.048 *** 
 (0.009)  (0.006)  (0.010)  
Mover 0.161 0.390 0.152 0.347 0.009  
 (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.008)  
Leaver 0.120 0.345 0.081 0.264 0.039 *** 
  (0.006)   (0.004)   (0.007)   
Notes: Estimates for turnover, mover, and leaver use six cycles of TFS samples, and other estimates use recent five 
cycles of SASS samples. *** significant at p<0.001; ** significant at p<0.05; * significant at p<0.1. Standard errors 
(s.e.) are calculated using survey BRR (balanced repeated replication) replicate weights, and are reported in 
parentheses. 
 
4.2 Determinants of Teacher Turnover 
4.2.1 Preliminary results based on OLS models 
The first key research question of this study is what are the determinants of first-year new 
teachers’ turnover. According to the theoretical models summarized in the literature review, 
individual-related factors, job-related factors, and matching-related factors are three groups of 
determinants of teacher turnover. These three sets of factors can be further broken down to 
teacher demographic characteristics, teacher qualification characteristics, teaching assignment 
and earnings, school demographic and student-body characteristics, and teacher-job match 
characteristics. Specifically, this study examines the following factors: gender, age62, race and 
ethnicity63, regular full-time status, teaching assignment64, earnings, education level65, state 
teaching certificate status66, school level67, school urbanicity location68, school size, minority 
                                                 
62 First-year new teachers are divided into five groups roughly according to quintiles of age distribution. The 
reference group is first-year new teachers whose age is under 23. 
63 Non-Hispanic whites are the reference group. 
64 Math/Science, special education, and English as secondary language teachers are examined in particular. 
65 First-year new teachers who do not have a bachelor’s degree are the reference group. 
66 First-year new teachers who do not have any state teaching certificates are the reference group. 
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enrollment and its interaction with teacher race and ethnicity. First-year new teachers in the 
recent five cycles of TFS sample are used in the analysis, and TFS BRR replicate weights are 
used for standard error calculation. TABLE 4.2 summarizes the results of a series of OLS 
regression models with different sets of variables sequentially added in the models. Specifically, 
the basic model is model (1), which includes no variables other than the variable of induction. 
Models (2) through (7) add into the basic model teacher demographic variables, job assignment 
and earnings variables, teacher qualification variables, school demographic variables, student 
body characteristics, and an ethnical matching variable, respectively. Since teachers in different 
times and different states may have common unobserved characteristics, TABLE 4.3 also 
summarizes the results of OLS models with cycle and/or state fixed effects, where sets of 
dummy variables for each survey cycle and for each state are added, respectively. An F-test is 
performed for the joint statistical significance of each set of variables added in each model. An 
F-test for the joint significance of interaction terms added in model (7) is close to 0.1, models (8) 
to (11) add in cycle and state fixed effects based on model (6) and model (7), respectively. Given 
that estimates of models with and without interaction terms only differ slightly and F-test for 
other sets of covariates and fixed effects added are all statistically significant, model (10) is 
chosen as the baseline model for simplicity. A consistent general pattern with regard to the 
determinants of teacher turnover is shown in results of these models.  
First, some teacher demographic characteristics are determinants (statistically significant 
factors) of first-year new teachers’ turnover. Male first-year new teachers are 2% more likely to 
turn over than their female counterparts, although this estimate becomes no longer statistically 
significant after controlling for school demographic and student-body characteristics. First-year 
                                                                                                                                                             
67 Elementary school is the reference group. 
68 Suburban school is the reference group. 
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new teachers whose entering age ranges from 30 to 40 are 3%-4% less likely to turn over 
compared with their youngest counterparts whose entering age ranges from 20 to 23, and these 
estimates are statistically significant at 5% and higher levels. Models (2) to (6) show that first-
year new teachers who are of Hispanic origin are 8%-10% more likely to turn over than their 
White counterparts, and model (7) indicates that this estimated percentage may be even larger 
after controlling for matching-related factors. These estimates are all statistically significant. 
Second, some teaching assignment and earning characteristics are determinants of first-year 
new teachers’ turnover. For example, regular full-time first-year new teachers are 9%-11% less 
likely to turn over, first-year new teachers whose teaching assignment is special education are 
about 7% more likely to turn over, first-year new teachers whose teaching assignment is ESL are 
about 9%-12% less likely to turn over, a $1,000 increase in first-year new teachers’ school-
related annual earnings is associated with a 1% decrease in their likelihood of turnover, and a 
$1,000 increase in first-year new teachers’ non-school earnings is associated with a 0.5% 
increase in their likelihood of turnover. All of these estimates are statistically significant. First-
year new teachers whose teaching assignment is math and science do not significantly differ 
from other teachers in terms of their turnover. 
In addition to the above-mentioned two sets of factors, some teacher qualification 
characteristics are also associated with first-year new teachers’ turnover. For example, first-year 
new teachers who have Master’s degrees and above are over 9%-10% more likely to turn over 
than their counterparts. This may imply that teachers who have higher degrees will have higher 
opportunity costs to stay in the original teaching job. First-year new teachers who have partial 
and full state teaching certificates are 5% and 3% less likely to turn over than their counterparts 
who have no state certificates, respectively. These estimates are statistically significant. It may 
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be due to the fact that teachers who have state certificates have more job- or teaching-specific 
human capital invested through the process of getting state certificates. 
Moreover, school demographic characteristics and student-body characteristics are also two 
sets of determinants of first-year new teachers’ turnover. First-year new teachers teaching in 
urban schools are 3%-4% more likely to turn over than their counterparts teaching in suburban 
schools. Although some models show that first-year new teachers teaching in rural schools are 
3% less likely to turn over, but after controlling for cycle and state fixed effects, the size shrinks 
to near 0 and it becomes statistically insignificant. First-year new teachers teaching in small 
schools, where the enrollment is less than 350, are 5%-6% more likely to turn over. A 10% 
increase in percentage of minority student enrolment is associated with a 0.6% increase in first-
year new teachers’ turnover. 
Finally, job-teacher matching-related factors are also determinants of first-year new 
teachers’ turnover. Specifically, variables of ethnical match between teachers and their student-
body characteristics, measured by interactions terms between race and ethnicity dummy 
variables and % minority enrolment, are added into models (7), (9), and (11). These models 
show that first-year new teachers response differently to a 10% increase in percentage of 
minority student enrolment. Hispanic first-year new teachers are 1% less likely to turnover 
facing such an increase in percentage of minority student enrolment, while minority first-year 
new teachers who are not black or Hispanic are 1% more likely to turnover. These estimates are 
statistically significant at 10%. 
F-tests give statistically significant results for the joint statistical significance of each set of 
variables added in models, except for that of ethnic match variables, the F-statistic of which is 
slightly above 10%. Since estimates except for race and ethnicity dummy variables do not 
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change much before and after adding in ethnic match variables, model (10) is used as the 






TABLE 4.2: OLS Models with Added Sets of Explanatory Variables 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   
Induction -0.048 *** -0.050 *** -0.035 *** -0.036 *** -0.035 *** -0.036 *** -0.036 *** 
  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)  
Male   0.015  0.026 ** 0.026 ** 0.023 * 0.022 * 0.022  
    (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  
23<Age<=26   0.002  -0.013  -0.019  -0.014  -0.015  -0.014  
    (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015)  
26<Age<=30   0.004  -0.002  -0.010  -0.012  -0.014  -0.013  
    (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018)  
30<Age<=40   -0.014  -0.030 ** -0.038 *** -0.038 *** -0.040 *** -0.039 *** 
    (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)  
Age>40   0.043 ** 0.024  0.012  0.017  0.015  0.015  
    (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.021)  (0.020)  (0.021)  
Black   0.004  0.019  0.005  -0.004  -0.014  -0.031  
    (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.037)  
Hispanic   0.085 *** 0.097 *** 0.097 *** 0.089 *** 0.077 *** 0.189 *** 
    (0.026)  (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.026)  (0.059)  
Other race or ethnicity   -0.033  -0.027  -0.029  -0.029 ** -0.055 ** -0.106 *** 
    (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.026)  (0.024)  (0.025)  (0.030)  
Regular full-time     -0.108 *** -0.098 *** -0.091 *** -0.093 *** -0.094 *** 
      (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018)  
Math/Science     -0.006  -0.008  -0.007  -0.007  -0.008  
      (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  
Special education     0.080 *** 0.076 *** 0.080 *** 0.081 *** 0.082 *** 
      (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018)  
ESL     -0.062  -0.067 * -0.067 * -0.068 * -0.071 * 
      (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.037)  
School-related earnings     -0.008 *** -0.010 *** -0.010 *** -0.010 *** -0.010 *** 
      (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  






      (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  
Bachelor's degree       0.044  0.022  0.025  0.025  
        (0.044)  (0.046)  (0.048)  (0.048)  
Master's degree and above       0.107 ** 0.085 * 0.088 * 0.088 * 
        (0.045)  (0.046)  (0.048)  (0.049)  
Partial state certification       -0.058 *** -0.052 *** -0.050 ** -0.053 *** 
        (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017)  
Full state certification       -0.042 *** -0.037 *** -0.035 ** -0.037 *** 
        (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)  
Secondary         -0.010  -0.008  -0.009  
          (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012)  
Combined         -0.019  -0.022  -0.022  
          (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.021)  
Urban         0.041 *** 0.031 ** 0.032 ** 
          (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)  
Rural         -0.033 *** -0.029 ** -0.027 ** 
          (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)  
Small         0.053 *** 0.054 *** 0.052 *** 
          (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  
% Minority enrollment           0.000 ** 0.000 ** 
            (0.000)  (0.000)  
Black*%Minority enrollment             0.000  
              (0.001)  
Hispanic*%Minority enrollment             -0.001 * 
              (0.001)  
Other race or ethnicity*%Minority enrollment             0.001 * 
              (0.001)  
Cycle fixed effects no  no  no  no  no  no  no  
State fixed effects no  no  no  no  no  no  no  
constant 0.281 *** 0.268 *** 0.483 *** 0.490 *** 0.500 *** 0.493 *** 0.492 *** 
  (0.009)  (0.015)  (0.024)  (0.051)  (0.054)  (0.056)  (0.056)  






R2 0.003  0.007  0.030  0.034  0.040  0.040  0.041  
F-statistic -  2.780  27.390  8.050  7.700  4.590  2.080  
Prob>F -   0.006   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.033   0.103   
Notes: Recent five cycles of TFS samples are used for analysis. *** significant at p<0.001; ** significant at p<0.05; * significant at p<0.1. Standard errors (s.e.) 
are calculated using survey BRR (balanced repeated replication) replicate weights, and are reported in parentheses. F-tests results are for added set of explanatory 
variables which do not appear in previous model. 
 
TABLE 4.3: OLS Models with Cycle and State Fixed Effects 
  (8)   (9)   (10)   (11)   
Induction -0.042 *** -0.043 *** -0.042 *** -0.043 *** 
  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012)  
Male 0.024 * 0.024 * 0.015  0.015  
  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  
23<Age<=26 -0.001  0.000  -0.002  -0.001  
  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.015)  (0.015)  
26<Age<=30 0.000  0.001  -0.004  -0.003  
  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.019)  
30<Age<=40 -0.021  -0.020  -0.032 ** -0.031 ** 
  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015)  
Age>40 0.029  0.028  0.017  0.017  
  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.020)  (0.020)  
Black -0.008  -0.003  -0.027  -0.042  
  (0.018)  (0.037)  (0.019)  (0.039)  
Hispanic 0.081 *** 0.194 *** 0.080 *** 0.194 *** 
  (0.025)  (0.058)  (0.025)  (0.052)  
Other race or ethnicity -0.059 ** -0.116 *** -0.055 ** -0.112 *** 
  (0.026)  (0.032)  (0.027)  (0.033)  
Regular full-time -0.093 *** -0.095 *** -0.114 *** -0.116 *** 
  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.019)  (0.019)  
Math/Science -0.011  -0.011  -0.005  -0.006  






Special education 0.079 *** 0.081 *** 0.074 *** 0.075 *** 
  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018)  
ESL -0.062 * -0.065 * -0.043  -0.046  
  (0.037)  (0.037)  (0.038)  (0.038)  
School-related earnings -0.011 *** -0.011 *** -0.010 *** -0.010 *** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  
Non-school earnings 0.005 *** 0.004 *** 0.004 *** 0.004 *** 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
Bachelor's degree 0.036  0.036  0.035  0.037  
  (0.050)  (0.050)  (0.048)  (0.049)  
Master's degree and above 0.098 ** 0.098 ** 0.101 ** 0.103 ** 
  (0.051)  (0.051)  (0.048)  (0.049)  
Partial state certification -0.042 *** -0.045 *** -0.052 *** -0.055 *** 
  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.016)  
Full state certification -0.025 ** -0.028 ** -0.028 ** -0.030 ** 
  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)  
Secondary -0.005  -0.006  0.000  -0.001  
  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012)  
Combined -0.029  -0.030  -0.039  -0.039  
  (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.023)  (0.023)  
Urban 0.037 ** 0.038 ** 0.037 ** 0.037 ** 
  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015)  
Rural -0.009  -0.007  0.002  0.004  
  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012)  
Small 0.049 *** 0.047 *** 0.062 *** 0.059 *** 
  (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.014)  
% Minority enrollment 0.000 * 0.000 * 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Black*%Minority enrollment   0.000    0.000  
    (0.001)    (0.001)  
Hispanic*%Minority enrollment   -0.001 *   -0.001 * 






Other race or ethnicity*%Minority enrollment   0.001 *   0.001 * 
    (0.001)    (0.001)  
Cycle fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  
State fixed effects no  no  yes  yes  
Constant 0.435 *** 0.434  0.275 *** 0.269  
  (0.056)  (0.057)  (0.102)  (0.102)  
No. of obs. 3810   3810   3810   3810   
R2 0.045  0.046  0.068  0.069  
F-statistic 11.340  -  7.150  -  
Prob>F 0.000   -   0.000   -   
Notes: Recent five cycles of TFS samples are used for analysis. *** significant at p<0.001; ** significant at p<0.05; * significant at p<0.1. Standard errors (s.e.) 
are calculated using survey BRR (balanced repeated replication) replicate weights, and are reported in parentheses. Estimates of %Minority enrollment in models 





Generally, findings of most determinants of teacher turnover are consistent with those in 
previous literature. For example, teachers who have higher school-related earnings, and who 
have state teaching certificates are less likely to turnover; teachers that have higher non-school 
earnings, have a master’s degree and above, who work in urban schools and/or small schools, 
and who face a higher percentage of minority students are more likely to turnover. For race and 
ethnicity characteristics, the findings are a little different from those in previous literature. 
Previous literature found that minority teachers are generally less likely to turnover, while my 
findings show that Hispanic teachers are exceptions. For male teachers, my findings do not show 
that they are less likely to turnover, and for teachers who work in secondary schools, my findings 






4.2.2 Consistency checks for OLS models 
Several checks are performed for OLS models with regard to statistical weights, age 
outliers, and definitions of induction program. 
TABLE 4.3 shows the results of OLS models with and without statistical weights. Model 
(10) is the baseline model, which uses both TFS final weight and TFS replicate weights. Model 
(11) does not use any statistical weights. Model (12) uses TFS final weight only. When 
comparing model (11) and model (10), it is shown that both the magnitudes of coefficient 
estimates and their statistical significance differ substantially. This indicates that one cannot 
make inferences for the population based on the model using no statistical weights in this study, 
since this model represents only the sample. When comparing model (12) and model (10), it is 
demonstrated that their magnitudes of coefficient estimates are almost the same, and the only 
difference lies in the statistical significance of estimates. This is because model (12) does not use 
replicate weights in standard error calculation, and can only give less precise estimates than what 
model (10), which uses replicate weights, can give. However, when statistical software does not 
support the complex survey estimation, which uses final weight and replicate weights, models 
using only final weight can be performed instead to give valid point estimates. 
Since principal-reported turnover is a variable constructed for teachers in SASS sample, 
which is the sampling frame for TFS survey and includes all teachers in TFS sample and teachers 
not sampled in TFS survey, Model (13) in TABLE 4.4 uses principal-reported turnover as the 
outcome variable in order to have a larger sample size. Model (13) is based on 1999-2001, 2003-
2005, and 2007-2009 SASS samples69, and uses SASS final weight and SASS replicate weights. 
Since principal-reported job status is not always consistent with teachers’ self-reported job 
                                                 






status70, some estimates in model (13) differ from those in model (10) in terms of their 
magnitude and statistical significance. Therefore, I will base my study on the TFS sample with 
teacher self-reported turnover variables and will not use the SASS sample with principal-
reported turnover variables for analysis. 
 
TABLE 4.4: Comparison of OLS Models using Different Samples and Statistical Weights 
  (10)   (11)   (12)   (13)   
Induction -0.042 *** -0.018  -0.042  -0.048 *** 
  (0.012)  (0.017)  (0.025)  (0.012)  
Male 0.015  0.002  0.015  0.026 ** 
  (0.013)  (0.017)  (0.028)  (0.013)  
23<Age<=26 -0.002  -0.001  -0.002  -0.014  
  (0.015)  (0.022)  (0.031)  (0.015)  
26<Age<=30 -0.004  -0.041  -0.004  0.002  
  (0.018)  (0.026)  (0.038)  (0.020)  
30<Age<=40 -0.032 ** -0.076 *** -0.032  -0.065 *** 
  (0.015)  (0.025)  (0.034)  (0.017)  
Age>40 0.017  -0.054 * 0.017  0.014  
  (0.020)  (0.027)  (0.043)  (0.022)  
Black -0.027  -0.001  -0.027  0.003  
  (0.019)  (0.033)  (0.044)  (0.022)  
Hispanic 0.080 *** 0.018  0.080  0.017  
  (0.025)  (0.034)  (0.054)  (0.026)  
Other race or ethnicity -0.055 ** 0.038  -0.055  0.004  
  (0.027)  (0.035)  (0.049)  (0.029)  
Regular full-time -0.114 *** -0.073 *** -0.114 *** -0.190 *** 
  (0.019)  (0.023)  (0.036)  (0.021)  
Math/Science -0.005  0.020  -0.005  0.012  
  (0.013)  (0.020)  (0.027)  (0.013)  
Special education 0.074 *** -0.003  0.074 * 0.105 *** 
  (0.018)  (0.025)  (0.038)  (0.019)  
ESL -0.043 * -0.026  -0.043  0.174 *** 
  (0.038)  (0.073)  (0.091)  (0.075)  
School-related earnings -0.010 *** -0.009 *** -0.010 *** -0.008 *** 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002)  
Non-school earnings 0.004 *** 0.004 ** 0.004  0.005 *** 
  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.001)  
                                                 





Bachelor's degree 0.035  -0.052  0.035  0.011  
  (0.048)  (0.050)  (0.098)  (0.026)  
Master's degree and above 0.101 ** 0.005  0.101  0.062 ** 
  (0.048)  (0.053)  (0.101)  (0.027)  
Partial state certification -0.052 *** -0.026  -0.052  0.019  
  (0.017)  (0.022)  (0.034)  (0.017)  
Full state certification -0.028 ** -0.032  -0.028  0.016  
  (0.014)  (0.021)  (0.032)  (0.014)  
Secondary 0.000  0.059 *** 0.000  -0.016  
  (0.012)  (0.018)  (0.023)  (0.010)  
Combined -0.039  0.098 *** -0.039  -0.012  
  (0.023)  (0.026)  (0.046)  (0.019)  
Urban 0.037 ** 0.016  0.037  0.028 * 
  (0.015)  (0.021)  (0.030)  (0.017)  
Rural 0.002  0.001  0.002  -0.009  
  (0.012)  (0.020)  (0.027)  (0.012)  
Small 0.062 *** 0.052 *** 0.062 ** 0.063 *** 
  (0.014)  (0.019)  (0.030)  (0.014)  
% Minority enrollment 0.001 *** 0.001 * 0.001  0.001 *** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Cycle fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  
State fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  
constant 0.275 *** 0.879 *** 0.275  0.500 *** 
  (0.102)  (0.101)  (0.174)  (0.061)  
No. of obs. 3810   3810   3810   6630   
R2 0.068   0.177   0.068   0.065   
Notes: Models (10), (11), and (12) are based on recent five cycles of TFS samples and model (13) is based on recent 
three cycles of SASS samples. Standard errors (s.e.) are reported in parentheses. Standard errors of models (10) and 
model (13) are calculated using survey final weight and replicate weights, standard errors of model (12) are 
calculated using no statistical weights, and standard errors of model (11) are calculated using only final weight.  *** 
significant at p<0.001; ** significant at p<0.05; * significant at p<0.1.  
 
According to the descriptive statistics in the first part of this chapter, some first-year new 
teachers may be considered as outliers, because of their entering age. Although values for the 
entering age reported by teachers are legitimate values, this study examines whether dropping 
outliers will change the estimates. In the baseline model (model (10)), first-year new teachers are 
divided into five groups according to quintiles of their entering age, dummy variables indicating 
age groups are used in the regression in order to reduce the influence of extreme values of 





continuous variable. Similarly to the baseline model, model (14) uses the full sample. First-year 
teachers whose entering age is above 60 and above 45 are considered as outliers and are 
excluded in model (15) and model (16), respectively. Results show that estimates in models (14) 
through (16) are very consistent with estimates in the baseline model, which implies that age 
outliers hardly influence the estimates. 
Baseline model uses CPI-adjusted earning variables. Model (17) in TABLE 4.5 also tests 
the consistency of using logarithm transformation of these earning variables. It is shown that 
whether or not using logarithm transformation hardly changes the estimates. 
 
TABLE 4.5: OLS Models w/ and w/o Age Outliers and w/ Log Transformation of Earnings 
  (10)   (14)   (15)   (16)   (17)   
Induction -0.042 *** -0.041 *** -0.042 *** -0.048 *** -0.041 *** 
  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012)  
Male 0.014  0.016  0.016  0.014  0.013  
  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.013)  
23<Age<=26 -0.002  
0.000  0.000  -0.002 
 
0.000  
  (0.015)  (0.016)  
26<Age<=30 -0.004  -0.004  
  (0.018)  (0.018)  
30<Age<=40 -0.031 ** (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
 
-0.030 * 
  (0.015)  (0.015)  
Age>40 0.018  0.019  
  (0.020)  (0.020)  
Black -0.027  -0.032 * -0.031 * -0.027  -0.029  
  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.020)  (0.019)  
Hispanic 0.082 *** 0.078 *** 0.078 *** 0.095 *** 0.081 *** 
  (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.026)  (0.025)  
Other race or ethnicity -0.055 ** -0.055 ** -0.055 ** -0.034  -0.054 ** 
  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.027)  
Regular full-time -0.115 *** -0.114 *** -0.113 *** -0.123 *** -0.109 *** 
  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.020)  
Math/Science -0.016  -0.005  -0.006  -0.014  -0.004  
  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.013)  
Special education 0.065 *** 0.073 *** 0.073 *** 0.096 *** 0.073 *** 





ESL -0.091  -0.050  -0.054  -0.008  -0.045  
  (0.036)  (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.043)  (0.038)  
School-related earnings -0.010 *** -0.010 *** -0.010 *** -0.010 *** -0.140 *** 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.024)  
Non-school earnings 0.004 *** 0.004 *** 0.005 *** 0.004 *** 0.018 ** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.007)  
Bachelor's degree 0.038  0.028  0.028  0.009  0.036  
  (0.049)  (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.056)  (0.049)  
Master's degree and above 0.105 ** 0.092 ** 0.091 ** 0.072  0.097 ** 
  (0.049)  (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.056)  (0.049)  
Partial state certification -0.051 *** -0.053 *** -0.053 *** -0.050 *** -0.052 *** 
  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017)  
Full state certification -0.028 ** -0.028 ** -0.028 ** -0.029  -0.030 ** 
  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.014)  
Secondary 0.001  -0.002  -0.002  0.000  -0.002  
  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012)  
Combined -0.038  -0.041 * -0.040  -0.025  -0.038  
  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.024)  (0.025)  (0.023)  
Urban 0.036 ** 0.038 ** 0.038 ** 0.036 ** 0.039 *** 
  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015)  
Rural 0.002  0.002  0.000  0.001  0.005  
  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012)  
Small 0.062 *** 0.061 *** 0.060 *** 0.074 *** 0.062 *** 
  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.014)  
% Minority enrollment 0.001 *** 0.001 ** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Cycle fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
State fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
constant 0.273 *** 0.257 ** 0.262 ** 0.308 *** 0.485 *** 
  (0.102)  (0.105)  (0.105)  (0.112)  (0.117)  
No. of obs. 3810   3810   3790   3460   3810   
R2 0.068   0.067   0.067   0.073   0.066   
Notes: Recent five cycles of TFS samples are used for analysis.  Models (15) and  (16) exclude first-year new 
teachers whose age is above 60 and 45, respectively. Standard errors (s.e.) are reported in parentheses, and are 
calculated using survey final weight and replicate weights.  *** significant at p<0.001; ** significant at p<0.05; * 
significant at p<0.1.  
 
Given that SASS questionnaires of earlier cycles and more recent cycles frame questions 
regarding new-teacher induction program in a slightly different way71, TABLE 4.6 shows the 
                                                 
71 SASS questionnaires of earlier cycles (1990-1992 and 1993-1995) asked teachers “During your first year of 
teaching, did you participate in a formal teacher induction program, i.e., a program to help beginning teachers by 





results of OLS models employing multiple definitions of the induction program. Model (18) 
replaces values of the induction program variable in the recent three cycles by using the values of 
the variable of having a mentor, and model (19) replaces the values of the induction program 
variable in the recent three cycles by using the values of a new variable indicating a teacher 
participated in an induction program and had a mentor, and model (20) replaces the values of 
induction program variable in the recent three cycles by using the values of a second new 
variable indicating a teacher  either participated in an induction program or had a mentor. Results 
show that the estimates in models using different definitions are largely the same except for 
some difference in the magnitude of estimates of coefficients of the induction variable. Estimates 
of induction variable in models using two relatively narrower definitions of induction program 
are slightly smaller than those in models using relatively broader definitions of induction 
program.72 
 
TABLE 4.6: Consistency Checks for Definitions of Induction Programs 
OLS models: Different definitions of induction program 
  (10)   (18)   (19)   (20)   
Induction -0.042 *** -0.026 ** -0.030 *** -0.047 *** 
  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.011)  (0.014)  
Male 0.015  0.014  0.015  0.013  
  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  
23<Age<=26 -0.002  -0.001  -0.001  0.000  
  (0.015)  (0.016)  (0.015)  (0.016)  
26<Age<=30 -0.004  0.000  -0.002  -0.002  
  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018)  
30<Age<=40 -0.032 ** -0.029 * -0.030 * -0.030 * 
  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015)  
Age>40 0.017  0.020  0.018  0.020  
  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.020)  
Black -0.027  -0.027  -0.027  -0.026  
                                                                                                                                                             
and 2007-2009) asked teachers “In your FIRST year of teaching, did you participate in a teacher induction 
program?” 
72 Although having a mentor is an important component of an induction program, an induction program usually 





  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.019)  
Hispanic 0.080 *** 0.079 *** 0.079 *** 0.080 *** 
  (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.025)  
Other race or ethnicity -0.055 ** -0.052 * -0.054 ** -0.052 * 
  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.027)  
Regular full-time -0.114 *** -0.116 *** -0.115 *** -0.114 *** 
  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.019)  
Math/Science -0.005  -0.006  -0.006  -0.006  
  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  
Special education 0.074 *** 0.073 *** 0.074 *** 0.073 *** 
  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018)  
ESL -0.043  -0.044  -0.043  -0.044  
  (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.038)  
School-related earnings -0.010 *** -0.010 *** -0.010 *** -0.010 *** 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  
Non-school earnings 0.004 *** 0.004 *** 0.004 *** 0.004 *** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
Bachelor's degree 0.035  0.034  0.035  0.037  
  (0.048)  (0.049)  (0.048)  (0.049)  
Master's degree and above 0.101 ** 0.099 ** 0.101 ** 0.103 ** 
  (0.048)  (0.049)  (0.049)  (0.049)  
Partial state certification -0.052 *** -0.049 *** -0.049 *** -0.052 *** 
  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017)  
Full state certification -0.028 ** -0.027 * -0.027 * -0.028 ** 
  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)  
Secondary 0.000  0.000  0.001  0.000  
  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012)  
Combined -0.039  -0.035  -0.036  -0.040 * 
  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.023)  
Urban 0.037 ** 0.039 ** 0.037 ** 0.039 ** 
  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015)  
Rural 0.002  0.005  0.003  0.003  
  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012)  
Small 0.062 *** 0.063 *** 0.063 *** 0.063 *** 
  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)  
% Minority enrollment 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Cycle fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  
State fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  
constant 0.275 *** 0.268 *** 0.272 *** 0.266 ** 
  (0.102)  (0.102)  (0.101)  (0.104)  
No. of obs. 3810   3810   3810   3810   
R2 0.068   0.066   0.067   0.067   
Notes: Recent five cycles of TFS samples are used for analysis. Standard errors (s.e.) are reported in parentheses, 
and are calculated using survey final weight and replicate weights.  *** significant at p<0.001; ** significant at 







4.2.3 Results based on models with limited-dependent variables 
Since the outcome variables are discrete variables, which may violate some assumptions of 
linear regression, a comparison between estimates using OLS regression and those using non-
linear models is shown in TABLE 4.9. The most recent five cycles (1990-1992, 1993-1995, 
1999-2001, 2003-2005, and 2007-2009) of TFS samples are used for analysis. Probit and logit 
models are also reported. Marginal effects at mean values of explanatory variables are reported 
for Probit and logit models, in order to compare with the coefficients in the baseline OLS model 
(and hereinafter). It is shown that estimates in OLS models are rarely different from those in 
Probit and logit models, which legitimates the usage of OLS models for inference in the present 
study, regardless of the discrete dependent variables. 
 
TABLE 4.7: Comparison Between OLS, Probit and Logit Models 
  OLS   Probit   Logit   
Induction -0.042 *** -0.041 *** -0.041 *** 
  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012)  
Male 0.015  0.014  0.015  
  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.014)  
23<Age<=26 -0.002  -0.003  -0.003  
  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.016)  
26<Age<=30 -0.004  -0.010  -0.007  
  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018)  
30<Age<=40 -0.032 ** -0.034 ** -0.032 ** 
  (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.015)  
Age>40 0.017  0.013  0.013  
  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.020)  
Black -0.027  -0.029  -0.030 * 
  (0.019)  (0.018)  (0.018)  
Hispanic 0.080 *** 0.080 *** 0.082 *** 
  (0.025)  (0.026)  (0.026)  
Other race or ethnicity -0.055 ** -0.056 ** -0.057 ** 
  (0.027)  (0.026)  (0.026)  
Regular full-time -0.114 *** -0.113 *** -0.111 *** 
  (0.019)  (0.020)  (0.021)  
Math/Science -0.005  -0.006  -0.006  
  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.014)  





  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018)  
ESL -0.043  -0.031  -0.042  
  (0.038)  (0.040)  (0.038)  
School-related earnings -0.010 *** -0.010 *** -0.011 *** 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  
Non-school earnings 0.004 *** 0.004 *** 0.004 *** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
Bachelor's degree 0.035  0.037  0.036  
  (0.048)  (0.043)  (0.042)  
Master's degree and above 0.101 ** 0.113 ** 0.115 ** 
  (0.048)  (0.053)  (0.055)  
Partial state certification -0.052 *** -0.053 *** -0.050 *** 
  (0.017)  (0.015)  (0.015)  
Full state certification -0.028 ** -0.027 ** -0.026 * 
  (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.013)  
Secondary 0.000  0.001  -0.001  
  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012)  
Combined -0.039  -0.035 * -0.039 * 
  (0.023)  (0.021)  (0.021)  
Urban 0.037 ** 0.039 ** 0.037 ** 
  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015)  
Rural 0.002  0.003  0.002  
  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012)  
Small 0.062 *** 0.062 *** 0.062 *** 
  (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.015)  
% Minority enrollment 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Cycle fixed effects yes  yes  yes  
State fixed effects yes  yes  yes  
No. of obs. 3810   3810   3810   
(Pseudo) R2 0.068     0.137   0.138    
Notes: Recent five cycles of TFS samples are used for analysis. Standard errors (s.e.) are reported in parentheses, 
and are calculated using survey final weight and replicate weights.  *** significant at p<0.001; ** significant at 
p<0.05; * significant at p<0.1. Pseudo R2 for Probit and logit models cannot be calculated for survey data, and the 
ones reported are calculated based on corresponding models using no survey replicate weights. In order to be 
comparable, R2 for the OLS model that uses no survey replicate weights is also calculated and it is 0.160. 
 
 
4.2.4 Transfer turnover versus exit turnover 
Teacher turnover can be further distinguished into transfer turnover and exit turnover, and 
those teachers are considered as movers and leavers, respectively. OLS, Probit, and logit models 
are performed for movers and leavers, respectively. Specifically, OLS, Probit and logit models 





addition, a multinomial logit model is performed using the full sample, including stayers, 
movers, and leavers. TABLE 4.8 shows the results. Marginal effects of non-linear models at 
means are reported in order to be comparable to the estimates of OLS coefficients. 
There are some factors that are common determinants of both movers and leavers. First, 
Hispanic first-year new teachers are more likely to be both movers and leavers. Second, regular 
full-time first-year new teachers are less likely to be both movers and leavers. Third, an increase 
in a first-year new teacher’s school-related earnings is associated with a lower likelihood of a 
teacher’s being both a mover and a leaver, while an increase in a first-year new teacher’s non-
school earnings is associated with a higher likelihood of a teacher’s being both a mover and a 
leaver. And last, participation in an induction program reduces a first-year new teacher’s 
probability of both being a mover and being a leaver, but the magnitude of the estimates for 
being a mover is smaller than that for being a leaver and the statistical significance of the former 
is only at 10%. 
TABLE 4.8 also shows that determinants of whether first-year new teachers are movers 
may be different from determinants of whether first-year new teachers are leavers. First, male, 
first-year, new teachers are more likely to be leavers than female counterparts. Second, first-year 
new teachers who are older are more likely to be leavers and less likely to be movers than their 
youngest counterparts. Third, black first-year new teachers are less likely to be leavers then 
white counterparts. Fourth, math and science first-year new teachers are less likely to be movers 
and special education first-year new teachers are more likely to be movers, and both of them are 
not more or less likely to be leavers. Fifth, first-year new teachers who hold bachelor’s degree 
are more likely to be movers than those who hold a lower or no degree. Sixth, first-year new 





counterparts who hold no state certification, but they are not more or less likely to be movers. 
Seventh, first-year new teachers who work in a combined school are less likely to be movers, but 
they are not significantly more likely to be leavers. And last, first-year new teachers who work in 
an urban school are more likely to be movers, but are not more or less likely to be leavers. 
Given that a teacher may face the turnover choice that is not only binary, e.g., whether to 
stay in the same school, to switch schools, or to leave teaching, a multinomial logit model is tried 
to accommodate this situation. The estimates based on the multinomial logit model are slightly 
different in terms of the magnitude from those based on OLS, probit and logit models. Hausman 
tests for IIA (Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives) assumption of mulinomial logit model are 
performed. However, the results suggest chi2 for omission of stayer (750.956) is statistically 
significant, suggesting IIA assumption is violated and multinomial logit model is not appropriate 
to use. 
Compared with previous literature, my findings in terms of determinants of transfer 
turnover and exit turnover are generally consistent with previous literature, except for the exit 
turnover of male teachers. My findings show that male teachers are more likely to experience 
exit turnover, which is what people conventionally expect, while most previous literature show 
that male teachers are less likely to experience exit turnover. 
 
4.2.5 Summary 
Section 4.2 tries to answer the first key research question of this study: what are the 
determinants of first-year new teachers’ turnover. Preliminary results based on OLS models 
suggest that teacher demographic characteristics, teacher qualification characteristics, teaching 





match characteristics are determinants of turnover, and if transfer turnover and exit turnover are 
examined separately, the determinants may differ. A set of consistency checks is performed, 
including comparisons of OLS models (1) using different samples and statistical weights, (2) 
using samples with and without age outliers, (3) using log transformation of earnings, and (4) 
using different definitions of induction programs. Given that outcome variables of interest are 
limited dependent variables, this section also perform Probit, logit, and multinomial logit models, 








TABLE 4.8: Transfer Turnover vs. Exit Turnover 
 Transfer turnover Exit turnover 
  OLS   Probit   Logit   Multinomial logit OLS   Probit   Logit   Multinomial logit 
Induction -0.021 ** -0.018 * -0.020 * -0.012  -0.038 *** -0.031 *** -0.027 *** -0.023 *** 
  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.007)  
Male -0.010  -0.010  -0.009  -0.009  0.032 *** 0.024 ** 0.023 ** 0.019 ** 
  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.008)  
23<Age<=26 -0.030 ** -0.029 ** -0.028 ** -0.032 *** 0.036 *** 0.044 *** 0.040 *** 0.034 *** 
  (0.014)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.010)  
26<Age<=30 -0.048 *** -0.047 *** -0.045 *** -0.050 *** 0.057 *** 0.061 *** 0.064 *** 0.055 *** 
  (0.017)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.012)  (0.014)  (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.015)  
30<Age<=40 -0.045 *** -0.044 *** -0.042 *** -0.043 *** 0.011  0.017  0.020  0.019 * 
  (0.014)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.011)  
Age>40 -0.034 * -0.044 ** -0.033 ** -0.037 *** 0.068 *** 0.066 *** 0.062 *** 0.055 *** 
  (0.018)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.013)  (0.016)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.015)  
Black 0.006  0.004  0.006  0.015  -0.047 *** -0.038 *** -0.038 *** -0.030 *** 
  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.015)  (0.016)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.008)  
Hispanic 0.067 *** 0.060 ** 0.065 *** 0.062 *** 0.043 ** 0.044 ** 0.042 ** 0.020  
  (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.024)  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.014)  
Other race or 
ethnicity -0.024  -0.027  -0.024  -0.016  -0.048 *** -0.036 *** -0.037 *** -0.032 *** 
  (0.023)  (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.021)  (0.017)  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.008)  
Regular full-time -0.102 *** -0.099 *** -0.096 *** -0.083 *** -0.055 *** -0.046 *** -0.041 *** -0.023 ** 
  (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.019)  (0.016)  (0.015)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.009)  
Math/Science -0.020 * -0.021 * -0.023 ** -0.025 ** 0.019 * 0.013  0.015  0.012  
  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.008)  
Special education 0.076 *** 0.078 *** 0.078 *** 0.064 *** 0.018  0.018  0.020  0.012  
  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.010)  
ESL -0.020  -0.004  -0.011  -0.015  -0.050 ** -0.043 ** -0.036 ** -0.021  
  (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.034)  (0.031)  (0.024)  (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.019)  
School-related 
earnings -0.005 *** -0.005 *** -0.005 *** -0.004 *** -0.010 *** -0.008 *** -0.008 *** -0.006 *** 






Non-school earnings 0.003  0.002 * 0.002 * 0.002 * 0.004 *** 0.002 *** 0.002 *** 0.001 *** 
  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
Bachelor's degree 0.043  0.063 * 0.055 * 0.060 *** 0.003  0.005  0.005  0.001  
  (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.029)  (0.023)  (0.049)  (0.029)  (0.025)  (0.020)  
Master's degree and 
above 0.063 ** 0.101 ** 0.092 * 0.096 ** 0.075  0.080 ** 0.079 ** 0.049 * 
  (0.030)  (0.044)  (0.048)  (0.041)  (0.048)  (0.042)  (0.042)  (0.029)  
Partial state 
certification -0.010  -0.014  -0.010  -0.010  -0.057 *** -0.041 *** -0.035 *** -0.028 *** 
  (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.007)  
Full state 
certification 0.018  0.016  0.018  0.020 * -0.060 *** -0.047 *** -0.041 *** -0.036 *** 
  (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.013)  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.007)  
Secondary -0.009  -0.009  -0.010  -0.009  0.008  0.010  0.006  0.008  
  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.006)  
Combined -0.043 * -0.037 * -0.044 ** -0.032 ** -0.015  -0.009  -0.013  -0.004  
  (0.022)  (0.021)  (0.022)  (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.009)  
Urban 0.036 *** 0.037 *** 0.037 *** 0.030 ** 0.008  0.011  0.006  0.007  
  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.008)  
Rural 0.002  0.002  0.002  0.000  -0.004  0.003  -0.001  0.002  
  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.007)  
Small 0.048 *** 0.043 *** 0.044 *** 0.039 *** 0.034 *** 0.025 ** 0.022 ** 0.018 ** 
  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.008)  
% Minority 
enrollment 0.000  0.000 * 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 ** 0.000 ** 0.000 *** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Cycle fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
State fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
No. of obs. 3200   3200   3200   3810   2740   2740   2740   3810   
(Pseudo) R2 0.048  0.141  0.142  0.127  0.099  0.169  0.170  0.127  
Notes: Recent five cycles of TFS samples are used for analysis. Specifically, OLS, Probit and logit models for transfer turnover exclude leavers, and those 
models for exit turnover exclude movers; multinomial model uses full sample and does not exclude either movers or leavers. Standard errors (s.e.) are reported in 
parentheses, and are calculated using survey final weight and replicate weights.  *** significant at p<0.001; ** significant at p<0.05; * significant at p<0.1. 
Pseudo R2 for Probit, logit and multinomial logit models cannot be calculated for survey data, and the ones reported are calculated based on corresponding 
models using no survey replicate weights. In order to be comparable, R2 for OLS models that use no survey replicate weights are also calculated and they are 







4.3 The Effect on Teacher Turnover of New-teacher Induction Programs 
4.3.1 OLS and Probit results with fixed effects 
OLS model (10) in TABLE 4.3 and corresponding Probit73 model in TABLE 4.7 show that 
an induction program tends to reduce by 4.2% and 4.1% of first-year new teachers’ turnover, 
respectively, after controlling for other determinants of teacher turnover. 
To further explore what kinds of induction program may influence first-year new teacher’s 
turnover, variables measuring program components, number of services received, and whether a 
program is a comprehensive one are added into the model, respectively. Since these variables are 
only available in the latest three cycles of surveys, the analysis in this section is based on first-
year new teacher TFS sample of 1999-2001, 2003-2005, and 2007-2009 cycles. 
SASS questionnaire ask whether a teacher received the following induction services, 
including having a mentor, having common planning time with teachers in the same subject, 
participation in classes or seminars for new teachers, having supportive communication, having 
extra classroom aides, and having a reduced schedule or preparations. TABLE 4.9 shows that 
after adding in variables measuring six program components, the estimates of the coefficients for 
induction program variable become insignificant, which implies that an induction program may 
influence teacher turnover through the components of the induction services. Specifically, 
participation in seminars or classes for new teachers and having supportive communication are 
associated with a decrease in the likelihood of a first-year new teacher’s turnover. These two 
program components tend to reduce both transfer turnover and exit turnover. Having common 
planning time with teachers in the same subject tends to reduce the likelihood of a first-year new 
teacher’s transfer turnover; while on the contrary, it tends to increase the likelihood of a first-
                                                 






year new teacher’s exit turnover. Having extra assistance (e.g., a teacher’s aide) tends to reduce 
first-year teachers’ turnover mainly because it tends to reduce those teachers’ exit turnover. 
Different from the above-mentioned program components, having reduced schedules or 
preparations tends to increase, rather than decrease, first-year new teachers’ turnover, especially 
transfer turnover. Both the sign and the statistical significance of estimates of having a mentor 
are somewhat unexpected. It seems that having a mentor may increase first-year teacher’s 
turnover, especially transfer turnover, although none of the estimates are statistically significant. 
This implies that having a mentor per se, without simultaneously receiving other induction 







TABLE 4.9: Components of Induction Services 
  Turnover Transfer turnover Exit turnover 
  OLS   Probit   OLS   Probit   OLS   Probit   
Induction -0.018   -0.017   -0.002   0.001   -0.020   -0.010   
  (0.022)  (0.023)  (0.020)  (0.019)  (0.018)  (0.014)  
Mentor 0.016   0.018   0.024   0.025   -0.005   -0.008   
  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.020)  (0.019)  (0.018)  (0.016)  
Seminars & classes -0.061  *** -0.067  *** -0.040  * -0.043  ** -0.051  *** -0.053  *** 
  (0.022)  (0.024)  (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.017)  (0.016)  
Common planning -0.003   -0.001   -0.033  ** -0.030  ** 0.032  ** 0.038  *** 
  (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.011)  
Supportive communication -0.119  *** -0.125  *** -0.101  *** -0.104  *** -0.067  *** -0.071  *** 
  (0.025)  (0.027)  (0.024)  (0.025)  (0.020)  (0.020)  
Reduced schedules 0.054  ** 0.054  ** 0.056  *** 0.056  *** 0.021   0.012   
  (0.024)  (0.026)  (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.021)  (0.017)  
Extra classroom assistance -0.037  ** -0.036  ** -0.006   -0.007   -0.052  *** -0.036  *** 
  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.014)  (0.009)  
Cycle fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
State fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Other covariates yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
No. of obs. 2790   2790   2370   2370   2130   2130   
R2 0.109    -   0.079    -   0.157    -   
Notes: Recent three cycles of TFS samples are used for analysis. Standard errors (s.e.) are reported in parentheses, and are calculated using survey final weight 
and replicate weights.  *** significant at p<0.001; ** significant at p<0.05; * significant at p<0.1.  All models also add a same set of additional covariates, the 








In addition, whether number of induction services received by a first-year new teacher 
matter is also explored. TABLE 4.10 shows the results for turnover, transfer turnover, and exit 
turnover, respectively. Both OLS and Probit version are reported. It is shown that the greater 
number of induction services received by a first-year new teacher, the less likely is this teacher to 
turn over after one year. This trend is same for both transfer turnover and exit turnover. 
Finally, whether receiving comprehensive induction services help reduce teacher turnover is 
also explored. A comprehensive level of induction services is defined as receiving five or more 
components of the six induction services mentioned previously. TABLE 4.11 shows the results 
for turnover, transfer turnover, and exit turnover, respectively. Both the OLS and Probit versions 
are reported. It is shown that participation in a comprehensive program tends to reduce teacher 
turnover, including both transfer turnover and exit turnover. The magnitude of the estimates of 
participation in a comprehensive program is also larger than the magnitude of corresponding 
estimates in TABLE 4.10, which may imply that a comprehensive induction program tends to be 







TABLE 4.10: Number of Induction Services Received 
  Turnover Transfer turnover Exit turnover 
  OLS   Probit   OLS   Probit   OLS   Probit   
Induction -0.022   -0.021   -0.002   -0.001   -0.028   -0.017   
  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.019)  (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.014)  
Number -0.028  *** -0.028  *** -0.021  *** -0.021  *** -0.019  *** -0.016  *** 
  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.004)  
Cycle fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
State fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Other covariates yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
No. of obs. 2790   2790   2370   2370   2130   2130   
R2 0.100    -   0.070    -   0.148    -   
Notes: Recent three cycles of TFS samples are used for analysis. Standard errors (s.e.) are reported in parentheses, and are calculated using survey final weight 
and replicate weights.  *** significant at p<0.001; ** significant at p<0.05; * significant at p<0.1.  All models also add a same set of additional covariates, the 
estimates of which are omitted in this table, and see appendix for full results. 
 
TABLE 4.11: Comprehensive Induction Program 
  Turnover Transfer turnover Exit turnover 
  OLS   Probit   OLS   Probit   OLS   Probit   
Induction -0.038  * -0.038  * -0.015   -0.014   -0.039  ** -0.028  * 
  (0.020)  (0.021)  (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.014)  
Comprehensive -0.061  *** -0.065  *** -0.038  ** -0.040  ** -0.040  *** -0.035  *** 
  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.014)  (0.012)  
Cycle fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
State fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Other covariates yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
No. of obs. 2790   2790   2370   2370   2130   2130   
R2 0.097    -   0.067    -   0.146    -   
Notes: Recent three cycles of TFS samples are used for analysis. Standard errors (s.e.) are reported in parentheses, and are calculated using survey final weight 
and replicate weights.  *** significant at p<0.001; ** significant at p<0.05; * significant at p<0.1.  All models also add a same set of additional covariates, the 







Previous literature on the effect of new teacher induction programs on teacher turnover is 
mixed. The preliminary finding of this study shows that induction programs reduce teacher 
turnover, which is consistent with what previous studies that do not employ advanced 
identification strategies found. However, previous randomized controlled studies and previous 
studies using instrumental variables do not show that induction programs have effects on 
turnover that is different from zero. 
 
4.3.2 PSM results 
In the initial stage of conducting the propensity-score matching estimation, twenty-one 
probit models with different specifications are tried to predict each first-year new teacher’s 
conditional probability of participating in an induction program. Specifically, first-year new 
teachers who participated in an induction program are matched with their counterparts who did 
not participate in an induction program but would have a same/similar probability of 
participation using one-to-one nearest neighbor matching.74 The probit model shown in TABLE 
4.12 is the one that has achieved the best possible balance in terms of means of pre-treatment 
covariates.75 76 In addition to variables measuring teacher demographic characteristics, teaching 
assignment and earnings, teacher qualifications, school demographic characteristics, and student-
body characteristics, the square terms of teachers’ entering age, schools’ enrollment, and 
interaction terms between % minority enrollment and school-related earnings, between non-
school earnings and full state certification,  between % minority enrollment and full state 
                                                 
74 The nonparticipant with the value of the propensity score that is closest to the participant is selected the match. 
75 Twenty-one models are tried for induction model and comprehensive model, respectively. The results for other 
twenty pair of models are in appendix.  






certification/ between non-school earnings and  combined school are included in induction or 
comprehensive Probit models.  
 
TABLE 4.12: Probit Models that Achieve Best Balance 
  Induction Comprehensive 
Variable Probit  Probit  
Male 0.136 *** -0.042  
  (0.051)  -(0.067)  
Age -0.029 *** -0.074 *** 
  (0.019)  (0.026)  
Black -0.130  0.461 *** 
  (0.097)  (0.114)  
Hispanic -0.093  0.233 * 
  (0.099)  (0.127)  
Other race and ethnicity 0.024  -0.028  
  (0.104)  (0.142)  
Regular full-time 0.280 *** -0.125  
  (0.067)  (0.095)  
Math & Science 0.030  -0.054  
  (0.060)  (0.079)  
Special education 0.042  0.110  
  (0.074)  (0.095)  
ESL 0.102  -0.909 * 
  (0.212)  (0.492)  
School-related earnings 0.016 * -0.007  
  (0.008)  (0.012)  
Non-school earnings -0.009  0.006  
  (0.006)  (0.007)  
Bachelor's degree 0.055  0.233  
  (0.107)  (0.148)  
Master's degree and above -0.069  0.056  
  (0.117)  (0.162)  
Partial state certification 0.203 ** -0.103  
  (0.067)  (0.086)  
Full state certification 0.093  -0.024  
  (0.085)  (0.085)  
Secondary -0.152 *** -0.216 *** 
  (0.056)  (0.077)  
Combined -0.404 *** -0.317 ** 
  (0.075)  (0.154)  
Enrollment 0.001 *** 0.000 ** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Urban -0.123 ** -0.077  
  (0.061)  (0.078)  






  (0.059)  (0.080)  
% Minority enrollment -0.002  0.002  
  (0.003)  (0.004)  
Age2 0.000  -0.001 *** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Enrollment2 0.000 *** 0.000  
  (0.000)  (0.000)  
% Minority enrollment * School-related earnings 0.000  0.000  
  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Non-school earnings * Full state certification 0.009 *** 0.007  
  (0.010)  (0.013)  
% Minority enrollment * Full state certification (0.000)  -  
  (0.001)  -  
Non-school earnings * Combined -  0.002  
  -  (0.003)  
Constant -0.158  -2.456 *** 
  (0.443)  (0.601)  
Cycle fixed effects yes  yes  
State fixed effects yes  yes  
No. of Observations 3810   2790   
Pseudo R2 0.124   0.07   
Notes: Recent five cycles of TFS samples are used for analysis of induction program, and recent three cycles of TFS 
samples are used for analysis of comprehensive induction program. Standard errors (s.e.) are reported in 
parentheses, and no statistical weights are used for standard error calculation.  *** significant at p<0.001; ** 
significant at p<0.05; * significant at p<0.1. 
 
Panel (A) of FIGURE 4.16 shows the distributions of estimated propensity scores before 
matching. It illustrates the propensity score distributions of treated (in red) and untreated (in 
blue) groups with complete overlap. However, it is shown that the distributions are somewhat 
unbalanced. Panel (B) of FIGURE 4.16 shows the distributions of estimated propensity scores 
after matching. Compared with the balance between distributions in panel (A), the balance in 
panel (B) improved, after dropping out some untreated cases in the left part of original 
distribution. Since the number of observations in the treated group is larger than that in the 
untreated group, when finding matched cases for treated cases, some untreated cases will be used 
with replacement77, as long as those cases are the best match for the corresponding treated cases. 
                                                 














































Panel (B): After Matching 
FIGURE 4.16: Distributions of Propensity Scores of Participation in an Induction Program 
Before and After Matching 
 
TABLE 4.13 shows the results of checking the balance between distributions of two groups 
with regard to 21 individual confounding covariates before and after matching. Before matching, 
for 12 out of the 21 covariates, the mean statistics of the treated group differ from that of 
untreated (or control) group significantly, including 7 at 1% level, 3 at 5% level, and 2 at 10% 
level. After matching, only for 2 out of the 21 covariates, the mean statistics between the treated 
group and untreated group are still statistically different, including 1 at 5% level and 1 at 10% 
level. Nonetheless, for these two variables, although the mean statistics are still statistically 
different between groups, the difference between two groups’ mean statistics reduces after 
matching. Therefore, in general the balance of distributions of covariates between two groups 
improves after matching is performed. 
 
TABLE 4.13: Balance Checks for Covariates Before and After Matching (Induction) 
    Mean     %reduct t-test   
Variable Sample Treated  Control %bias bias t     p>|t| 
        
Male Unmatched 0.31652 0.28031 7.9  2.35 0.019 
 Matched 0.31652 0.31694 -0.1 98.8 -0.03 0.975 
        
Age Unmatched 29.567 30.479 -10.6  -3.17 0.002 
 Matched 29.567 29.681 -1.3 87.4 -0.47 0.639 
        
Black Unmatched 0.06431 0.06517 -0.3  -0.10 0.917 
 Matched 0.06431 0.06347 0.3 2.1 0.12 0.906 
        
Hispanics Unmatched 0.05801 0.06097 -1.3  -0.37 0.708 
 Matched 0.05801 0.05759 0.2 85.8 0.06 0.950 
        






 Matched 0.0496 0.04918 0.2 92.7 0.07 0.947 
        
Regular full-time Unmatched 0.87852 0.78416 25.4  7.81 0.000 
 Matched 0.87852 0.86087 4.8 81.3 1.81 0.071 
        
Math & Science Unmatched 0.19462 0.17169 5.9  1.76 0.078 
 Matched 0.19462 0.18201 3.3 45.0 1.11 0.266 
        
Special education Unmatched 0.10677 0.10301 1.2  0.37 0.715 
 Matched 0.10677 0.10929 -0.8 32.8 -0.28 0.779 
        
ESL Unmatched 0.01051 0.01121 -0.7  -0.20 0.839 
 Matched 0.01051 0.00841 2.0 -198.7 0.75 0.454 
        
School-related earnings Unmatched 16.824 15.567 28.7  8.73 0.000 
 Matched 16.824 16.925 -2.3 91.9 -0.78 0.434 
        
Non-school earnings Unmatched 1.6771 2.0168 -7.5  -2.32 0.020 
 Matched 1.6771 1.7632 -1.9 74.6 -0.67 0.500 
        
Bachelor's degree Unmatched 0.80286 0.79117 2.9  0.87 0.384 
 Matched 0.80286 0.81 -1.8 38.9 -0.62 0.533 
        
Master's degree and above Unmatched 0.15174 0.15067 0.3  0.09 0.928 
 Matched 0.15174 0.14124 2.9 -874.2 1.02 0.305 
        
Partial state certification Unmatched 0.32072 0.23476 19.3  5.69 0.000 
 Matched 0.32072 0.32577 -1.1 94.1 -0.37 0.710 
        
Full state certification Unmatched 0.47835 0.50806 -5.9  -1.78 0.076 
 Matched 0.47835 0.47121 1.4 75.9 0.49 0.622 
        
Secondary Unmatched 0.47961 0.44078 7.8  2.33 0.020 
 Matched 0.47961 0.48214 -0.5 93.5 -0.17 0.862 
        
Combined Unmatched 0.09794 0.16538 -20.0  -6.16 0.000 
 Matched 0.09794 0.10425 -1.9 90.7 -0.72 0.471 
        
Enrollment Unmatched 796.18 614 31.1  9.20 0.000 
 Matched 796.18 761.95 5.8 81.2 1.99 0.047 
        
Urban Unmatched 0.24338 0.25788 -3.3  -1.00 0.316 
 Matched 0.24338 0.2396 0.9 73.9 0.30 0.761 
        
Rural Unmatched 0.30307 0.43798 -28.2  -8.51 0.000 
 Matched 0.30307 0.30895 -1.2 95.6 -0.44 0.660 
        
% Minority enrollment Unmatched 39.977 38.174 5.1  1.55 0.122 







TABLE 4.14 summarizes estimates of the effects of participation in induction programs 
after propensity-score matching is conducted. Panel (A) presents results without using survey 
weights, and panel (B) presents results using TFS final weight.78 After propensity-score 
matching, three models, including simple difference in means, regression-adjusted linear model, 
and regression-adjusted Probit model, are conducted for each outcome variable in each panel. 
Models in the first row of each panel are difference in means between induction participants and 
non-participants in terms of their turnover, transfer turnover, and exit turnover, respectively. 
These models simply compare means of estimated outcome variables between treated and 
untreated groups of first-year new teachers who have similar probability of participation in an 
induction program. Recall that there are still a few confounding variables, the means of which 
between two groups differ significantly after matching, as shown in TABLE 4.15, models in the 
second row of each panel give regression-adjusted difference estimates, in order to get tighter 
estimates. Models in the third row of each panel provide a Probit version of regression adjusted 
estimates, and marginal effects estimated are reported. When TFS final weight is used in the 
panel (B), weight is calculated with the TFS final weight multiplies the weight assigned in the 
matching procedure. 79 Panel (A) of TABLE 4.14 shows two patterns: one is that without using 
TFS final weight, the PSM estimate of the effect of induction program on turnover is very 
similar to the corresponding estimate in OLS model without statistical weights (model (11) in 
TABLE 4.6); the other is that PSM estimates on transfer turnover and exit turnover are in 
opposite directions, for example, it shows that an induction program tends to reduce exit turnover 
but increase transfer turnover. After applying TFS final weights, in panel (B) of TABLE 4.16, it 
                                                 
78 Description of psmatch2 command in STATA suggest to do models with and without using weights, given that it 
is still unclear in literature how to use weights with propensity-score method. 







shows that the magnitude of PSM estimates of the effect of induction program on turnover is 
comparable to the OLS estimates shown in column (10) and (12) in TABLE 4.680, however, the 
standard errors are larger than the OLS estimates81. Similar with results shown in panel (A), 
panel (B) of TABLE 4.14 also shows that an induction program tends to reduce exit turnover but 
increase transfer turnover. Although the estimates of the effect on transfer turnover are very 
close to zero in panel (B), this pattern contradicts the pattern of OLS estimates, which shows an 
induction program tends to reduce both transfer turnover and exit turnover. PSM Estimates of 
effect of induction program on exit turnover shown in panel (B) are comparable with OLS 
estimates. Most estimates are not statistically significant, except for some estimates of effect on 
exit turnover. 
 
TABLE 4.14: PSM Results w/ and w/o Weights (Induction) 
  Induction 
  Turnover   Transfer turnover Exit turnover   
Difference-in-means -0.018  0.020  -0.056 ** 
 (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.024)  
Regression-adjusted difference -0.016  0.017  -0.043 ** 
 (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.021)  
Probit -0.014  0.021  -0.039 * 
  (0.025)   (0.024)   (0.021)   
Panel (A) 
  Induction 
  Turnover   Transfer turnover Exit turnover   
Difference-in-means -0.043  0.021  -0.080  
 (0.059)  (0.029)  (0.066)  
Regression-adjusted difference -0.045  -0.004  -0.067 ** 
 (0.029)  (0.024)  (0.027)  
Probit -0.028  0.008  -0.031 * 
  (0.029)   (0.021)   (0.017)   
Panel (B) 
                                                 
80 The PSM estimate of the Probit version (shown in the third row in TABLE 4.16) is smaller in magnitude than the 
corresponding Probit estimate shown in TABLE 4.9. 






Notes: Panel (A) and panel (B) are the results for the effects of induction program using models without and with 
TFS final weight, respectively. Standard errors (s.e.) are reported in parentheses.  *** significant at p<0.001; ** 
significant at p<0.05; * significant at p<0.1. 
 
 
Panel (A) of FIGURE 4.17 shows the distributions of estimated propensity scores of 
participation in a comprehensive induction program before matching. Similar to what FIGURE 
4.16 shows, it illustrates the propensity score distributions of treated (in red) and untreated (in 
blue) groups with complete overlap; however, the distributions are somewhat unbalanced. Panel 
(B) of FIGURE 4.17 shows the distributions of estimated propensity scores after matching. 
Compared with the balance between distributions in panel (A), the balance in panel (B) 









































FIGURE 4.17 Overlap of Propensity Scores of Participaiton in A Comprehensive Induction 
Program Before and After Matching 
 
TABLE 4.15 shows the results of further checking the balance between distributions of two 
groups with regard to 21 individual confounding covariates before and after matching based on 
the propensity score of participation in a comprehensive induction program. Before matching, for 
9 out of the 21 covariates, the mean statistics of the treated group differ from that of untreated (or 
control) group significantly, including 4 at 1% level, 2 at 5% level, and 3 at 10% level. After 
matching, there are no covariates, the mean statistics of which between the treated group and 
untreated group are still statistically different. The balance of distributions of covariates between 







TABLE 4.15: Balance checks Before and After Matching (Comprehensive) 
    Mean     %reduct t-test   
Variable Sample Treated  Control %bias bias t     p>|t| 
        
Male Unmatched 0.27968 0.30749 -6.1  -1.22 0.221 
 Matched 0.27968 0.2837 -0.9 85.5 -0.14 0.888 
        
Age Unmatched 29.799 29.725 0.8  0.17 0.867 
 Matched 29.799 30.123 -3.7 -340.0 -0.59 0.557 
        
Black Unmatched 0.12274 0.05923 22.2  5.03 0.000 
 Matched 0.12274 0.13078 -2.8 87.3 -0.38 0.703 
        
Hispanics Unmatched 0.07646 0.05314 9.5  2.03 0.043 
 Matched 0.07646 0.05433 9.0 5.1 1.41 0.158 
        
Other race and ethnicity Unmatched 0.04427 0.05226 -3.7  -0.74 0.462 
 Matched 0.04427 0.06439 -9.4 -151.5 -1.40 0.162 
        
Regular full-time Unmatched 0.85312 0.86455 -3.3  -0.67 0.503 
 Matched 0.85312 0.84909 1.2 64.8 0.18 0.859 
        
Math & Science Unmatched 0.17505 0.20209 -6.9  -1.37 0.170 
 Matched 0.17505 0.16097 3.6 47.9 0.59 0.553 
        
Special education Unmatched 0.12475 0.0993 8.1  1.69 0.092 
 Matched 0.12475 0.1328 -2.6 68.4 -0.38 0.705 
        
ESL Unmatched 0.00201 0.00871 -9.2  -1.57 0.117 
 Matched 0.00201 0.00402 -2.8 70.0 -0.58 0.564 
        
School-related earnings Unmatched 16.62 16.752 -3.1  -0.63 0.531 
 Matched 16.62 16.249 8.8 -180.9 1.48 0.138 
        
Non-school earnings Unmatched 2.0369 1.8528 3.5  0.79 0.432 
 Matched 2.0369 1.966 1.4 61.5 0.22 0.827 
        
Bachelor's degree Unmatched 0.82093 0.77526 11.4  2.24 0.025 
 Matched 0.82093 0.82696 -1.5 86.8 -0.25 0.803 
        
Master's degree and above Unmatched 0.13883 0.16986 -8.6  -1.69 0.091 
 Matched 0.13883 0.13682 0.6 93.5 0.09 0.927 
        
Partial state certification Unmatched 0.27767 0.29486 -3.8  -0.76 0.445 
 Matched 0.27767 0.28974 -2.7 29.8 -0.42 0.673 
        






 Matched 0.46881 0.44064 5.6 -349.3 0.89 0.373 
        
Secondary Unmatched 0.47284 0.47866 -1.2  -0.24 0.814 
 Matched 0.47284 0.51308 -8.1 -591.3 -1.27 0.205 
        
Combined Unmatched 0.10664   0.1372 -9.3  -1.83 0.068 
 Matched 0.10664 0.12475 -5.5 40.7 -0.89 0.373 
        
Enrollment Unmatched 873.54 741.49 20.5  4.27 0.000 
 Matched 873.54 909.91 -5.6 72.5 -0.87 0.384 
        
Urban Unmatched 0.25755 0.25436 0.7  0.15 0.882 
 Matched 0.25755 0.21529 9.7 -1224.6 1.57 0.117 
        
Rural Unmatched 0.22535 0.2953 -16.0  -3.14 0.002 
 Matched 0.22535 0.26358 -8.7 45.3 -1.40 0.161 
        
% Minority enrollment Unmatched 45.846 41.085 13.6  2.73 0.006 
  Matched 45.846 44.1 5.0 63.3 0.78 0.435 
 
Similar to TABLE 4.16, TABLE 4.16 summarizes PSM estimates of the effect a 
comprehensive induction program on turnover, transfer turnover, and exit turnover with and 
without weights. In terms of the signs, PSM estimates of the effect of comprehensive induction 
services are all negative, indicating that comprehensive induction services tend to reduce overall 
teacher turnover, transfer turnover, as well as exit turnover. The magnitude of these PSM 
estimates are comparable to that of the OLS estimates shown in TABLE 4.13, except that the 
magnitude of PSM estimates on exit turnover are slightly smaller than those of the OLS estimate. 
However, PSM estimates have larger standard errors, and none of estimates are statistically 
significant. 
 
TABLE 4.16: PSM Results with Weights (Comprehensive) 
  Comprehensive 
  Turnover   Transfer turnover Exit turnover   
Difference-in-means -0.044  -0.039  -0.025  
 (0.034)  (0.033)  (0.031)  






 (0.031)  (0.030)  (0.027)  
Probit -0.046  -0.037  -0.003  
  (0.035)   (0.033)   (0.030)   
Panel (A) 
  Comprehensive 
  Turnover   Transfer turnover Exit turnover   
Difference-in-means -0.064  -0.051  -0.031  
 (0.052)  (0.049)  (0.033)  
Regression-adjusted difference -0.057  -0.038  -0.029  
 (0.046)  (0.043)  (0.032)  
Probit -0.065  -0.038  -0.018  
  (0.044)   (0.037)   (0.017)   
Panel (B) 
Notes: Panel (A) and panel (B) are the results for the effects of comprehensive induction program using models 
without and with TFS final weight, respectively. Standard errors (s.e.) are reported in parentheses.  *** significant at 
p<0.001; ** significant at p<0.05; * significant at p<0.1. 
 
Estimates of program effects not being statistically significant can be due to that PSM 
models are not allowed to use replicate weights and only final weight is used in PSM models. 
However, compared with the estimates of program effects in OLS models with only final weight, 
e.g., model 12 in TABLE 4.6, estimates in PSM models still have larger standard errors, which 
may suggest that not being able to use replicate weight in PSM models is not the only reason 
why estimates become insignificant. 
Similar to OLS estimates, PSM estimates can be interpreted as causal effects only when the 
assumption of ignorability of treatment variable holds.  In the case of this study, it assumes that 
(comprehensive) induction participation is an exogenous variable and there are no unobserved 
factors that influence both program participation and turnover outcomes. Although this 
assumption is untestable, sensitivity tests are performed to test how sensitive these estimates 
would be, had there been such unobserved factors. The relevant statistic ranges from 1.05 to 1.3 






although PSM models have already adjusted differences between treated and untreated groups in 
terms of their observable characteristics. 
 
In summary, OLS and Probit models with fixed effects suggest that new-teacher induction 
programs on average reduce first-year new teacher’s turnover by 4%. The effect is stronger on 
exit turnover than on transfer turnover. The effects on turnover of detailed induction service 
components, number of induction services received, and comprehensive level of services are also 
examined. A comprehensive level of an induction program reduces turnover outcomes, and its 
effect sizes are larger than those of an average induction program. Propensity-score matching is 
performed to achieve the best possible balance between treated and control groups in terms of 
the means of observed characteristics. Results of PSM suggest that both an average induction 
program and a comprehensive induction program tend to reduce teacher turnover, and the effect 
sizes of a comprehensive program are generally larger than those of OLS or Probit models with 
fixed effects.  However, most of the estimates of the PSM models are not statistically significant; 
only exit turnover shows a significant effect of an average induction program. 
 
4.3.3 IV-DID results 
In this section, variation in the timing of states mandatory induction legislation is employed 
as the instrumental variable for the potential endogenous treatment variable, induction 
participation. Three assumptions of this instrumental variable, including ignorability, non-zero 
correlation between instrumental variable and treatment variable, and exclusion restriction are 






treat  (ITT) effects, or the effects of mandatory law on turnover, are also reported.82 Standard 
errors are also adjusted, given that variation of mandatory law is at the state level and there may 
be correlations between observations within a state as well as serial correlation across cycles. 
During the last three decades, states have been active in legislation to mandate induction 
programs for new teachers in public schools. According to my review of legal provisions of all 
50 states and the District of Columbia, about two thirds of the states have already required that 
new teachers participate in an induction/mentoring program during their initial year(s) of 
employment. TABLE 4.17 lists the dates of legal change for each of the 50 states and the District 
of Columbia. 
 
TABLE 4.17: Dates of Legal Change Mandating New-teacher Induction Programs 
State Date mandatory law effective 
Alabama No mandatory law 
Alaska No mandatory law 
Arizona No mandatory law 
Arkansas November 24, 2003 
California January 1, 1999 
Colorado June 6, 1991 
Connecticut 1986 
Delaware July 1, 2010 
District of Columbia No mandatory law 
Florida No mandatory law 
Georgia No mandatory law 
Hawaii No mandatory law 
Idaho No mandatory law 
Illinois January 1, 2004 
Indiana March 29, 1988 
Iowa 2001 
Kansas No mandatory law 
Kentucky March 7, 1996 
Louisiana February 2002 
Maine July 1, 1988 
                                                 
82 If the correlation between instrument and treatment variable is weak, then even a small correlation between 






Maryland July 24, 2000 
Massachusetts October 1, 2001 
Michigan December 31, 1993 
Minnesota No mandatory law 
Mississippi No mandatory law 
Missouri September 30, 2008 
Montana No mandatory law 
Nebraska No mandatory law 
Nevada No mandatory law 
New Hampshire No mandatory law 
New Jersey May 7, 2001 
New Mexico July 1, 2002 
New York February 2, 2004 
North Carolina January 1, 1998 
North Dakota No mandatory law 
Ohio July 1, 2002 
Oklahoma May 13, 1996 
Oregon No mandatory law 
Pennsylvania June 1, 1987 
Rhode Island No mandatory law 
South Carolina June 10, 1997 
South Dakota No mandatory law 
Tennessee No mandatory law 
Texas No mandatory law 
Utah November 4, 2002 
Vermont No mandatory law 
Virginia 1999 
Washington 1996-1999 
West Virginia August 6, 1991 
Wisconsin May 1, 2000 
Wyoming No mandatory law 
Source: author’s research of state regulations and codes and administrative codes. 
 
In terms of the specific mandatory induction requirements, each state may have its own 
implementation. For example, some states adopt a state-wide uniform program, while others 
authorize local education agencies to develop state-approved programs. Some states may also 
integrate their mandatory induction requirements with their requirements on teacher licensures, 






state mandatory laws. In terms of program type, a few states have and implement their state-level 
induction programs, and most states either allow local school district to implement induction 
programs that are approved by states, or only give local school district guidance on 
implementing induction programs. Only 1/3 of states provide funds for induction programs, and 
more than half of states link the participation in induction programs to teacher’s professional 
licensure system. 
 
TABLE 4.18: Induction Requirements of Mandatory Laws in Different States 
State Program Type Fund Availability Linkage to Professional Licensure 
Arkansas State-approved program Yes, not competitive Yes 
California State-approved program Yes, not competitive Yes 
Colorado State-approved program No Yes 
Connecticut State-level program Yes, not competitive Yes 
Delaware State-level program Not known Yes 
Illinois Local program Yes, not competitive Yes, optional 
Indiana State-approved program No Yes 
Iowa State-approved program Yes, not competitive Yes 
Kansas State-approved program Yes, competitive No 
Kentucky State-level program Yes, not competitive Yes 
Louisiana State-level program No Yes 
Maine Local program No Yes 
Maryland Local program No No 
Massachusetts State-approved program No Yes 
Michigan Local program No No 
Missouri State-approved program Not known Yes 
New Jersey State-approved program 
Depending on fiscal 
status No 
New Mexico State-approved program Not known Yes 
New York State-approved program No Yes 
North Carolina State-approved program No Yes 






Oklahoma Local program No Yes 
Pennsylvania State-approved program No Yes 
South Carolina Local program Yes, competitive No 
Utah Local program No No 
Virginia State-approved program Yes, competitive No 
Washington Local program Yes Not known 
West Virginia Local program No No 
Wisconsin Local program No No 
Source: author’s research of state regulations and codes and administrative codes. 
 
In order to use the implementation of a mandatory law, as an instrumental variable, to make 
inferences about the new teacher induction programs’ causal effect, several assumptions have to 
be made about the instrumental variable. First, timing of mandatory law should be an exogenous 
source of variation. Empirically, whether and when a state has such a law should not reflect pre-
existing differences in state-level characteristics. It is evaluated by generating state-level 
characteristics for each of the 50 states and District of Columbia from the 1987 SASS surveys. 
For each state, two dependent variables are constructed. One is whether a state has a mandatory 
law. The other is years to this mandatory law conditioning on having such a law, as the number 
of years that elapsed from 1987.83 
TABLE 4.19 and TABLE 4.20 report the point-estimates and robust standard errors from 
cross-state regressions of the above-mentioned two dependent variables on selected six sets of 
1987 state characteristics, respectively. Although most 1987 state characteristics are not 
predictors of state mandatory law status, there are a few exceptions, suggesting that the 
implementation of mandatory laws itself may not be a good instrumental variable. Therefore, 
together with the implementation of mandatory law, cycle fixed effects and state fixed effects are 
included as excluded instrumental variables, in order to make the ignorability assumption of the 
                                                 






instrumental variable more reliable. In addition, in order to get more precise estimates, covariates 
are also included in estimation. 
 
TABLE 4.19: 1987-State-level Predictors of the Mandatory Law 
Having a mandatory law 
                      
A. Teacher demographic characteristics       
 Fraction of public school teachers Mean age of 
public school 
teachers    Male   White   Black   Hispanic   
Point estimate -2.434   1.665  * 0.198   0.777   0.171  *** 
  (2.095)  (0.576)  (0.569)  (1.660)  (0.090)  
R2 0.125  
           
B. Teaching assignment characteristics        
 Fraction of public school teachers 
  Regular full-time 
First-year new 
teachers Math & Science 
Special 
Education ESL   
Point estimate 1.064   -4.708   0.452   7.090  *** -9.377   
  (2.062)  (8.788)  (6.811)  (2.484)  (14.876)  
R2 0.153  
           
C. Teacher qualification characteristics       
 Fraction of public school teachers 
  
Bachelor's 









Point estimate -7.239   -6.346   5.815   5.750   0.738   
  (16.045)  (16.109)  (7.496)  (6.535)  (0.930)  
R2 0.081  
           
D. School characteristics         
 Fraction of public schools Mean 
enrollment of 
public schools   Elementary Secondary Urban   Rural   
Point estimate 1.275   4.479  *** -1.766  *** -1.198  ** 0.000   
  (0.819)  (1.508)  (0.448)  (0.507)  (0.001)  
R2 0.268  
                      
E. School's student-body characteristics       







Point estimate     -0.003       
      (0.003)      
R2     0.012       
                      




Mean earnings of public school 
teachers 
Public school teachers' mean rates 
of turnover 









Point estimate 2.701  ** -0.004   -0.106   -1.456  * 1.215   
  (1.325)  (0.019)  (0.261)  (0.760)  (2.087)  
R-squared 0.111  
                      
No. of Obs. 50 
Notes: The dependent variable is whether a state has a mandatory induction law. Regressors are population weighted 
state aggregates based on 1987 SASS/TFS. The State of Connecticut is deleted from this analysis, because it 
implemented the mandatory law in the year of 1986, which is before the year of 1987. The results do not change 
if the state which implemented the mandatory law in 1987 is deleted as well. Point estimates are obtained by 
regressing the dependent variable on each state characteristic individually. Regressing the dependent variable on all 
the variables in one model does not alter the results. All regressions are unweighted. Robust standard errors are 
reported in the parentheses. Standard errors (s.e.) are reported in parentheses.  *** significant at p<0.001; ** 
significant at p<0.05; * significant at p<0.1. 
 
TABLE 4.20: 1987-State-level Predictors of Years to Implementation of the Mandatory Law 
Years to the mandatory law conditional on having a mandatory law 
                      
A. Teacher demographic characteristics       
 Fraction of public school teachers Mean age of 
public school 
teachers    Male   White   Black   Hispanic   
Point estimate -44.748   108.370   106.120   121.701   2.121  * 
  (35.833)  (106.382)  (97.326)  (111.315)  (1.154)  
R2 0.168  
           
B. Teaching assignment characteristics        
 Fraction of public school teachers 
  Regular full-time 
First-year new 
teachers Math & Science Special Education ESL   
Point estimate 64.323   13.788   0.962   109.548  * 329.666   
  (46.774)  (98.907)  (119.959)  (59.859)  (231.068)  
R2 0.260  
           






 Fraction of public school teachers 








Point estimate -215.976   -229.135   -255.517  ** -206.740  * -1.178   
  (221.547)  (222.263)  (111.979)  (110.662)  (13.202)  
R2 0.276  
           
D. School characteristics         
 Fraction of public schools Mean 
enrollment of 
public 
schools   Elementary Secondary Urban   Rural   
Point estimate -95.338  *** -78.216  * -18.511   -13.460  * 0.010   
  (27.015)  (42.008)  (15.627)  (7.739)  (0.012)  
R2 0.301  
                      
E. School's student-body characteristics       
 Mean public school's percentage of minority enrollment 
Point estimate     0.134  *     
      (0.067)      
R2     0.108       
                      




Mean earnings of public school 
teachers 
Public school teachers' mean rates 
of turnover 









Point estimate 27.862   -0.304   3.341   46.599  ** -26.745   
  (32.160)  (0.352)  (3.532)  (19.794)  (50.556)  
R2 0.284  
                      
No. of Obs. 27 
Notes: The dependent variable is states’ years to the mandatory law conditional on having such a law. Regressors 
are population weighted state aggregates based on 1987 SASS/TFS. The State of Connecticut is deleted from this 
analysis, because it implemented the mandatory law in the year of 1986, which is before the year of 1987. Point 
estimates are obtained by regressing the dependent variable on each state characteristic individually. Regressing the 
dependent variable on all the variables in a one model does not alter the results. All regressions are unweighted. 
Robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses. Standard errors (s.e.) are reported in parentheses.  *** 






The second assumption of the instrumental variable is that the mandatory law has to have a 
positive correlation with induction participation, which can be examined visually and tested 
empirically using regression models. Visually, it can be examined using graphs showing each 
state’s trend of induction participation before and after the implementation of a mandatory law, 
as shown in FIGURE 4.18.  The blue line indicates the percentage of first-year new teachers who 
participated in an induction program, and the red line indicates the percentage of first-year new 
teachers who received a comprehensive level of induction services, and the vertical red line 
indicates the time when a state’s mandatory induction law becomes effective. For most states 
that have implemented a mandatory induction law, the percentage of first-year new teachers who 
participated in an induction program increases after the implementation of the mandatory law; 
however, for a few other states (NJ, IL, NC, VA, OK, UT), the percentage of first-year new 
teachers who participated in an induction program does not change much or decreases after the 
implementation of the mandatory law. There may be several explanations. First, induction 
participation rates are only measured every three or four years in SASS, which may not be able 
to represent the exact changes in induction participation rates after the implementation of a 
mandatory law in some cases. For example, it is possible that the induction participation rate 
increases in the year that right after the implementation of a mandatory law, but this participation 
rate is not observed and measured. Second, the induction participation rates in some states are 
already very high or have been improved to be very high before the implementation of a 
mandatory law, which may have little effect on further improving the participation rates. For 
example, the states of North Carolina, Oklahoma, Illinois, and New Jersey already had over 80% 
of first-year new teachers participated in an induction program right before the implementation 






immediately in the increase of induction participation rates. For example, the induction 
participation rates of the states of Virginia and Utah do not increase right after the 
implementation of a mandatory law; however, the induction participation rates of these two 
states have an increasing trend after implementing a mandatory law for a period of time. 
No matter what reasons explain why the induction participation rates in a few states do not 
increase after the implementation of a mandatory law, not increasing in the participation rates 
after the implementation of a mandatory law empirically will weaken the instrumental variable in 
terms of the correlation between mandatory law and induction participation. This point is also 
confirmed empirically by regressing induction participation on mandatory law using models with 
and without teachers in states, the induction participation rates of which do not increase after the 
implementation of a mandatory law (TABLE 4.23). Therefore, observations in the states of 
North Carolina, Oklahoma, Illinois, New Jersey, Virginia and Utah are not used in the following 
analysis, in order to make the instrument variable stronger. 
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FIGURE 4.18 Trend of Induction Participation by State 
Notes: Red vertical line indicates the time when a state first implemented mandatory induction legislation. WA has 







TABLE 4.21 compares first-stage results using samples with and without excluding the 
above-mentioned six states. Mandatory law is a dummy variable with 1 indicating a state has 
implemented a mandatory induction law by the time a cycle of SASS/TFS is administered and 0 
indicating a state has no mandatory induction law that is effective by the time a cycle of 
SASS/TFS is administered. Models (1) through (3) and models (4) through (6) display the results 
of regressing individual teacher’s induction participation on a state having a mandatory law 
using different model specifications, respectively. In models (1) and (4), whether a state has a 
mandatory law is the only explanatory variable.  By adding in cycle-fixed effects and state-fixed 
effects sequentially, models (2) and (5) become difference-in-differences models. In order to 
make ignorability assumption more valid, models (3) and (6) further add in additional covariates. 
It shows that mandatory law and induction participation have a positive correlation conditional 
on cycle and state fixed effects and other covariates and the correlation is statistically significant. 
It also shows that this correlation becomes stronger after excluding the six states. In addition to 
the F-statistics reported for each model, a partial F-statistic is also reported84 for the significance 
of the effect of mandatory law on induction participation conditional on cycle and state fixed 
effects and other covariates for model (6). This F-statistic is 14.66, and it is highly significant, 
indicating this instrumental variable is not weak.85 
 
TABLE 4.21: Comparison of First Stage Models w/ and w/o Fixed Effects and Covariates 
Dependent variable Induction 
Sample TFS-5 TFS-5 excluding six states 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   
Mandatory law 0.162 *** 0.099 *** 0.124 *** 0.175 *** 0.172 *** 0.202 *** 
                                                 
84 Partial F-statistic is reported when using ivreg2 command in STATA to conduct IV analysis. However, this 
command does not accommodate “svy” prefix, the command for declaring data as survey data, and cannot be used 
with models using survey replicate weights. 






  (0.013)  (0.022)  (0.021)  (0.014)  (0.023)  (0.022)  
Cycle fixed effects no  yes  yes  no  yes  yes  
State fixed effects no  yes  yes  no  yes  yes  
Additional covariates no  no  yes  no  no  yes  
No. of obs. 3880   3880   3810   3320   3320   3260   
F-statistic 155.43  26.4  25.77  155  28.79  25.21  
R2 0.027   0.109   0.154   0.029   0.124   0.163   
Notes: Recent five cycles of TFS samples are used for analysis. Models (1) through (3) use the full sample, and 
models (4) through (6) exclude observations in six states, excluding NJ, IL, NC, VA, OK, UT. Standard errors (s.e.) 
are calculated using survey BRR (balanced repeated replication) replicate weights, and are reported in parentheses.  
*** significant at p<0.001; ** significant at p<0.05; * significant at p<0.1. 
 
Model (6) in TABLE 4.21 is applied to samples of different combinations of stayers, 
movers and leavers, and the first-stage results in both OLS and Probit versions are shown in 
TABLE 4.22. Probit models give results that are very similar to OLS results. It shows that first-
year new teachers who work in a state having a mandatory law are on average 17%-20% more 
likely to participate in an induction program. 
 
TABLE 4.22: Effect of Mandatory Law on Induction Participation (First Stage Results) 
Dependent variable Induction 
Sample TFS-5: All TFS-5: Stayer & Mover TFS-5: Stayer & Leaver 
  OLS   Probit   OLS   Probit   OLS   Probit   
Mandatory law 0.202 *** 0.207 *** 0.198 *** 0.203 *** 0.171 *** 0.176 *** 
  (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.026)  (0.026)  
Cycle fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
State fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Additional 
covariates yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
No. of obs. 3260   3260   2740   2740   2340   2340   
F-statistic 25.21  16.38  30.17  16.48  20.51  14.32  
R2 0.163   -   0.170   -   0.177   -   
Notes: Recent five cycles of TFS samples that excluding observations in six states (e.g., NJ, IL, NC, VA, OK, UT) 
are used for analysis. Standard errors (s.e.) are calculated using survey BRR (balanced repeated replication) replicate 







Model (6) in TABLE 4.21 is also applied to the most recent three cycles of TFS samples in 
order to examine whether a mandatory law influences specific components of induction services, 
given that only most recent three cycles of questionnaires asked questions about detailed 
induction services a teacher received. Estimates of mandatory law in all models except for the 
model in the first column in TABLE 4.23 are not statistically significant, which indicates that a 
state having a mandatory law does not increase the percentage of its first-year new teachers who 
received induction services except for having a mentor. The estimate of mandatory law on 
number of induction services received is statistically significant at 1%; however, the estimate of 
mandatory law on receiving comprehensive induction services is not statistically significant. 
Although having a mandatory law tends to increase the number of induction services a first-year 
new teacher received, but the number of induction services increased due to a mandatory law is 
only less than 1 on average, and the percentage of first-year new teachers who receive a 
comprehensive level of induction services does not increase because of implementation of a 
mandatory law. This implies that the potential effect of a mandatory law on turnover will not go 
through its effects on increasing comprehensive induction participation. Therefore, the following 








TABLE 4.23: Effect of Mandatory Law on Induction Services 








Number   Comprehensive 
Mandatory law 0.284 *** 0.049   -0.026   0.041   0.010   0.072   0.431 *** 0.064   
  (0.046)  (0.052)  (0.055)  (0.052)  (0.041)  (0.052)  (0.148)  (0.045)  
Cycle fixed effects yes  yes  Yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
State fixed effects yes  yes  Yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Additional covariates yes  yes  Yes  yes  yes  yes  yes   yes   
No. of obs. 2390   2390   2390   2390   2390   2390   2390  2390  
F-statistic 16.15  21.06  23.15  6.65  6.74  6.82  9.22  5.42  
R2 0.191   0.178   0.191   0.152   0.150   0.107   0.154   0.089   
Notes: Recent three cycles of TFS samples that excluding observations in six states (e.g., NJ, IL, NC, VA, OK, UT) are used for analysis. Standard errors (s.e.) 
are calculated using survey BRR (balanced repeated replication) replicate weights, and are reported in parentheses.  *** significant at p<0.001; ** significant at 








IV-DID estimator are obtained through two-stage least squares (2SLS) procedures. A Probit 
version of this two-stage procedure86is also applied, and it gives similar results to OLS version of 
models. TABLE 4.24 shows the results of second-stage regressions, or the IV-DID results. 
Contrary to the OLS and PSM results shown in previous sections, IV-DID estimates for overall 
turnover and transfer turnover are positive, indicating that induction program participation 
increases, rather than decreases, these two types of turnover. Since standard errors at individual 
teacher level do not yet account for the situation of correlation between individuals within a 
same state as well as serial correlations over cycles, standard errors at state level that address 
these issues are calculated. These estimates are not statistically significant, and after adjusting 
standard errors at state level these estimates are even more not statistically significant,  which 
makes it difficult to conclude that the effects of an induction program on teacher turnover is 
different from zero. Note that IV estimates are local estimates, which only apply to those who are 
“compliers”. In this study “compliers” are those who would not have participated in an induction 
program had no mandatory law required them to do so. 
It is noted that a cost of using IV is that the 2SLS estimates can have very large standard 
errors (Wooldridge, 2009). Therefore, a Hausman test is performed to examine whether OLS and 
2SLS estimates of induction participation are practically different. The result of Wu-Hausman 
statistic is 14.2 and it is highly significant, suggesting that induction participation is endogenous 
and using IV is necessary.87 
 
TABLE 4.24: The Effect of Induction on Turnover (Second Stage Results) 
Dependent variable Turnover Transfer turnover Exit turnover  
                                                 
86 A STATA program is written by the author. 
87 The Hausman test is based on models without statistical weights, given that STATA’s post estimation test of 






 2SLS  2SProbit  2SLS  2SProbit  2SLS  2SProbit  
Induction 0.195   0.214   0.227 * 0.256   -0.002   -0.096   
  (0.119)  (0.229)  (0.118)  (0.169)  (0.086)  (0.252)  
Cycle fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  Yes  
State fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  Yes  
Additional covariates yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   Yes  
No. of obs. 3260   3260   2740   2740   2340   2340   
Notes: Recent five cycles of TFS samples that excluding observations in six states (e.g., NJ, IL, NC, VA, OK, UT) 
are used for analysis. Numbers of observations are rounded to the nearest ten. Estimates of DID-IV effect in Probit 
models are calculated using a STATA program written by the author. Standard errors (s.e.) are reported in 
parentheses.  *** significant at p<0.001; ** significant at p<0.05; * significant at p<0.1. Standard errors reported in 
OLS models are calculated using individual teacher level survey BRR (balanced repeated replication) replicate 
weights, and do not account for correlation between individuals within a state as well as serial correlation over 
cycle. State-level standard errors that address these issues are calculated and they are 0.421, 0.379 and 0.221 for 
OLS models in columns 1, 3, and 5, respectively. Standard errors in Probit models are calculated using 
nonparametric bootstrap method. 
 
TABLE 4.25 shows results of difference-in-differences estimator of the effect of mandatory 
law on turnover, which is referred to in literature as the “Intention to Treat” (ITT) effect.88   
There are two reasons why ITT estimates are reported. One is that IV-DID estimates can also be 
calculated using ITT-DID estimates. Specifically, first-stage estimates are also referred as 
percentage of “compliers”89 in IV literature, and IV-DID can be calculated through dividing ITT-
DID estimates by the percentage of “compliers” or first-stage estimates.90 Another reason is that 
compared with IV estimates, ITT estimates are more consistent. If an instrumental variable is 
weak, then even a small correlation between instrument and the error can produce a larger 
inconsistency in the IV estimate than in the ITT estimate (Bound, Jaeger, & Baker, 1995).  For 
three outcome variables of turnover, both OLS and Probit versions of ITT-DID models are 
reported. Probit version of ITT-DID estimates are calculated using a STATA program written by 
                                                 
88 ITT is an unbiased estimate if ignorability of instrumental variable (e.g., timing of mandatory law) is assumed. IV 
estimator is theoretically a biased estimator and is only asymptotically consistent. Usually IV papers have very 
large sample size, for example Angrist and Krueger (1991)’s sample size ranges from 4000 to 130000. Given that 
the sample size of this study is not very large, ITT results are reported in addition to IV results. 
89 “Compliers” are those teachers who would not have participated in an induction program had no mandatory law 
required them to do so, and would have participated in an induction program had a mandatory law required. 






the author91, and it gives estimates similar to those of OLS version of models. Similarly to IV-
DID results, ITT-DID estimates show that a mandatory law increases, rather than decreases, 
teacher turnover, especially for transfer turnover. The effect of a mandatory law on exit turnover 
is very close to zero. Only one estimate is significant at 5%. However, given that standard errors 
at the individual teacher level do not yet account for the situation of correlation between 
individuals within the same state as well as serial correlations over cycles, standard errors at state 
level that address these issues are also calculated. These corrected standard errors indicate that 
ITT-DID estimates are all not significantly different from zero. 
 
TABLE 4.25: The Effect of Mandatory Law on Turnover (ITT) 
Dependent variable Turnover  Transfer turnover Exit turnover 
 OLS  Probit  OLS  Probit  OLS  Probit  
Mandatory law 0.039  * 0.048    0.045  ** 0.051    -0.0003   0.010   
  (0.023)  (0.058)  (0.022)  (0.056)  (0.014)  (0.041)  
Cycle fixed effects yes  yes  Yes  yes  yes  Yes  
State fixed effects yes  yes  Yes  yes  yes  Yes  
Additional covariates yes   yes   Yes   yes   yes   Yes  
No. of obs. 3260  3260  2740  2740  2340      
R2 0.071   -   0.052   -   0.092   -   
Notes: Recent five cycles of TFS samples that excluding observations in six states (e.g., NJ, IL, NC, VA, OK, UT) 
are used for analysis. Numbers of observations are rounded to the nearest ten. Estimates of ITT-DID effect in Probit 
models are calculated using a STATA program written by the author according to Puhani (2012). Standard errors 
(s.e.) are reported in parentheses.  *** significant at p<0.001; ** significant at p<0.05; * significant at p<0.1. 
Standard errors reported in OLS models are calculated using individual teacher level survey BRR (balanced repeated 
replication) replicate weights, and do not account for correlation between individuals within a state as well as serial 
correlation over cycle. State-level standard errors that address these issues are calculated and they are 0.041, 0.037 
and 0.023 for OLS models in columns 1, 3, and 5, respectively. Standard errors in Probit models are calculated using 
nonparametric bootstrap method. 
 
 
The third assumption of instrumental variable is the exclusion restriction assumption, which 
requires that the mandatory law should affect turnover through no other channels than its effect 
                                                 
91 The STATA program calculates the difference of two cross-differences in order to incorporate DID framework 






on induction participation. Given that there is only one instrumental variable in this study, the 
overidentification test, or Sargen test, is not appropriate to use.92 Although it is an assumption 
that cannot be tested directly, TABLE 4.26 reports the ITT-DID results for new public school 
teachers, whose years of experience are between 1 and 3 years. Only the OLS version of models 
is reported (hereinafter).93 It shows that the implementation of a mandatory law tends to reduce 
turnover of this group of teachers, implying other channels may exist, for example, the 
implementation of a mandatory law may be an indicator of a state’s changes of its overall status 
of administration and regulations of teacher market. This effect is no longer significant after 
aggregating standard errors to the state level, indicating that the exclusion restriction assumption 
of IV is valid. In other words, the potential effect of state mandatory laws on teacher turnover 
only goes through the channel of induction program participation. However, it is also worthy of 
note that the direction of ITT-DID estimates for first-year new teachers are opposite to those 
estimates for new teachers having more than one year but less than three years of experience. It 
implies that, if there were any other channels, the ITT-DID effect for first-year new teachers 
would be even underestimated, and thus participation in the new teacher induction program 
would increase more percentage points of first-year new teachers’ turnover. 
 
TABLE 4.26: Effect of Mandatory Law on Turnover through Other Pathways 
 New public school teachers excluding first-year new teachers 
 Turnover  Transfer turnover Exit turnover 
Mandatory law -0.050  ** -0.044  ** -0.022    
  (0.021)  (0.018)  (0.015)  
Cycle fixed effects yes  yes  yes  
                                                 
92 It can be used when the model is overidentified, say, the number of instruments is larger than the number of 
endogenous variable. This test assumes that at least one of the instruments is exogenous. 
93 It is because that Probit version of models provides consistent patterns with OLS models, but not as robust as 






State fixed effects yes  yes  yes  
Additional covariates yes   yes   yes   
No. of obs. 3040  2430  1880  
R2 0.087   0.075   0.082   
Notes: Recent five cycles of TFS samples that excluding observations in six states (e.g., NJ, IL, NC, VA, OK, UT) 
are used for analysis. Numbers of observations are rounded to the nearest ten. New public school teachers, whose 
years of experience is between 1 and 3 years, are included in the sample. Numbers of observations are rounded to 
the nearest ten. OLS models are used to calculate the ITT-DID effects. Standard errors (s.e.) are reported in 
parentheses.  *** significant at p<0.001; ** significant at p<0.05; * significant at p<0.1. Standard errors are 
calculated using individual teacher level survey BRR (balanced repeated replication) replicate weights, and do not 
account for correlation between individuals within a state as well as serial correlation over cycle. 
 
In summary, conditional on cycle and state fixed effects, variation in timing of 
implementation of a mandatory induction law is considered as an exogenous source of variation, 
and it is employed as the instrumental variable for the induction program participation variable. 
Results of first-stage regressions suggest that the implementation of a mandatory law increases 
20% of first-year new teachers’ participation in an average induction program, however, it does 
not increase the participation of comprehensive induction services.  It suggests implementation 
of a mandatory law affects teacher turnover through the channel of its impacts on participation in 
an average induction program, but not the participation of comprehensive induction services. 
These 20% of new teachers are also called “compliers”. Results of ITT-DID and IV-DID show 
that implementation of a mandatory law and induction program participation tend to increase, 
rather than reduce overall turnover and transfer turnover, and their effects on exit turnover are 
close to zero. Given that all estimates are not statistically significant, one may conclude that an 










4.4 Exploration of Potential Heterogeneous Effects of New-teacher Induction Programs 
Based on the IV-DID framework, TABLE 4.27 to TABLE 4.36 show the results of first-
stage estimates, ITT estimates94, and second-stage estimates by different groups to check if the 
instrumental variable actually works for each subgroup of first-year new teachers and to explore 
if the effects of new-teacher induction programs on turnover are heterogeneous for different 
subgroups. Results are shown by gender, age group, race and ethnicity, full-time teaching status, 
teaching assignment, education, state teaching certificate status, school level, school location, 
and school size, respectively. Models in columns 1 through 3 in each table are first-stage 
regression, ITT-DID regression, and IV-DID regression for turnover, models in columns 4 
through 6 are corresponding regressions for transfer turnover, and columns 7 through 9 are for 
exit turnover. If the estimates of mandatory law in first-stage regressions for a subgroup are not 
significantly different from zero, then no IV regression results will be reported. 
The coefficients of mandatory law in the first-stage regressions for both genders are positive 
and highly significant. However, the effects of mandatory law and induction participation on 
turnover seem to have different patterns for different genders of first-year new teachers. A 
mandatory law and induction program participation tend to increase the turnover, especially 
transfer turnover, of female first-year new teachers. On the contrary, the point estimates show 
that a mandatory law and induction program participation tend to reduce male first-year new 
teachers’ transfer turnover but increase their exit turnover. But these estimates are not 
statistically significant. 
                                                 
94 As mentioned in previous section, ITT estimates are more consistent than IV estimates, when IV is weak and/or 
sample size is small. Some subgroups may only have small samples; therefore, reporting ITT estimates is helpful in 






TABLE 4.27: Summary of Results by Gender 
Female 
Dependent variable Induction Turnover Induction Transfer turnover Induction Exit turnover 
 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Induction -   -   0.264  * -   -   0.326  ** -   -   0.033    
  -  -  (0.137)  -  -  (0.148)  -  -  (0.092)  
Mandatory law 0.212  *** 0.056  ** -  0.192  *** 0.063  ** -  0.186  *** 0.006   -  
  (0.027)  (0.028)  -  (0.028)  (0.027)  -  (0.031)  (0.016)  -  
Cycle fixed effects Yes  yes  yes  Yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
State fixed effects Yes  yes  yes  Yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Additional 
covariates Yes   yes   yes   Yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   
No. of obs. 2270  2270  2270  1940  1940  1940  1590  1590  1590  
R2 0.191    0.081    -   0.189    0.060    -   0.218    0.105    0.096    
 
Male 
Dependent variable Induction Turnover Induction Transfer turnover Induction Exit turnover 
 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Induction -   -   -0.064    -   -   -0.120    -   -   0.173    
  -  -  (0.249)  -  -  (0.197)  -  -  (2.034)  
Mandatory law 0.184  *** -0.012   -  0.212  *** -0.026   -  0.099  ** 0.017   -  
  (0.046)  (0.038)  -  (0.049)  (0.034)  -  (0.049)  (0.031)  -  
Cycle fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  Yes  
State fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  Yes  
Additional 






No. of obs. 990  990  990  800  800  800  750  750  750  
R2 0.293    0.224    0.227    0.351    0.214    0.208    0.311    0.258    0.194    
 
Notes: Recent five cycles of TFS samples that excluding observations in six states (e.g., NJ, IL, NC, VA, OK, UT) are used for analysis. Numbers of 








For first-year new teachers in different age groups, the coefficients of mandatory law in 
first-stage regressions are positive and highly significant for all age sub-groups but the group that 
includes first-year teachers who are 40 and older. For the sub-group of first-year new teachers 
whose ages are 23 and younger, the ITT and IV results show that a mandatory law and induction 
program participation reduce overall turnover mainly through their effects on transfer turnover. 
However, a mandatory law and induction program participation tend to increase all types of 






TABLE 4.28: Summary of Results by Age Group 
Age<=23 
Dependent variable Induction Turnover Induction Transfer turnover Induction Exit turnover 
 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Induction -   -   -0.738  ** -   -   -0.996  ** -   -   0.313    
  -  -  (0.353)  -  -  (0.407)  -  -  (7.987)  
Mandatory law 0.223  *** -0.164  ** -  0.213  *** -0.213  *** -  0.124  ** 0.039   -  
  (0.043)  (0.065)  -  (0.046)  (0.064)  -  (0.048)  (0.037)  -  
Cycle fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
State fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Additional covariates yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   
No. of obs. 680  680  680  610  610  610  460  460  460  
R2 0.350    0.145    -   0.354    0.146    -   0.419    0.205    0.034    
 
23<Age<=26 
Dependent variable Induction Turnover Induction Transfer turnover Induction Exit turnover 
 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Induction -   -   0.844  *** -   -   0.780  *** -   -   0.195    
  -  -  (0.253)  -  -  (0.249)  -  -  (0.185)  
Mandatory law 0.203  *** 0.171  *** -  0.229  *** 0.179  *** -  0.175  *** 0.034   -  
  (0.039)  (0.042)  -  (0.043)  (0.045)  -  (0.045)  (0.029)  -  
Cycle fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
State fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Additional covariates yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   






R2 0.262    0.153    -   0.260    0.148    -   0.317    0.181    0.095    
 
26<Age<=30 
Dependent variable Induction Turnover Induction Transfer turnover Induction Exit turnover 
 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Induction -   -   0.063    -   -   0.219    -   -   -0.203    
  -  -  (0.149)  -  -  (0.167)  -  -  (0.245)  
Mandatory law 0.342  *** 0.021   -  0.353  *** 0.077   -  0.230  *** -0.047   -  
  (0.052)  (0.048)  -  (0.056)  (0.053)  -  (0.059)  (0.045)  -  
Cycle fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
State fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Additional covariates yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   
No. of obs. 490  490  490  410  410  410  370  370  370  
R2 0.365    0.347    0.340    0.382    0.258    0.195    0.441    0.417    0.381    
 
30<Age<=40 
Dependent variable Induction Turnover Induction Transfer turnover Induction Exit turnover 
 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Induction -   -   0.616  ** -   -   0.576  *** -   -   0.086    
  -  -  (0.244)  -  -  (0.200)  -  -  (12.780)  
Mandatory law 0.297  *** 0.183  *** -  0.347  *** 0.200  *** -  0.193  *** 0.017   -  
  (0.059)  (0.057)  -  (0.067)  (0.057)  -  (0.062)  (0.054)  -  
Cycle fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
State fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  






No. of obs. 580  580  580  480  480  480  440  440  440  
R2 0.279    0.273    -   0.286    0.297    -   0.359    0.268    0.245    
 
Age>40 
Dependent variable Induction Turnover Induction Transfer turnover Induction Exit turnover 
 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Induction -   -   -0.860    -   -   0.740    -   -   -0.563    
  -  -  (78.249)  -  -  (7.207)  -  -  (1.302)  
Mandatory law -0.033   0.028   -  -0.013   -0.010   -  -0.123   0.069   -  
  (0.093)  (0.066)  -  (0.101)  (0.058)  -  (0.105)  (0.044)  -  
Cycle fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
State fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Additional covariates yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   
No. of obs. 480  480  480  380  380  380  370  370  370  
R2 0.362    0.212    -   0.409    0.235    -   0.436    0.264    .   
 
 
Notes: Recent five cycles of TFS samples that excluding observations in six states (e.g., NJ, IL, NC, VA, OK, UT) are used for analysis. Numbers of 







White first-year new teachers and minority first-year new teachers both have higher 
participation in an induction program because of the implementation of a mandatory law, but the 
increased percentage of minority teachers’ participation is significantly higher than that of white 
teachers’ participation. However, ITT and IV results show that minority first-year new teachers 
are more likely to turnover, especially to leave the education system, because of the induction 






TABLE 4.29: Summary of Results by White and Minority 
Non-Hispanic White 
Dependent variable Induction Turnover Induction Transfer turnover Induction Exit turnover 
 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Induction -   -   0.022    -   -   0.159    -   -   -0.167  * 
  -  -  (0.129)  -  -  (0.137)  -  -  (0.093)  
Mandatory law 0.190  *** 0.004   -  0.174  *** 0.028   -  0.171  *** -0.028  * -  
  (0.025)  (0.024)  -  (0.026)  (0.023)  -  (0.029)  (0.015)  -  
Cycle fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
State fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Additional covariates yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   
No. of obs. 2690  2690  2690  2260  2260  2260  1930  1930  1930  
R2 0.189    0.071    0.068    0.199    0.047    0.007    0.210    0.104    0.093    
 
Minority 
Dependent variable Induction Turnover Induction Transfer turnover Induction Exit turnover 
 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Induction -   -   0.716  ** -   -   0.223    -   -   0.905    
  -  -  (0.343)  -  -  (0.168)  -  -  (0.803)  
Mandatory law 0.268  *** 0.192  *** -  0.326  *** 0.073   -  0.195  *** 0.177  *** -  
  (0.056)  (0.059)  -  (0.061)  (0.056)  -  (0.067)  (0.047)  -  
Cycle fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  Yes  
State fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  Yes  
Additional covariates yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   Yes   
No. of obs. 570  570  570  480  480  480  410  410  410  








Notes: Recent five cycles of TFS samples that excluding observations in six states (e.g., NJ, IL, NC, VA, OK, UT) are used for analysis. Numbers of 







No matter whether first-year new teachers are regular full-time teachers or not, a mandatory 
law increases their induction program participation rates. And ITT and IV results further show 
that a mandatory law, through increasing induction participation, increases all types of turnover 






TABLE 4.30: Summary of Results by Regular Full-time Status 
Regular full-time 
Dependent variable Induction Turnover Induction Transfer turnover Induction Exit turnover 
 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Induction -   -   0.043    -   -   0.085    -   -   -0.072    
  -  -  (0.130)  -  -  (0.126)  -  -  (0.114)  
Mandatory law 0.203  *** 0.009   -  0.197  *** 0.017   -  0.152  *** -0.011   -  
  (0.025)  (0.026)  -  (0.026)  (0.024)  -  (0.029)  (0.016)  -  
Cycle fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
State fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Additional covariates yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   
No. of obs. 2750  2750  2750  2360  2360  2360  2000  2000  2000  
R2 0.166    0.065    0.059    0.175    0.046    0.037    0.183    0.090    0.095    
 
Others 
Dependent variable Induction Turnover Induction Transfer turnover Induction Exit turnover 
 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Induction -   -   0.753    -   -   0.677    -   -   0.227    
  -  -  (1.160)  -  -  (0.669)  -  -  (0.302)  
Mandatory law 0.197  *** 0.148  *** -  0.225  *** 0.152  ** -  0.266  *** 0.060   -  
  (0.051)  (0.055)  -  (0.058)  (0.065)  -  (0.067)  (0.048)  -  
Cycle fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  Yes  
State fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  Yes  
Additional covariates yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   Yes   
No. of obs. 510  510  510  380  380  380  350  350  350  








Notes: Recent five cycles of TFS samples that excluding observations in six states (e.g., NJ, IL, NC, VA, OK, UT) are used for analysis. Numbers of 







First-stage regressions show that the implementation of a mandatory law moves more first-
year new teachers whose teaching assignment is math and science, special education, or ESL to 
participate in an induction program than it is able to move teachers of other teaching assignments. 
And a mandatory law, through its function on increasing program participation, reduces the exit 
turnover of first-year new teachers whose teaching assignment is math and science, special 






TABLE 4.31: Summary of Results by Teaching Assignment 
Math & Science 
Dependent variable Induction Turnover Induction Transfer turnover Induction Exit turnover 
 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Induction -   -   -0.956  *** -   -   -0.441    -   -   -0.723  *** 
  -  -  (0.318)  -  -  (0.214)  -  -  (0.264)  
Mandatory law 0.235  *** -0.225  *** -  0.219  *** -0.097  *** -  0.244  *** -0.176  *** -  
  (0.055)  (0.046)  -  (0.060)  (0.036)  -  (0.066)  (0.043)  -  
Cycle fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
State fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Additional covariates yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   
No. of obs. 620  620  620  500  500  500  460  460  460  
R2 0.323    0.235    -   0.330    0.225    0.158    0.387    0.281    -   
 
Special Education 
Dependent variable Induction Turnover Induction Transfer turnover Induction Exit turnover 
 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  
Induction -   -   0.348  ** -   -   0.265    -   -   -0.072    
  -  -  (0.141)  -  -  (0.123)  -  -  (0.236)  
Mandatory law 0.537  *** 0.187  ** -  0.631  *** 0.167  * -  0.449  *** -0.033   -  
  (0.080)  (0.093)  -  (0.065)  (0.099)  -  (0.088)  (0.076)  -  
Cycle fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
State fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Additional covariates yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   
No. of obs. 350  350  350  310  310  310  240  240  240  







Teaching Assignment Other than Math & Science, Special Education, and ESL 
Dependent variable Induction Turnover Induction Transfer turnover Induction Exit turnover 
 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Induction -   -   0.261    -   -   0.105    -   -   0.365    
  -  -  (0.191)  -  -  (0.183)  -  -  (0.322)  
Mandatory law 0.162  *** 0.042   -  0.155  *** 0.016  * -  0.118  *** 0.043  *** -  
  (0.027)  (0.028)  -  (0.028)  (0.027)  -  (0.031)  (0.016)  -  
Cycle fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
State fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Additional covariates yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   
No. of obs. 2260  2260  2260  1900  1900  1900  1620  1620  1620  
R2 0.201    0.077    -   0.213    0.064    0.041    0.225    0.096    -   
 
Notes: Recent five cycles of TFS samples that excluding observations in six states (e.g., NJ, IL, NC, VA, OK, UT) are used for analysis. Numbers of 









A mandatory law does not make first-year new teachers who have no college degree or 
master’s degree and above more likely to participate in an induction program, but it significantly 
increases the induction participation of first-year new teachers who have bachelor’s degree. The 
ITT and IV regressions show that a mandatory law and induction participation will increase the 






TABLE 4.32: Summary of Results by Education Level 
No Bachelor’s degree 
Dependent variable Induction Turnover Induction Transfer turnover Induction Exit turnover 
 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Induction -   -   0.536    -   -   -   -   -   .   
  -  -  (0.555)  -  -  -  -  -  .  
Mandatory law 0.462   -2.568   -  -2.973   0.699   -  0.396   1.343   -  
  (2.039)  (2.740)  -  (2.500)  (1.010)  -  (3.589)  (3.201)  -  
Cycle fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
State fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Additional covariates yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   
No. of obs. 70  70  70  40  40  40  70  70  70  
R2 0.926    0.896    0.847    1.000    1.000    -   0.971    0.913    0.069    
 
Bachelor’s degree 
Dependent variable Induction Turnover Induction Transfer turnover Induction Exit turnover 
 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Induction -   -   0.258  ** -   -   0.244  ** -   -   0.093    
  -  -  (0.107)  -  -  (0.102)  -  -  (0.077)  
Mandatory law 0.237  *** 0.061  ** -  0.239  *** 0.058  ** -  0.212  *** 0.020   -  
  (0.023)  (0.025)  -  (0.024)  (0.024)  -  (0.027)  (0.016)  -  
Cycle fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
State fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Additional covariates yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   
No. of obs. 2600  2600  2600  2210  2210  2210  1830  1830  1830  








Master’s degree and above 
Dependent variable Induction Turnover Induction Transfer turnover Induction Exit turnover 
 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Induction -   -   -0.580    -   -   0.033    -   -   -0.042    
  -  -  (14.008)  -  -  (3.931)  -  -  (15.046)  
Mandatory law -0.057   0.033   -  -0.088   -0.003   -  -0.160  ** 0.007   -  
  (0.067)  (0.055)  -  (0.069)  (0.046)  -  (0.073)  (0.050)  -  
Cycle fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
State fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Additional covariates yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   
No. of obs. 590  590  590  480  480  480  440  440  440  
R2 0.303    0.239    0.065    0.316    0.240    0.237    0.383    0.274    0.281    
 
Notes: Recent five cycles of TFS samples that excluding observations in six states (e.g., NJ, IL, NC, VA, OK, UT) are used for analysis. Numbers of 








A mandatory law does not make first-year new teachers who have no state teaching 
certificate more likely to participate in an induction program, but it significantly increases the 
induction participation of first-year new teachers who have partial or full state teaching 
certificate. The ITT and IV regressions show that a mandatory law and induction participation 
tend to increase all types of turnover for first-year new teachers who have partial or full state 
teaching certificate, except for the exit turnover for first-year new teachers who have full state 






TABLE 4.33: Summary of Results by Teaching Certificate Status 
No teaching certificate 
Dependent variable Induction Turnover Induction Transfer turnover Induction Exit turnover 
 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Induction -   -   0.817    -   -   0.375    -   -   0.628    
  -  -  (7.078)  -  -  (1.100)  -  -  (18.803)  
Mandatory law 0.091  * 0.075   -  0.139  *** 0.052   -  0.057   0.036   -  
  (0.048)  (0.048)  -  (0.053)  (0.044)  -  (0.058)  (0.039)  -  
Cycle fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
State fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Additional covariates yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   
No. of obs. 730  730  730  560  560  560  530  530  530  
R2 0.289    0.201    -   0.340    0.172    0.026    0.341    0.280    -   
 
Partial teaching certificate 
Dependent variable Induction Turnover Induction Transfer turnover Induction Exit turnover 
 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Induction -   -   0.224    -   -   0.237    -   -   0.127    
  -  -  (0.164)  -  -  (0.171)  -  -  (0.145)  
Mandatory law 0.249  *** 0.056   -  0.220  *** 0.052   -  0.232  *** 0.029   -  
  (0.047)  (0.040)  -  (0.047)  (0.036)  -  (0.052)  (0.030)  -  
Cycle fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
State fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Additional covariates yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   
No. of obs. 930  930  930  790  790  790  690  690  690  







Full teaching certificate 
Dependent variable Induction Turnover Induction Transfer turnover Induction Exit turnover 
 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Induction -   -   -0.002    -   -   0.051    -   -   -0.048    
  -  -  (0.146)  -  -  (0.158)  -  -  (0.093)  
Mandatory law 0.254  *** -0.0004   -  0.237  *** 0.012   -  0.219  *** -0.010   -  
  (0.034)  (0.035)  -  (0.035)  (0.035)  -  (0.040)  (0.019)  -  
Cycle fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
State fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Additional covariates yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   
No. of obs. 1610  1610  1610  1390  1390  1390  1120  1120  1120  
R2 0.248    0.104    0.104    0.247    0.094    0.093    0.275    0.131    0.132    
 
Notes: Recent five cycles of TFS samples that excluding observations in six states (e.g., NJ, IL, NC, VA, OK, UT) are used for analysis. Numbers of 









A mandatory law does not result in first-year new teachers who work in a secondary school 
more likely to participate in an induction program, but it significantly increases the induction 
participation of first-year new teachers who work in an elementary or a combined school. The 
ITT and IV estimates further show that a mandatory law and induction participation will reduce 






TABLE 4.34: Summary of Results by School Level 
Elementary 
Dependent variable Induction Turnover Induction Transfer turnover Induction Exit turnover 
 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Induction -   -   0.073    -   -   0.172    -   -   -0.160    
  -  -  (0.133)  -  -  (0.140)  -  -  (0.100)  
Mandatory law 0.262  *** 0.019   -  0.245  *** 0.042   -  0.222  *** -0.036  * -  
  (0.033)  (0.033)  -  (0.035)  (0.033)  -  (0.039)  (0.020)  -  
Cycle fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
State fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Additional covariates yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   
No. of obs. 1350  1350  1350  1180  1180  1180  930  930  930  
R2 0.182    0.111    0.102    0.191    0.084    0.054    0.206    0.129    0.114    
 
Secondary 
Dependent variable Induction Turnover Induction Transfer turnover Induction Exit turnover 
 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Induction -   -   1.938    -   -   0.932    -   -   2.840    
  -  -  (33.752)  -  -  (4.654)  -  -  (56.193)  
Mandatory law 0.047   0.090  *** -  0.086  ** 0.080  *** -  0.019   0.053  ** -  
  (0.039)  (0.033)  -  (0.039)  (0.030)  -  (0.040)  (0.027)  -  
Cycle fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
State fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Additional covariates yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   
No. of obs. 1490  1490  1490  1210  1210  1210  1120  1120  1120  








Dependent variable Induction Turnover Induction Transfer turnover Induction Exit turnover 
 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Induction -   -   -0.859  *** -   -   -0.543  * -   -   -0.605    
  -  -  (0.262)  -  -  (0.299)  -  -  (14.041)  
Mandatory law 0.336  *** -0.289  *** -  0.334  *** -0.181  ** -  0.294  *** -0.178  * -  
  (0.062)  (0.081)  -  (0.074)  (0.078)  -  (0.088)  (0.091)  -  
Cycle fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
State fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Additional covariates yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   
No. of obs. 420  420  420  340  340  340  290  290  290  
R2 0.591    0.382    0.000    0.650    0.419    0.222    0.673    0.406    0.195    
 
Notes: Recent five cycles of TFS samples that excluding observations in six states (e.g., NJ, IL, NC, VA, OK, UT) are used for analysis. Numbers of 









A mandatory law makes first-year new teachers who work in suburban, urban or rural 
schools more likely to participate in an induction program, but the increased participation is 
significantly higher for urban and rural teachers than for suburban teachers. ITT and IV estimates 
show that a mandatory law and induction participation tend to reduce all types of turnover for 
urban teachers; however, these estimates are not statistically significant. ITT and IV estimates 
also show that a mandatory law and induction participation significantly increase rural teachers’ 






TABLE 4.35: Summary of Results by School Urbanicity Location 
Suburban 
Dependent variable Induction Turnover Induction Transfer turnover Induction Exit turnover 
 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Induction -   -   0.823    -   -   0.263    -   -   0.488    
  -  -  (10.438)  -  -  (10.185)  -  -  (1.483)  
Mandatory law 0.078  ** 0.064  * -  0.101  *** 0.027   -  0.095  ** 0.046  ** -  
  (0.035)  (0.034)  -  (0.035)  (0.035)  -  (0.042)  (0.022)  -  
Cycle fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
State fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Additional covariates yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   
No. of obs. 1250  1250  1250  1070  1070  1070  940  940  940  
R2 0.216    0.157    -   0.226    0.122    0.067    0.257    0.193    -   
 
Urban 
Dependent variable Induction Turnover Induction Transfer turnover Induction Exit turnover 
 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Induction -   -   -0.276    -   -   -0.154    -   -   -0.218    
  -  -  (0.190)  -  -  (0.197)  -  -  (0.758)  
Mandatory law 0.280  *** -0.077   -  0.266  *** -0.041   -  0.165  *** -0.036   -  
  (0.049)  (0.053)  -  (0.049)  (0.051)  -  (0.056)  (0.031)  -  
Cycle fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
State fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Additional covariates yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   
No. of obs. 840  840  840  700  700  700  600  600  600  








Dependent variable Induction Turnover Induction Transfer turnover Induction Exit turnover 
 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Induction -   -   0.020    -   -   0.380  *** -   -   -0.401  ** 
  -  -  (0.129)  -  -  (0.125)  -  -  (0.173)  
Mandatory law 0.303  *** 0.006   -  0.316  *** 0.120  *** -  0.273  *** -0.109  *** -  
  (0.044)  (0.037)  -  (0.051)  (0.029)  -  (0.051)  (0.035)  -  
Cycle fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
State fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Additional covariates yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   
No. of obs. 1170  1170  1170  970  970  970  810  810  810  
R2 0.324    0.111    0.110    0.338    0.105    -   0.365    0.155    -   
 
Notes: Recent five cycles of TFS samples that excluding observations in six states (e.g., NJ, IL, NC, VA, OK, UT) are used for analysis. Numbers of 







A mandatory law increases the induction participation of first-year teachers who work in 
either small schools or non-small schools (note: small schools are defined as the schools, the 
enrollment of which is less than 350). But there are no statistically significant estimates in the 






TABLE 4.36: Summary of Results by School Size 
Small 
Dependent variable Induction Turnover Induction Transfer turnover Induction Exit turnover 
 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Induction -   -   0.183    -   -   0.188    -   -   0.019    
  -  -  (0.143)  -  -  (0.137)  -  -  (0.090)  
Mandatory law 0.185  *** 0.034   -  0.186  *** 0.035   -  0.163  *** 0.003   -  
  (0.025)  (0.026)  -  (0.027)  (0.025)  -  (0.029)  (0.014)  -  
Cycle fixed effects yes  Yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
State fixed effects yes  Yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Additional covariates yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   
No. of obs. 2340  2340  2340  2000  2000  2000  1710  1710  1710  
R2 0.171    0.071    0.018    0.181    0.052    0.006    0.195    0.097    0.092    
 
Other 
Dependent variable Induction Turnover Induction Transfer turnover Induction Exit turnover 
 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 1-stage-DID ITT-DID IV-DID 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Induction -   -   0.301    -   -   0.375    -   -   0.318    
  -  -  (0.202)  -  -  (0.244)  -  -  (0.903)  
Mandatory law 0.283  *** 0.085   -  0.248  *** 0.093  * -  0.148  *** 0.047   -  
  (0.045)  (0.054)  -  (0.053)  (0.049)  -  (0.056)  (0.058)  -  
Cycle fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
State fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Additional covariates yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   
No. of obs. 920  920  920  730  730  730  630  630  630  








Notes: Recent five cycles of TFS samples that excluding observations in six states (e.g., NJ, IL, NC, VA, OK, UT) are used for analysis. Numbers of 
observations are rounded to the nearest ten. Standard errors (s.e.) are reported in parentheses.  *** significant at p<0.001; ** significant at p<0.05; * significant at 




In summary, an induction program significantly increases turnover and transfer turnover of 
teachers who are female, not regular full-time, have bachelor’s degree, and significantly reduces 
turnover and transfer turnover of teachers whose age is between 20 and 23 years old, and/or who 
work in combined schools. An average induction program increases minority teachers’ turnover 
and exit turnover significantly, and reduces math and science teachers’ turnover and exit 
turnover significantly. For teachers who work in rural schools, an average induction program 





4.5 Summary of Findings and Discussion 
Findings based on the empirical analysis of SASS/TFS are summarized as follows. 
First, trends in terms of first-year new teachers’ induction participation, their turnover, and 
the composition of this newly hired teaching force are displayed for each cohort. Specifically, 
there is an increasing trend of induction participation. First-year new teachers’ turnover, 
including both transfer turnover and exit turnover, fluctuates, however. With respect to changes 
in the composition of first-year new teachers’ work force, there are five trends.  One is that the 
decreasing trend of the percentage of teachers who have a bachelor’s degree is compensated by 
an increasing trend of percentage teachers who have a master’s degree. Another trend is that the 
percentage of first-year new teachers who have a partial state teaching certificate has increased 
over time, however, the percentage of those who have a full state teaching certificate has 
decreased. In addition, first-year new teachers’ school-related earnings have increased over time. 
Furthermore, the percentage of first-year new teachers who work in suburban schools has 
increased over time, while the percentage of those who work in rural schools has decreased. 
Lastly, the percentage of minority students taught by a first-year new teacher has increased over 
time. 
Second, first-year new teachers who participated in an induction program and those who did 
not participate in such a program differ in many aspects. One important difference lies in that 
those who did not participate in an induction program have about a 5% higher turnover rate than 
those who participated in such a program. This difference is statistically significant, and it is 
particularly true for exit turnover rate. However, at the same time, those two groups of first-year 





time teaching status, education level, state teaching certificate status, earnings, their schools’ 
location, type, and size, and the student body characteristics they faced, etc. 
Third, teacher demographic characteristics, teacher qualification characteristics, teaching 
assignment and earnings, school demographic and student-body characteristics and teacher-job 
match are determinants of turnover. First-year new teachers whose entering age ranges from 30 
to 40 are 3-4% less likely to turnover compared with their youngest counterparts whose entering 
age ranges from 20-23. First-year new teachers who are Hispanic or Latino origin are 8-10% 
more likely to turnover than their white counterparts. First-year new teachers who have a 
master’s degree and above are 9-10% more likely to turnover compared with their counterparts 
who have no undergraduate degree, while first-year new teachers who have bachelor’s degree do 
not statistically different from their counterparts who have no undergraduate degree in terms of 
turnover. First-year new teachers who have partial or full state teaching certificates are 3-5% less 
likely to turnover than their counterparts who have no state certificates, which might reflect more 
job- or teaching-specific human capital they have accumulated. Regular full-time first-year new 
teachers are 9-11% less likely to turnover than their counterparts who are part-time teachers 
and/or substitute teachers. A $1,000 increase in first-year new teachers’ school-related earnings 
is associated with a 1% decrease in their likelihood of turnover, while a $1,000 increase in their 
non-school earnings is associated with a 0.5% increase in their likelihood of turnover. First-year 
new teachers who teach in an urban school are 3-4% more likely to turnover than those who 
teach in a suburban school. First-year new teachers who teach in a small school, the enrollment 
of which is less than 350, are 5-6% more likely to turnover. A 10% increase in percentage of 
minority student enrollment is associated with a 0.6% increase in first-year new teachers’ 





10% increase in the percentage of minority students. If transfer turnover and exit turnover are 
examined separately, their determinants may differ. 
Fourth, after controlling for other covariates, OLS models with cycle and state fixed effects 
show that participation in an induction program reduces first-year new teachers’ turnover by 4%. 
If considering transfer turnover and exit turnover separately, an induction program reduces 2% 
and 3% of first-year new teachers’ transfer turnover and exit turnover, respectively. As for the 
detailed induction service components, attending seminars or classes for new teachers and 
having supportive communication tend to reduce turnover of all types, having common planning 
time with teachers in the same subjects tends to reduce the transfer turnover, but increase the exit 
turnover, having extra assistance (e.g., a teacher’s aide) tends to reduce first-year new teachers’ 
turnover mainly because it helps reduce exit turnover, while on the contrary, having reduced 
schedules or preparations tends to increase, rather than  decrease, first-year new teachers’ 
turnover, especially transfer turnover. In terms of the number and level of induction services, the 
greater the number of induction services received by a first-year new teacher, the less likely that 
teacher is to turnover after one year. A comprehensive level of an induction program reduces all 
types of turnover, and its effect sizes are larger than those of an average induction program. 
Fifth, after propensity-score matching is performed, a better balance between treated and 
control groups’ distributions of confounding covariates is achieved, and PSM estimates suggest 
that either an average induction program or a comprehensive induction program helps reduce 
first-year new teachers’ turnover, except that an average induction program tends to increase 
transfer turnover. The magnitude of PSM estimates is all comparable to that of OLS estimates, 
but standard errors are larger. Most of the estimates are not statistically significant at the 5% 





turnover. Sensitivity tests are also performed and the results suggest that PSM estimates are 
sensitive to potential hidden biases, even though PSM models have made treated and control 
groups more comparable in terms of observed characteristics. 
Sixth, conditional on cycles and states, having a mandatory law requiring induction in a 
state increased its first-year new teachers’ participation in an induction program or the 
percentage of those who had a mentor significantly. In terms of number and level of induction 
services, a mandatory law slightly increased the average number of induction services a teacher 
received, but it did not increase the percentage of first-year new teachers who participated in a 
comprehensive level of induction program. Different from the patterns of estimates displayed in 
OLS and PSM models, IV-DID estimates suggest that for those first-year new teachers who 
would participate in an induction program because the law requires them to do so and would not 
if no law requires such a participation, participation in an induction program may increase, rather 
than decrease, teacher turnover, especially transfer turnover. Given that these IV-DID estimates 
about program effects are not statistically significant, the bottom line is that it is hard to conclude 
that induction programs on average have any effects on reducing teacher turnover. 
Last, for different sub-groups of first-year new teachers, there may be different patterns of 
the effects on turnover of induction programs. Patterns differ by teachers’ gender and age, as 
well as by schools’ level and location. For example, an induction program significantly increased 
turnover and transfer turnover of teachers who are female, not regular full-time, had bachelor’s 
degree, and significantly reduced turnover and transfer turnover of teachers whose age is 
between 20 and 23 years old, and/or who worked in combined schools. An induction program 
increased minority teachers’ turnover and exit turnover significantly, and reduced math and 





schools, an induction program increased teachers’ transfer turnover but reduced teachers’ exit 
turnover. These different patterns may suggest that different mechanisms dominate in explaining 
how first-year new teachers’ induction participation and turnover for different sub-groups of 
teachers. 
In summary, as most previous studies have found, preliminary regression analysis of this 
study also finds a statistically significant positive relationship between participation in an 
induction program and teacher turnover reduction. However, given that program participation is 
a self-selection process, it is very difficult to interpret this relationship causally. To address this 
issue, this study takes advantage of a relative exogenous source of variation, the variation in the 
timing of state legislation in mandatory induction requirements, and uses it as the instrumental 
variable for induction program participation for identification. It is found that states do have their 
induction program participation rates increased by 20% points, however, induction program 
participation tends to increase, rather than decrease, teachers’ switching between schools, and is 
not able to influence teachers’ exiting teaching. Since these estimates are not statistically 
different from zero, it implies that new-teacher induction programs hardly have any effects on 
reducing teacher turnover. It is particularly true for those teachers who participated in an 
induction program only because of a mandatory law requirement and would not have 
participated had no such a law implemented. 
Three potential reasons may explain why an induction program does not reduce teacher 
turnover. The first reason is that IV estimate is a local estimator and only applies to “compliers”. 
As previously mentioned, “compliers” in this study are those teachers who would not have 
participated in an induction program had no mandatory law required them to do so. To some 





which may prevent them from actively learning through an induction program. It could also be 
that their schools tend to passively accept rather than actively create a condition to implement 
induction programs. These passive factors may add up together to make it hard for a teacher to 
absorb program effects, even when the program theoretically has an effect. The second reason is 
that although a state mandatory induction law does help to increase first-year new teachers’ 
participation of an induction program, it does not seem to increase the participation of a 
comprehensive level of induction services. However, in terms of reducing teacher turnover, it is 
likely that a comprehensive induction program works, whereas a regular one does not. As for the 
third reason, it may be helpful to do an analysis of what theoretical roles95 an induction program 
may have. New-teacher induction programs play two related but distinct roles: specific 
training96, and/or exposure to job-related experiences. Economic theories imply that both 
specific training and job-experience exposure influence teachers’ job turnover. Specifically, the 
more specific training a worker has, the less likely he/she leaves the job; however, more 
exposure to job-related experiences does not monotonically predict a worker’s probability of 
leaving, depending on how good the job-match is. In the case of new-teacher induction programs 
in this study, a possible scenario may be that those programs help little in increasing one’s 
teaching specific human capital, whereas it helps to accelerate teachers’ process of getting 
familiar with their jobs, and teachers may realize more quickly that their jobs are not as pleasant 
as they expected. 
                                                 
95 See You (2010) for a summary of relevant theoretical models. 
96 The training could be school-specific, district-specific, or even profession-specific, depending on the scope of the 





This study has several limitations. First, the sample size of first-year new public school 
teachers is relatively small97, especially when identification needs state and cycle fixed effects to 
be added. Second, surveys are conducted only once every three or four years, which may provide 
no information of years in between. Third, induction programs differ from one to another, and 
their implementation varies as well; however, there is no information about program 
implementation and components of programs are only available for recent cycles of surveys. If 
information is available to address the above three limitations, more precise estimates may be 
obtained. Fourth, this study only has measures of one-year teacher turnover; therefore the 
conclusions do not apply to turnover over years. And last, IV estimates only apply to 
“compliers”, and inference based on IV estimates cannot be generalized to other groups. 
Despite these limitations, this study makes several contributions to the literature. First, this 
study uses data drawn from multiple cycles of SASS/TFS surveys, while previous studies used 
only one cycle of this national survey.  Therefore, findings of this study are more generalizable 
both geographically and temporally. Second, this study uses timing variation of state mandatory 
induction legislation as the instrumental variable and incorporates it with a difference-in-
differences framework to address the endogeneity issue in the estimation the effects of induction 
programs on teacher turnover. This is different from most previous studies that arbitrarily assume 
that induction participation is an exogenous variable. Third, this study compares different 
methods in the estimation of induction program effects, while previous studies usually apply one 
single method. Lastly, this study conducts a comprehensive legal research for all 50 states and 
the District of Columbia’s education provisions, and finds that a mandatory induction law 
increases only first-year new teachers’ participation in an average induction program, not their 
                                                 
97 Usually IV studies have very large sample size, for example Angrist and Krueger (1991)’s sample size ranges from 





participation in comprehensive induction services; it also finds that an average induction 
program is not able to reduce teacher turnover. It is the first attempt in literature to link the 
interpretation of induction programs’ effect to the background of relevant legislation. 
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CHAPTER 5 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS BASED ON NYC DATA 
 
This chapter presents the results of empirical analysis based on the NYC Department of 
Education administrative Data. Two key research questions are addressed in this chapter: What 
are the determinants of newly hired teachers’ time to turnover, and whether NYC mentoring 
policy has effects on teachers’ time to turnover. Specifically, section 5.1 provides an introduction 
of New York City public K-12 education and its city-wide mentoring program from 2004-05 to 
2006-07 school years. Section 5.2 shows general trends of newly hired teachers’ demographic, 
school, retention characteristics, as well as differences in terms of these characteristics between 
years that have and have no effective mentoring policy. Section 5.3 presents the results with 
regard to determinants of new teachers’ time to turnover. Section 5.4 attempts to evaluate 
whether the NYC mentoring policy has effects on increasing new teachers’ time to turnover 
using difference-in-differences strategies. Section 5.5 conducts sub-group analysis and explores 
potential heterogeneous policy effect on new teachers’ time to turnover. And section 5.6 
summarizes the findings. 
 
5.1 Public K-12 Education in NYC and the Mentoring Program 
5.1.1 Public K-12 education in NYC 
The New York City Department of Education (DOE) manages the city’s public school 
system in all five boroughs of the city (including Manhattan, Brooklyn, Queens, Bronx, and 
Staten Island). It is the largest, and arguably the most influential system of schools in the United 
States, consisting of over 1,700 schools that employ 75,000 teachers and serve about 1.1 million 
students each year. For the school year 2011-12, DOE’s total budget is $24 billion, with about 
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$19 billion of total budget being operating budget, funding for principals, teachers, textbooks, 
and supplies.98  
Unlike most of the traditional public school systems in the United States, beginning in 2002 
New York City public school system has shifted to the control of the mayor rather an elected 
school board. NYC public schools were previously grouped into 37 districts. In 2003, the 
districts were grouped into 10 geographical regions99. In 2007 the regions were dissolved and 
schools were organized into one of 11 school support organizations, categorized as three main 
types including Empowerment Support Organization, Learning Support Organization, and 
Partnership Support Organization. Different from previous geographical support structures, the 
current network support organization structure is more flexible in supporting local schools to 
make their key decisions. In exchange for the increased autonomy to run their schools, school 
principals signed with DOE a performance agreement of increased responsibility for the 
outcomes of their students. And Progress Report100 and NYC School Survey101 are among the 
DOE evaluation tools. 
Under the broad background of demographic changes in the United States (e.g., baby boom 
echo generation getting to school age, increasing number of teachers getting retired), New York 
City has had a teacher shortage problem for more than ten years. Teacher shortage is particular 
challenging for New York City for the following several reasons. The first one is that, as a huge 
urban school system, its teacher turnover problem is more severe. Its annual separation rate is 
10%; and for new teachers, the rate is 18%.102 Teacher turnover rates are particularly high in 
                                                 
98 New York City Department of Education – About us (http://schools.nyc.gov/AboutUs/default.htm) & Funding out schools 
(http://schools.nyc.gov/AboutUs/funding/overview/default.htm). 
99 The 11th “region” is special education programs. 
100 Progress Report grades schools based on student performance, progress, and school environment. 
101 NYC School Survey provides feedback from parents, teachers, and students on four aspects of school learning environments, 
including safety & respect, communication, engagement, and academic expectation. 
102  http://www.nyc.gov/html/records/pdf/govpub/1024teachersal.pdf 
217 
 
high poverty, urban schools. The percentage of students who are eligible for reduced and free 
lunch is 70% for an average NYC school. The second reason is due to its diversity of student-
body characteristics. More than 80%103 of students are ethnic minorities, and about 40% of 
students live in households where a language other than English is spoken. And these 
characteristics do not provide favorable working conditions for teachers. In addition, school 
and/or class size reduction reforms to a certain extent exacerbate NYC’s teacher shortage 
problems. NYC has replaced underperforming big high schools with smaller secondary schools 
since 2002, and creating 528104 new schools. And beginning in 2007, NYC has also passed and 
implemented a Five Year Class Size Reduction Plan. 
In order to recruit and retain teachers, particularly in highest need schools and critical 
shortage subject areas, programs such as the Teaching Fellows program and Teachers of 
Tomorrow (TOT) program have been launched since 2000. The Teaching Fellows program 
provides an alternative route to teaching certification by recruiting and training individuals to 
become teachers in highest-need schools and critical shortage area. The Teachers of Tomorrow 
(TOT) program provides financial incentives (e.g., recruitment incentives, and tuition 
reimbursement) for teachers who take challenging assignments and teach in highest-need schools. 
 
5.1.2 NYC mentoring program 
At the end of 2003, following the passage of the bill (EDU-05-03-0007, listed in New York 
State Register) requiring mentoring for new teachers, the Commissioner’s Regulations were 
revised accordingly.  Under the revised provisions of the Commissioner’s Regulations, effective 
                                                 
103 Calculated based on numbers from Wikipedia for 2007. 
104 Number from DOE is 528, but number from Ed Week is 200. 
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on February 2, 2004, new teachers with less than two105 years of teaching experience must 
participate in a mentoring program in the first year of employment to meet the teaching 
experience requirement for the professional certificate (8 CRR-NY 80-3.4), and the school 
districts are responsible to plan, design, and implement such programs (8 CRR-NY 100.2). 
Arguably motivated by the passage of this state law, in August of 2004, New York City 
Department of Education, with its partners the United Federation of Teachers (UFT) and the 
New Teacher Center at the University of California, Santa Cruz (NTC), jointly launched one of 
the largest mentoring programs in the United States, with an annual budget of $36 million. This 
program is a one-year comprehensive program based largely on the NTC model. Mentors are 
rigorously selected based on qualities of an effective mentor (NTC Policy Paper, April 2006, 
p.13), extensively trained by the NTC through a professional development program, provided 
with an instructionally-based formative new teacher assessment system, and matched with first-
year teachers by grade level and subject area whenever possible.  Mentors are released full time 
from their original job to meet with each new teacher assigned to them for at least 1.5 hours 
every 6 school days, and the designed teacher-to-mentor ratio is 17:1 (NTC Policy Paper, April 
2006, p.5).  Assignment into the mentoring program was related to whether a teacher had prior 
experience and whether or not the teacher was hired on-time; however, this variation is not due 
to criteria designed by the program.106 Generally, the program requirements were met, although 
there were variations in the implementation of the mentoring program. The top 20% of 
applicants who are finally hired as mentors are selected from an application pool based on 
                                                 
105 Based on Rockoff (2008) and NTC Policy Paper (April, 2006), this New York State requirement is for teachers with less than 
one year of teaching experience.  However, the original provision of state administrative regulations and codes (8 CRR-NY 80-
3.4) is as follows.  “[The candidate] shall be required to participate in a mentored program in the first year of employment, 
unless candidate has successfully completed two years of teaching experience prior to such teaching in the public schools”. 
106 See Figure 4 and its explanations in Rockoff (2008) for correlation between program participation and prior experience, 
and/or hired on-time. The only explicit, official goal of the assignment process was to match teachers with mentors who had 
expertise in their subject areas (Rockoff, 2008, section 4.1). 
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comprehensive selection criteria (NTC Policy Paper, April 2006, p.13), over 90% of mentors 
worked full time107, the average number of teachers in a mentor’s caseload is around 16108, and 
mean hours mentoring received is about 1.25 – 1.5 hours every 6 school days109. 
This mentoring program had been implemented for three years until the organizational 
structure change of NYC Department of Education in 2007.  After the school year 2006-07, the 
city-wide program was discontinued (Rockoff, 2008, footnote 6), and current new-teacher 
induction and mentoring is implemented by individual schools under NYC and NYS 
requirements of mentoring and teacher certification. 
 
In summary, major changes and reforms of New York City Department of Education is 
illustrated with a historical timeline in FIGURE 5.1. 
 
                                                 
107 See Table 2 in Rockoff (2008). 
108 See Table 2 in Rockoff (2008). 
109 Table 2 in Rockoff (2008) shows that the mean mentoring hours received per teacher is 32.0 for 2004-05 year and 39.1 for 
2005-06 year.  I calculate teacher’s real work days (154 days) by subtracting 14 holidays, 5 personal days, and 7 sick days from 
180 work days in a school year.  Then I calculate how many 6-day cycles are for one school year by dividing 154 work days by 6, 
which is 25.67.  Finally I divide 32.0 and 39.1 by the 25.67. If teacher’s total number of work days per year is 180, then the hours 
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In the following sections, the results of the empirical analysis based on NYC DOE data are 
presented.  DOE administrative data include information concerning teacher demographic 
characteristics (e.g., age, gender, race and ethnicity, subject area), years of experience (as a 
measure of teacher qualification), and teacher employment information (e.g., schools in which 
teachers are employed, time points at which teachers begin and end their job in a specific school 
and/or DOE), as well as information on school demographics, progress report grade, and learning 
environment scores (e.g., safety & respect, communication, engagement, and academic 
expectation). Given that DOE administrative data track longitudinal information for every 
teacher in the record, it is possible to perform analysis to overcome two limitations of the study 
in previous chapter based on SASS/TFS. Specifically, the working sample size is ten times larger 
(e.g., 20000 vs. 2000); and it is possible to answer “when” teachers leave, rather than limit the 
answer to “whether” they leave. 
Rockoff (2008) is the only previous study that has examined the effect of the NYC 
mentoring program’s effect. Although a number of different teacher and student outcome 
variables are examined in his paper, in terms of teacher retention/turnover, his paper uses three 
dummy variables, including completing year 1, retention to year 2, and returning to school in 
year 2, as measures. This current study expands measures of turnover employed in Rockoff 










5.2 Descriptive Statistics 
5.2.1 General trends over years 
In this section, several trends with regard to characteristics of New York City newly hired 
teacher force, their time to turnover, and characteristics of their schools are presented. It provides 
a general picture of what have been changing along with changes in NYC mentoring policy. 
FIGURE 5.2 displays the trends of average age and teaching experience of NYC new 
teacher work force. It shows that mean age of newly hired teachers has been slightly decreasing 
over time. Mean prior teaching experience of newly hired teachers abruptly decreases before 
2004, and afterwards slightly decreases over time. The abrupt drop may be due to the fact that 
the sample prior to 2004 includes some teachers who are not new hires cannot be identified due 
to lack of information. 110 Figure 5.2 also shows that a very high proportion (over 80%) of newly 
hired teachers are hired on time (hired in July, August, and September), and this proportion is 
increasing over time. In particular, this proportion was relatively low in years of 2004 through 
2006. Given that these years are also the years in which NYC mentoring policy is in effect, the 
trend may reflect the fact that schools and the DOE reallocated time and efforts from their 
regular administrative work to implementation of NYC mentoring policy during these years. The 
proportion of newly hired teachers who were hired on-time in 1999 is zero. Teachers who are 
recorded with a change of job status in DOE transaction file in January to June of 2000 are 
considered as 1999 cohort (teachers who are newly hired in 1999-2000 school year), and are by 
definition hired late. 
                                                 
110 NYC DOE pedagogue files are only available for years from 2003 to 2009. A teacher’s employment status is determined 
according to both pedagogue files and transaction data file. Prior to 2004 (especially for years prior to 2003), whether a teacher 















































1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
year
Age Prior Teaching Experience
Hired On Time
 
FIGURE 5.2: Trends of New Teachers’ Average Age, Prior Teaching Experience, and 
Proportion of On-time Hires 
Notes: The left vertical axis is mean age, and the right vertical axis refers to mean years of prior teaching experience 
as well as proportion of hired on-time. Proportion of new hires who are hired on-time is zero in 1999 is due to 
definition of 1999 cohort of new hires and definition of hired on-time. 
 
FIGURE5.3 shows the trends of proportions of newly hired teachers who are male, and who 
are of different race and ethnicity. It shows that after year 2001 a higher proportion of white 
teachers and lower proportion of black teachers were newly hired. Gender composition of newly 




























FIGURE 5.3: Trends of Proportions of Male New Teachers and of New Teachers of Different 
Race and Ethnicity 
 
FIGURE 5.4 shows the trends of proportions of newly hired teachers by their subject area. 
The proportion of math and science teachers increased before 2003, afterwards it decreased 
slightly, and after 2008 it increased at a higher speed. The proportion of special education 
teachers increased over time. The proportion of teachers who teach English language learners 
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year
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Special Education
 
FIGURE 5.4: Trends of Proportions of New Hires in Different Subject Areas 
Notes: ELL refers teachers whose teachng subject area is teaching English language learners. 
 
FIGURE 5.5 shows the trends of demographic characteritics of schools, by which new 
teachers are hired. It shows that average school enrollment decreased clearly beginning in 2003, 
and other school student-body characteristics (e.g., percentages of students who were speical 
education students, who were English language learners, who were eligible to reduced or free 
lunch, percentages of students of different race and ethnical groups, of different gender) were 
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FIGURE 5.5: Trends of School Enrollment and Student-body Characteristics 
Notes: ELL refers to students who are English language learners. 
 
FIGURE 5.6 shows the trends of proportions of newly hired teachers who were from 
different types of schools.  It shows that the proportion of new teachers who were hired by an 
elementary school decreases over time. The proportion of those who were hired by a high school 





























FIGURE 5.6: Trends of Proportion of New Hires of Different Types of Schools 
 
FIGURE 5.7 shows the trends of schools’ average progress report grade and learning 
environment scores.111 Progress report of NYC grades schools based on student progress, 
performance, and environment beginning in 2006-07 school year. Learning environment scores, 
including safety and respect score, communication scores, engagement scores, and academic 
expectation scores were summary scores of community’s opinions on these four aspects based on 
NYC school surveys beginning in 2006-07.  Focusing on the years after the 2006-07 school year, 
it shows that NYC schools on average improved over time in terms of progress report grade and 
four aspects of learning environment scores.  
 
                                                 
111  Given that Progress Report and School Learning Environment Survey begin since 2007, grade and scores for years prior to 
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Year
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Academic Score
 
FIGURE 5.7: Trends of School Progress Report Grade and Learning Environment Scores 
Notes: Learning environment scores are from NYC school surveys participated by principals, teachers, parants, and 
students in 6-12 grades. 
 
FIGURE 5.8 displays the Kaplan-Meier survival estimates of time to turnover, to transfer 
turnover, and to exit turnover in panel (A), panel (B) and panel (C) respectively. Kaplan-Meier 
survival estimate is a non-parametric estimate of survival time. It shows that newly hired 
teachers in the earliest years (e.g., 1999, 2000, 2001) had higher survival times. It is due partially 
the fact that a higher portion of teachers in the sample in earliest years include not only new hires 
but also incumbent teachers who were not able to be identified due to lack of information in 
pedagogue datafiles provided by NYC DOE. Given that NYC DOE pedagogue data files are not 
available for years prior to 2003, estimates of survival times for earliest years may represent 






do not have enough time to display their changes of employment status. Therefore, in the 
analysis that followes, only teachers who were newly hired in 2003 through 2006 are included in 
the sample, and other teacher samples from other years are used for consistentcy checks. 
Esimates of survival times for years after 2003 are not distinguishable from each other. In terms 
of the patterns of survival estimates, panel (B) displays a sharp drop at the right end of the 
curves, whereas panel (C) does not display such a sharp drop. It implies that teachers may finally 
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Panel (C) Time to Exit Turnover 
FIGURE 5.8: Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates of Time to Turnover by Year 
Notes: The horizontal axis is the analysis time t, and the vertical axis is estimated survivor function indicating the 
probability of surviving after t. 
 
5.2.2 Difference in teacher and school characteristics by NYC mentoring policy status 
New York City mentoring policy requires implementation of a city-wide mentoring 
program in 2004. In 2007 the policy changes and the mentoring program is no longer a city-wide 
one. The mentoring programs are implemented by individual schools. The mentoring policy in 
this study refers only to the one that requires a city-wide mentoring program. 
 TABLE 5.1 shows the difference in terms of teacher and school characteristics between 
teachers who are newly hired in the year before and after the implementation of the NYC 
mentoring policy. Only 2003-2006 samples of teacher are used. It shows that retention rates, 
time to turnover and hazard rate112 of turnover differ significantly before and after the 
implementation of mentoring policy. Moreover, it is worthy of note that a number of teacher and 
school characteristics also differ before and after the implementation of mentoring policy, 
including males, blacks, Hispanics, age, prior teaching experience, hired on-time, ELL and/or 
special education teachers, school types (e.g., elementary, middle, high, combined), school 
enrollments, ELL%, white%, Asian%, and female% of student-body, and school learning 
environment scores. 
 
TABLE 5.1: Difference Before and After Implementation of Mentoring Policy 
  Mentoring Policy Difference 
  no yes 
 
                                                 






 Mean SD Mean SD   
Teacher demographic characteristics 
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 School type and enrollment 
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   Hazard Rate of Turnover 0.203 - 0.151 - 0.052 *** 
  (0.004)   (0.002)   (0.005)   
Notes: Teachers newly hired in years from 2003 to 2006 are included in the sample. Standard errors are reported in 







5.3 Determinants of Time to Teacher Turnover 
This section presents survival models of different specifications, using different years of 
sample and different missing data imputation methods. These models are compared and a final 
survival model is selected for inference based on graphical examinations of underlying 
assumptions and Akaike Information Criterion of model fit. 
 
5.3.1 Proportional hazard (PH) models versus accelerated failure time (AFT) models  
There are two types of survival models, proportional hazard (PH) models and accelerated 
failure time (AFT) models. The difference between these two types of survival models lies in 
their underlying assumptions. PH models compare the hazards, assuming the effect of covariates 
is multiplicative (proportional) with respect to hazard, whereas AFT models compare the 
survival times, assuming the effect of covariates is multiplicative with respect to survival time. 
This section presents results of both PH models and AFT models with only one explanatory 
variable, mentoring policy, which is a dummy variable with 1 indicating a teacher is newly hired 
in years of 2004, 2005, or 2006, and 0 indicating a teacher is newly hired in years other than 
2004, 2005, and 2006. 
TABLE 5.2 shows the results. Models in column 1 through 3 are proportional hazard 
models, assuming constant hazard ratio. Specifically, model in column 1 is Cox model, which is 
a semi-parametric model and does not parameterize baseline hazard. Exponential and Weibull 
models are parametric models. Models in column 4 through 7 are accelerated failure time (AFT) 
models, which are all parametric models. Specifically, Exponential and Weibull models in 






difference lies in the interpretation of estimated coefficients. The exponential of estimated 
coefficients in PH models are interpreted as the change of hazard ratio associated with the 
explanatory variable, while the exponential of estimated coefficients in AFT models are 
interpreted as the change of acceleration factor of survival times. No matter whether AFT models 
or PH models are used, Exponential and Weibull models assume a proportional hazard ratio. 
Model in column 6 is a Log-logistic AFT model, which assumes not proportional hazard (PH) 
ratio but proportional odds (PO) ratio. Model in column 7 is another parametric AFT model, 
Log-normal model, and it does not assume either PH or PO. 
To select an appropriate model for the estimation of survival times, graphical examinations 
of PH and/or PO assumptions and Akaike Information Criterion of model fit are used as criteria. 
FIGURE 5.7 shows the graphical examinations. Lines in the figures do not parallel and even 
cross, which indicates that neither proportional hazards (PH, assuming hazard ratio are constant 
between two groups, e.g., mentoring policy groups) nor proportional odds (PO, assuming odds 
ratio is constant between two groups, e.g., mentoring policy groups) assumptions are satisfied. In 
terms of the model fit, parametric models have lower AIC values compared with Cox 








TABLE 5.2: Model Selection Between Cox Proportional Hazard Model and Parametric AFT Models 
  PH model AFT model 
  Cox Exponential Weibull Exponential Weibull Log-logistic Log-normal 













 Constant - 
 

















-0.065  *** - 
 
-0.065  *** -0.187  *** 0.430  *** 
  -   -   (0.006)   -   (0.006)   (0.006)   (0.005)   











 AIC 404511.7   92332.26   92216.69   92332.26   92216.69   91633.94   93235.4   
Notes: Teachers newly hired in years from 2003 to 2006 are included in the sample. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Exponential and Weibull models 
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FIGURE 5.9: Graphical Examinations of PH and PO assumptions 
Note: Figures in the upper panel are examinations of PH assumption, and the figure in the lower panel is the 
examination of PO assumption. 
 
5.3.2 Log-normal AFT models with different sets of explanatory variables 
This section presents results of Log-normal AFT models with different sets of explanatory 
variables, their transformations, and interaction terms. 
TABLE 5.3 reports results of Log-normal AFT models with different sets of explanatory 
variables. Specifically, model (1) adds only the mentoring policy variable, model (2) adds in 
variables of individual teacher characteristics in addition to the mentoring policy variable, model 
(3) further adds in teacher experience variables, model (4) adds in school enrollment, school type 
variables in addition to variables in model (3), model (5) further adds in school learning 






and progress report grade, but removes special education variable.113 Model (6) has the lowest 
AIC statistic and is used as the model specification for interpretation of estimates. Mentoring 
policy, gender, race and ethnicity, subject area, prior teaching experience, school enrollment, 
school type, student-body characteristics, progress report grade and learning environment scores 
are determinants of new teachers’ time to turnover. Specifically, mentoring policy, being white, 
black and/or Hispanic, more prior teaching experience, teaching in a high school, more 
percentages of free lunch students, more percentages of white and Asian students are associated 
with longer time to turnover, while being male, teaching math & science, teaching ELL, teaching 
in a middle school, having more percentage of ELL students, and having higher engagement 
scores are associated with shorter time to turnover. 
  
                                                 






TABLE 5.3: Log-normal AFT Models with Different Sets of Covariates 
  Log-normal AFT models     
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 















-0.164  *** -0.168 *** -0.088 *** -0.061  *** -0.031  
 












0.361  *** 0.356 *** 0.082 *** 0.064  *** 0.056  * 












0.367  *** 0.338 *** 0.095 *** 0.156  *** 0.230  *** 












0.490  *** 0.460 *** 0.141 *** 0.153  *** 0.205  *** 




























 Math & Science 
  
-0.204 *** -0.193 *** -0.113 *** -0.126 *** -0.124 *** 












-0.418 *** -0.416 *** -0.238 *** -0.239 *** -0.198 *** 










 Special Education 
  
-0.086 *** -0.081 *** -0.064 *** -0.040 * -0.026 
 




























 Prior Teaching Experience 

















 Novice Teacher 
    
-0.527 
 
-0.423 *** -0.384 *** -0.367 *** 








 Total Enrollment 
      
0.000 *** 0.000  *** 0.000  *** 







      






       
0.068   (0.068)   (0.792)   
Middle 
      
-0.346 ** -0.017    -0.093  *** 
       
0.023   (0.030)   (0.034)   
High 
      
-0.284 *** 0.001    0.067  * 
       
0.026   (0.032)   (0.038)   
Combined 
      
-0.177 *** 0.099  *** 0.049    
       
0.026   (0.031)   (0.034)   
Special Education 
      
0.090 ** 0.345  ***     
       
0.041   (0.044)       
Transfer 
      
-0.071   -0.147    -0.013    
       
0.095   (0.095)   (0.098)   
Free Lunch % 
          
0.002  *** 
           
(0.001) 
 ELL % 
          
-0.003  ** 
           
(0.001) 
 Special Education % 
          
-0.004  ** 
           
(0.002) 
 White % 
          
0.014  * 
           
(0.007) 
 Black % 
          
0.005  
 
           
(0.007) 
 Hispanic % 
          
0.006  
 
           
(0.007) 
 Asian % 
          
0.015  ** 
           
(0.008) 
 Female % 
          
-0.001  
 
           
(0.001) 
 Progress Report Grade 
          
0.040  *** 
           
(0.009) 
 Safety & Respect Score 
        
0.301  *** 0.041  
 











        
0.000  
 
0.224  *** 




 Engagement Score 
        
-0.374  *** -0.373  *** 




 Academic Expectation 
Score 
        
0.389  *** 0.293  *** 












0.078   (0.146)   (0.752)   
Shape Parameters 0.430  *** 0.421  *** 0.419 *** 0.242 *** 0.230  *** 0.237  *** 




(0.006)   (0.006)   




30574   28681   28681 
 
26019 
 AIC 93235.4   92005.75   91861.74   78237.01   77543.73   69935.78   







TABLE 5.4 compares models using transformations of age variable. Specifically, model (1) 
is the same model as the model (6) in TABLE 5.3. Model (2) further add in a square term of the 
age variable, model (3) uses age group dummy variables instead of continuous variables, and 
model (4) add in both of continuous age variables and dummy age group variables 
simultaneously. In model (1), age is not a statistically significant determinant of teachers’ time to 
turnover. However, after adding in the square term of the age variable in model (2), both age and 
age square become significant determinants, implying that time to turnover is first increasing 
then decreasing with entering age of newly hired teachers. In models (3) and (4), age group 
dummy variables are not statistically significant. In models (1) through (4), other determinants of 
time to turnover have very similar patterns, and their magnitude and significant level change 
little. Model (2) is chosen as the baseline model for the following comparisons because it 
captures most information and has a relatively small AIC value. 
TABLE 5.4 also compares models with and without deleting age outliers. Specifically, 
models (5) and (6) exclude those new hires whose age is larger than 60 and 45, respectively. 
Compared with the baseline model (2), the magnitude and significance of estimates in model (5) 
change little, implying that outliers do not matter and can be kept in the sample. In addition, 
when new hires whose age is above 45 are excluded in the model (6), some estimates change in 
magnitude and significance level, including mentoring policy, age etc. It implies that these 







TABLE 5.4: Log-normal AFT Models Using Transformations of Age and w/ and w/o Age Outliers 
  Log-normal AFT models     
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 













 Male -0.031  
 


























































 Age -0.001  
 
0.021  *** 
  
















-0.0003 ** -0.0003 *** 0.0004 
 
   
(0.000) 











     




     Age>=35 




     





































































































































 Early 0.452    0.446    0.448   0.421   0.445    0.456    
 
(0.792)   (0.792)   (0.791)   (0.790)   (0.792)   (0.771)   
Middle -0.093  *** -0.091  *** -0.093 *** -0.092 *** -0.092  *** -0.074  ** 
 
(0.034)   (0.034)   (0.034)   (0.034)   (0.034)   (0.034)   
High 0.067  * 0.067  * 0.065 * 0.068 * 0.065  * 0.081  ** 
 
(0.038)   (0.038)   (0.038)   (0.038)   (0.038)   (0.039)   
Combined 0.049    0.049    0.049   0.050   0.050    0.076  ** 
 
(0.034)   (0.034)   (0.034)   (0.034)   (0.034)   (0.034)   
Transfer -0.013    -0.016    -0.014   -0.015   -0.014    -0.028    
 
(0.098)   (0.098)   (0.098)   (0.098)   (0.098)   (0.100)   















































































































































































































 Academic Expectation 













 Constant 4.991  *** 4.572  *** 4.962 *** 4.680 *** 4.541  *** 5.183  *** 
 
(0.752)   (0.762)   (0.752)   (0.776)   (0.765)   (0.803)   
Shape Parameters 0.237  *** 0.237  *** 0.238 *** 0.237 *** 0.238  *** 0.212  *** 




(0.006)   (0.006)   




26019   26019   25915 
 
23681 
 AIC 69935.78   69926.38   69938.21   69917.77   69632.41   62995.71   
Notes: Teachers newly hired in years from 2003 to 2006 are included in the sample of models (1) through (4).  Models (5) and (6) exclude observations whose 








TABLE 5.5 compares models using transformations of the school total enrollment variable. 
Specifically, model (1) is the same model as model (2) in TABLE 5.4, and it is used as the 
baseline model for comparison. Models (2) and (3) add in a square term of the enrollment 
variable and dummy variables of large and small schools, respectively, and model (4) adds in 
these terms simultaneously. Although model (2) shows the square term of enrollment is 
statistically significant, but the magnitude is very close to zero114, therefore, it does not capture 
more information. However, when two dummy variables of large and small schools that are 
created according to school enrollment are added in models (3) and (4), it shows that new hires 
in large schools have significantly longer time to turnover, and those in small schools have 
significantly shorter time to turnover. Given that model (3) and model (4) have almost same 
estimates and AIC values, model (3) is chosen as the baseline model for later analysis due to its 
simplicity. 
 
TABLE 5.5: Log-normal AFT Models Using Transformation of Total Enrollment 
  Log-normal AFT models 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
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 Total Enrollment 0.000  *** 0.000  *** 
  





   
(0.000) 
 Total Enrollment2 
  
0.000 *** 
    
   
(0.000) 
     Large 
    
0.178  *** 0.141  *** 





    
-0.076  *** -0.059  ** 




 Early 0.446   0.517   0.448   0.456  
 
 
(0.792)   (0.791)   (0.792)   (0.791) 
 Middle -0.091  *** -0.075  ** -0.107  *** -0.094  
 
 
(0.034)   (0.034)   (0.034)   (0.034) 
 High 0.067  * 0.114  ** 0.116  *** 0.102  
 
 
(0.038)   (0.039)   (0.039)   (0.040) 
 Combined 0.049    0.068  ** 0.047    0.056  
 
 
(0.034)   (0.034)   (0.033)   (0.034) 
 Transfer -0.016    0.046    0.019    0.022  
 
 
(0.098)   (0.099)   (0.099)   (0.099) 
































 White % 0.014  * 0.011  
 









































 Asian % 0.015  ** 0.012  
 









































































 Academic Expectation 









 Constant 4.572  *** 4.612  *** 4.549  *** 4.609  *** 
 
(0.762)   (0.762)   (0.762)   (0.762)   
Shape Parameters 0.237  *** 0.236  *** 0.237  *** 0.237  *** 
  (0.006) 
 
(0.006)   (0.006)   (0.006)   





 AIC 69926.38   69894.02   69900.72   69897.53   
Notes: Teachers newly hired in years from 2003 to 2006 are included in the sample. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. Schools having more than 1000 enrollments are defined as large schools, and schools having less than 
450 enrollments are defined as small schools. These cutoffs are determined roughly according to 25% and 75% 
percentiles of school enrollment distribution. 
 
TABLE 5.6 further checks the results based on models adding square terms of student-body 
characteristics, including percentages of students who are eligible for free lunch, who are English 
learners, who are special education students, who are of different race and ethnicity groups, and 
who are female in models (2) through (4). Model (1) is the baseline model, which is the same as 
model (3) in TABLE 5.5. Results show that none of these square terms are statistically 
significant, except for square terms of percentage students who are eligible for free lunch and 
who are Asian. However, given the magnitude is too small, it has no significance for 
interpretation. These square terms are not added in models for later analysis. 
 
TABLE 5.6: Log-normal AFT Models Using Square Terms of Student-body Characteristics 
Variables 
  Log-normal AFT models 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 





























































 Age 0.021  
 





































































 Prior Teaching 











































 Early 0.448    0.378    0.416    0.451  
 
 
(0.792)   (0.792)   (0.792)   (0.792) 
 Middle -0.107  *** -0.132  *** -0.115  *** -0.110  *** 
 
(0.034)   (0.035)   (0.034)   (0.034)   
High 0.116  *** 0.083  ** 0.123  *** 0.110  *** 
 
(0.039)   (0.040)   (0.039)   (0.040) 
 Combined 0.047    0.020    0.041    0.045  
 
 
(0.033)   (0.034)   (0.033)   (0.033) 
 Transfer 0.019    -0.013    0.052    0.019  
 
 
(0.099)   (0.099)   (0.099)   (0.099) 


































 White % 0.015  * 0.013  
 














































 Asian % 0.016  * 0.013  
 

























 Free Lunch % 2 
  
-0.0001  *** 
    
   
(0.000) 
     ELL % 2 
  
0.0000  
     
   
(0.000) 
     Special Education % 2 
  
0.0000  
     
   
(0.000) 
     White % 2 
    
0.0000  
   
     
(0.000) 
   Black % 2 
    
0.0000  * 
  
     
(0.000) 
   Hispanic % 2 
    
0.0000  
   
     
(0.000) 
   Asian % 2 
    
-0.0001  *** 
  
     
(0.000) 
   Female % 2 
      
0.0001  
 
       
(0.000) 











































 Academic Expectation 









 Constant 4.549  *** 4.551  *** 4.574  *** 4.591  *** 
 
(0.762)   (0.761)   (0.771)   (0.762)   
Shape Parameters 0.237  *** 0.236  *** 0.236  *** 0.237  *** 
  (0.006) 
 
(0.006)   (0.006)   (0.006)   











Notes: Teachers newly hired in years from 2003 to 2006 are included in the sample. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. Model (1) is the baseline model, which is same as the model (3) in TABLE 5.5. 
 
TABLE 5.7 considers adding in interaction terms between newly hired teachers’ race and 
ethnicity variables and student-body characteristics in models (2) through (4), in order to 
examine whether ethnic match is a determinant of time to turnover. Model (1) is the baseline 
model, which is the same as model (3) in TABLE 5.5. Results show, however, none of these 
interaction terms are statistically significant. 
 
TABLE 5.7: Log-normal AFT Models Adding Ethnical Match Variables between Teacher and 
Student-body 
  Log-normal AFT models 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 

























 White 0.056  * 0.759  
 









 Black 0.228  *** 0.172  *** -2.146  
 



















 Age 0.021  
 






















































































































 Early 0.448    0.357    0.253    0.450    
 
(0.792)   (0.791)   (0.792)   (0.791)   
Middle -0.107  *** -0.109  *** -0.109  *** -0.107  *** 
 
(0.034)   (0.034)   (0.034)   (0.034)   
High 0.116  *** 0.117  *** 0.116  *** 0.119  *** 
 
(0.039)   (0.039)   (0.039)   (0.039)   
Combined 0.047    0.047    0.043    0.047    
 
(0.033)   (0.033)   (0.033)   (0.033)   
Transfer 0.019    0.033    0.030    0.023    
 
(0.099)   (0.099)   (0.099)   (0.099)   


































 White % 0.015  * 0.015  
 









































































     
   
(0.013) 
     White*black% 
  
-0.0096  
     
   
(0.013) 
     White*Hispanic% 
  
-0.0065  
     
   
(0.013) 
     White*Asian% 
  
-0.0053  
     
   
(0.013) 







    
0.0194  
   
     
(0.018) 
   Black*black% 
    
0.0268  
   
     
(0.018) 
   Black*Hispanic% 
    
0.0220  
   
     
(0.018) 
   Black*Asian% 
    
0.0167  
   
     
(0.019) 
   Hispanic*white% 
      
(0.016) 
 
       
(0.021) 
 Hispanic*black% 
      
(0.019) 
 
       
(0.021) 
 Hispanic*Hispanic% 
      
(0.020) 
 
       
(0.021) 
 Hispanic*Asian% 
      
(0.012) 
 
       
(0.021) 











































 Academic Expectation 









 Constant 4.549  *** 4.188  *** 5.053  *** 4.712  *** 
 
(0.762)   (1.161)   (0.797)   (0.786)   
Shape Parameters 0.237  *** 0.236  *** 0.236  *** 0.236  *** 
  (0.006) 
 
(0.006)   (0.006)   (0.006)   





 AIC 69900.72   69874.48   69862.05   69887.43   
Notes: Teachers newly hired in years from 2003 to 2006 are included in the sample. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. Model (1) is the baseline model, which is same as the model (3) in TABLE 5.5. 
 
5.3.3 Log-normal AFT models using different years of sample 
In this section, models using different years of sample are compared. Model (1) in Table 5.8 
is the current baseline model, which is the same model as the model (3) in TABLE 5.5. 






through (5) use teachers who were newly hired from 2003 to 2004, from 2003 to 2005, from 
2003 to 2006, and from 2006 to 2007, respectively.115 Compared with estimates in model (1), 
some estimates (e.g., mentoring policy) change in other models, especially when 2006 sample is 
added.116 It implies that 2006 may be a special cutoff year, in terms of teacher turnover. 
Therefore, in model (4) a dummy variable of years after 2006 is added in addition to mentoring 
policy. And results show that the dummy variable for years after 2006 is statistically significant, 
and it absorbs a certain part of the estimate for mentoring policy variable. In model (5), sample 
from only 2006 to 2007 are included. It shows that mentoring policy becomes no longer 
significant, and other estimates do change to some extent. Given that in year of 2007, NYC DOE 
changed in a number of aspects (e.g., its organization, individual school accountability 
requirements, class size reduction plan), using a dummy variable for the mentoring policy is not 
able to differentiate the mentoring policy’s effect from the year effect. In short, the finding on 
mentoring policy is affected by the sample year; 2007 sample is not used for later analysis, and 
model (4) with dummy variable for year after 2006 is used as the new baseline model for later 
analysis. 
 
TABLE 5.8: Log-normal AFT Models Using Different Years of Sample 
  Log-normal AFT models 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 












 Male -0.032  
 
















 White 0.056  * 0.035  
 












                                                 
115 Year of 2003 refers to 2003-04 school year, and so on. 
116 A model adding dummy variables of for each year is also performed, and it shows that estimate of dummy variable for 2006 


































































 ELL -0.203  *** -0.247 
 



















































 Prior Teaching 





















































 Early 0.448        0.391    0.410    0.524    
 
(0.792)       (1.270)   (0.793)   (0.647)   
Middle -0.107  *** -0.098  ** -0.125  *** -0.105  *** -0.069    
 
(0.034)   (0.048)   (0.040)   (0.034)   (0.049)   
High 0.116  *** 0.077    0.114  ** 0.133  *** 0.053    
 
(0.039)   (0.055)   (0.046)   (0.039)   (0.056)   
Combined 0.047    -0.023    0.024    0.047    0.027    
 
(0.033)   (0.048)   (0.039)   (0.033)   (0.047)   
Transfer 0.019    -0.031    0.101    -0.009    -0.250  * 
 
(0.099)   (0.132)   (0.114)   (0.099)   (0.135)   
Free Lunch % 0.001  ** 0.002  
 




































































































































 Progress Report Grade 0.039  *** 0.013  
 



















































 Academic Expectation 











 After 2006 
      
0.152  *** 
  
       
(0.025) 
   Constant 4.549  *** 3.924  *** 3.232  ** 3.908  *** 6.939  *** 
 
(0.762)   (1.148)   (0.933)   (0.770)   (1.012)   
Shape Parameters 0.237  *** 0.226  *** 0.238  *** 0.237  *** 0.238  *** 
  (0.006) 
 
(0.008)   (0.007)   (1.113)   (0.010)   







 AIC 69900.72   37806.76   54949.09   69865.89   27957.5   
Notes: Model (1) is the baseline model, which is same as the model (3) in TABLE 5.5. Models (1) and (4) use 
teachers newly hired in years from 2003 to 2006. Model (2) uses those from 2003 to 2004, model (3) uses those 
from 2003 to 2005, and model (6) uses those from 2006 to 2007. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.   
 
5.3.4 Log-normal AFT models using different missing data imputation methods 
In this section, the baseline model (model (4) in TABLE 5.8) is compared with models 
using different methods to impute missing values, given that different imputation methods may 
have different weaknesses and strengths and may result in different estimates. Specifically, 
model (1) is the baseline model, models (2) through (5) use mean imputation, dummy 
imputation, regression imputation, and multiple imputation. Results show that in general 






general trends are similar. Particularly, after mean imputation and dummy imputation of missing 
values, estimates of mentoring policy shrink towards zero. Multiple imputation results of the 
estimate of mentoring policy are closest to the estimate of the baseline model. The following 
analysis in section 5.3 will present both baseline model results as well as multiple imputation 
results. 
 
TABLE 5.9: Log-normal AFT Models Using Different Missing Data Imputation Methods 
  Log-normal AFT models 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 




(0.019)   (0.019)   (0.020)   (0.021)   
Male -0.032  
 




(0.019)   (0.019)   (0.020)   (0.021)   




(0.029)   (0.030)   (0.033)   (0.034)   




(0.035)   (0.036)   (0.039)   (0.040)   




(0.037)   (0.038)   (0.041)   (0.042)   




(0.006)   (0.006)   (0.007)   (0.007)   




(0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   




(0.024)   (0.024)   (0.026)   (0.030)   




(0.038)   (0.037)   (0.040)   (0.042)   
Special Education -0.031  
 




(0.023)   (0.023)   (0.025)   (0.026)   
Hired On Time 0.017  
 




(0.024)   (0.023)   (0.025)   (0.026)   
Prior Teaching 
Experience 0.002  
 




(0.010)   (0.010)   (0.011)   (0.011)   




(0.060)   (0.060)   (0.065)   (0.067)   









(0.022)   (0.022)   (0.024)   (0.029)   




(0.022)   (0.023)   (0.024)   (0.029)   
Early 0.410    -0.450  *** 0.224  *** -0.103    -0.193  * 
 
(0.793)   (0.065)   (0.086)   (0.078)   (0.106)   
Middle -0.105  *** -0.262  *** -0.090  *** 0.778  *** -0.141    
 
(0.034)   (0.027)   (0.033)   (0.032)   (0.082)   
High 0.133  *** -0.064  ** 0.121  *** 1.126  *** 0.127    
 
(0.039)   (0.031)   (0.038)   (0.037)   (0.095)   
Combined 0.047    -0.056  ** 0.051    0.919  *** 0.038    
 
(0.033)   (0.028)   (0.033)   (0.033)   (0.065)   
Transfer -0.009    -0.485  *** -0.006    0.729  *** 0.037    
 
(0.099)   (0.074)   (0.101)   (0.110)   (0.134)   
Special 
  
0.079  * 1.625  * 0.884  *** 0.298  ** 
   
(0.044)   (0.832)   (0.052)   (0.088)   




(0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   
ELL % -0.002  
 




(0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   
Special Education % -0.002  
 




(0.002)   (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.002)   




(0.007)   (0.007)   (0.008)   (0.001)   
Black % 0.010  
 




(0.008)   (0.007)   (0.008)   (0.001)   
Hispanic % 0.010  
 




(0.008)   (0.007)   (0.008)   (0.001)   




(0.008)   (0.008)   (0.008)   (0.001)   
Female % -0.001  
 




(0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   




(0.008)   (0.009)   (0.009)   (0.011)   




(0.029)   (0.030)   (0.031)   (0.035)   




(0.045)   (0.046)   (0.049)   (0.082)   




(0.043)   (0.043)   (0.046)   (0.073)   
Academic Expectation 




(0.054)   (0.054)   (0.058)   (0.056)   









(0.023)   (0.023)   (0.026)   (0.027)   
Constant 3.908  *** 4.213  *** 4.219  ** 0.465    4.647  *** 
 
(0.770)   (0.775)   (0.768)   (0.836)   (0.351)   
Shape Parameters 0.237  *** 0.281  *** 0.270  *** 0.355  *** 0.392  *** 
  (1.113) 
 
(0.005)   (0.005)   (0.836)   (0.005)   
No. of Obs. 26019   30846   30846   30846   30846   
AIC 69865.89   86097.42   85648.24   89144.19   -   
Notes: Teachers newly hired in years from 2003 to 2006 are included in the sample. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. Model (1) is the baseline model, which is the same model as model (4) in TABLE 5.8. Models (2) 







5.3.5 Log-normal AFT models for time to transfer turnover and time to exit turnover  
Next, determinants of time to transfer turnover and time to exit turnover are considered. 
TABLE 5.10 compares estimates of Log-normal AFT models for time to transfer turnover and 
time to exit turnover. Particularly, older new hires are associated with shorter time to transfer 
turnover but longer time to exit turnover. On-time hires are associated with longer time to 
transfer turnover, but shorter time to exit turnover. Higher percentages of free lunch students 
and/or Asian students are associated with longer time to exit turnover, but have no statistically 
significant relationships with time to transfer turnover. Moreover, higher percentages of ELL 






TABLE 5.10: Time to Transfer Turnover vs. Time to Exit Turnover 
  Log-normal AFT models 
 
Time to turnover Time to transfer turnover Time to exit turnover 
  complete cases 
multiple 
imputation complete cases 
multiple 
imputation complete cases 
multiple 
imputation 




(0.021)   (0.033) 
 
(0.037)   (0.024) 
 
(0.022)   
Male -0.032  
 
-0.067  *** -0.076  ** -0.132  *** -0.009  
 




(0.021)   (0.033) 
 
(0.037)   (0.024) 
 
(0.023)   
White 0.055  * 0.318  *** 0.057  *** 0.536  *** 0.036  
 




(0.034)   (0.054) 
 
(0.058)   (0.039) 
 
(0.038)   
Black 0.224  *** 0.513  *** 0.089  
 




(0.040)   (0.063) 
 
(0.068)   (0.047) 
 
(0.044)   




(0.042)   (0.067) 
 
(0.072)   (0.048) 
 
(0.046)   
Age 0.021  *** 0.015  ** -0.016  
 




(0.007)   (0.011) 
 
(0.012)   (0.008) 
 
(0.008)   
Age2 -0.0003  *** -0.0003 *** 0.0001 
 




(0.000)   (0.000) 
 
(0.000)   (0.000) 
 
(0.000)   
Math & Science -0.123  *** -0.107 *** -0.066 
 




(0.030)   (0.042) 
 
(0.050)   (0.030) 
 
(0.029)   
ELL -0.207  *** -0.381 *** -0.446 *** -0.767 *** -0.050 
 




(0.042)   (0.063) 
 
(0.069)   (0.049) 
 
(0.046)   
Special Education -0.031  
 
-0.075 *** -0.139 *** -0.201 *** 0.028 
 




(0.026)   (0.041) 
 
(0.045)   (0.030) 
 
(0.028)   
Hired On Time 0.017  
 




(0.026)   (0.040) 
 
(0.044)   (0.032) 
 
(0.030)   
Prior Teaching 
Experience 0.002  
 
0.013    0.008  
 
0.027    -0.004  
 




(0.011)   (0.017) 
 
(0.020)   (0.013) 
 










(0.067)   (0.103) 
 
(0.117)   (0.077) 
 
(0.072)   




(0.029)   (0.037) 
 
(0.052)   (0.026) 
 
(0.026)   




(0.029)   (0.041) 
 
(0.048)   (0.029) 
 
(0.027)   
Early 0.410    -0.193  * -0.880    -0.239    6.214    -0.171 ** 
 
(0.793)   (0.106)   (1.043)   (0.224)   (200.796)   (0.083)   
Middle -0.105  *** -0.141    -0.259  *** -0.256    -0.026    -0.063   
 
(0.034)   (0.082)   (0.057)   (0.130)   (0.041)   (0.053)   
High 0.133  *** 0.127    -0.046    0.108    0.214  *** 0.122 * 
 
(0.039)   (0.095)   (0.066)   (0.142)   (0.047)   (0.058)   
Combined 0.047    0.038    0.009    0.091    0.064    0.018   
 
(0.033)   (0.065)   (0.056)   (0.095)   (0.040)   (0.049)   
Transfer -0.009    0.037    -0.472  *** -0.324    0.242  ** 0.238 * 
 
(0.099)   (0.134)   (0.156)   (0.202)   (0.123)   (0.125)   
Special 
  
0.298  ** 
  
0.440  * 
  
0.181 *** 
   
(0.088)   
  
(0.146)   
  
(0.063)   
Free Lunch % 0.001  * -0.001    -0.002  
 




(0.001)   (0.001) 
 
(0.001)   (0.001) 
 
(0.001)   
ELL % -0.002  
 
-0.002    -0.004  * -0.006  ** -0.001  
 




(0.001)   (0.002) 
 
(0.002)   (0.001) 
 
(0.001)   
Special Education % -0.002  
 




(0.002)   (0.003) 
 
(0.005)   (0.002) 
 
(0.002)   
White % 0.018  ** 0.005  *** 0.014  
 




(0.001)   (0.013) 
 
(0.002)   (0.009) 
 
(0.002)   
Black % 0.010  
 
-0.003  ** 0.007  
 
-0.005  ** 0.009  
 




(0.001)   (0.013) 
 
(0.002)   (0.009) 
 
(0.002)   
Hispanic % 0.010  
 
-0.001    0.011  
 
0.002    0.007  
 




(0.001)   (0.013) 
 
(0.001)   (0.009) 
 
(0.002)   
Asian % 0.019  ** 0.010  *** 0.016  
 









(0.001)   (0.013) 
 
(0.002)   (0.009) 
 
(0.002)   
Female % -0.001  
 
0.002    0.001  
 






(0.001)   (0.002) 
 
(0.002)   (0.002) 
 
(0.001)   
Progress Report Grade 0.034  *** 0.041  *** 0.069  *** 0.084  *** 0.016 
 




(0.011)   (0.014) 
 
(0.020)   (0.010) 
 
(0.010)   
Safety & Respect Score 0.060  * 0.063    -0.029  
 




(0.035)   (0.052) 
 
(0.058)   (0.038) 
 
(0.034)   
Communication Score 0.132  *** 0.127    0.065  
 




(0.082)   (0.083) 
 
(0.117)   (0.059) 
 
(0.066)   




(0.073)   (0.076) 
 
(0.106)   (0.054) 
 
(0.054)   
Academic Expectation 




(0.056)   (0.095) 
 
(0.082)   (0.068) 
 
(0.056)   




(0.027)   (0.043) 
 
(0.046)   (0.030) 
 
(0.027)   
Constant 3.908  *** 4.647  *** 4.968  ** 4.897  *** 4.779    6.009 *** 
 
(0.770)   (0.351)   (1.300)   (0.705)   (0.921)   (0.301)   
Shape Parameters 0.237  *** 0.392  *** 0.509  *** 0.743  *** 0.308  *** 0.311 *** 
  (0.770) 
 
(0.005)   (0.010)   (0.008)   (0.921)   (0.007)   
No. of Obs. 26019   30846   26019 
 
30846   26019 
 
30846   
AIC 69865.89   -   38809.57   -   52360.18   -   









In summary, mentoring policy, being white, black and/or Hispanic, more prior teaching 
experience, teaching in a high school, a higher percentage of free lunch students, and/or higher 
percentages of white and Asian students are associated with longer time to turnover, while being 
male, teaching math & science, teaching ELL, teaching in a middle school, having a higher 
percentage of ELL students, and having higher engagement scores are associated with shorter 
time to turnover. Time to turnover first increases then decreases with entering age of newly hired 
teachers. If considering time to transfer turnover and time to exit turnover separately, older new 
hires are associated with shorter time to transfer turnover but longer time to exit turnover; on-
time hires are associated with longer time to transfer turnover, but shorter time to exit turnover; 
higher percentages of free lunch students and/or Asian students are associated with longer time 
to exit turnover, but have no statistically significant relationships with time to transfer turnover; 
higher percentages of ELL students are only associated with shorter time to transfer turnover. 
Generally, compared with previous literature, patterns of estimates are similar, for example, 
Imazeki (2002) also found that special education teachers, math teachers, high school teachers 
have higher hazard of turnover (shorter survival times). 
 
5.4 The Effect on Time to Turnover of NYC Mentoring Policy 
Based on preliminary results shown in TABLE 5.10, mentoring policy is a significant 
determinant of new hires’ time to turnover, and its effect on time to transfer turnover is larger 
than that on time to exit turnover. The estimates of mentoring policy’s coefficients are 0.090, 
0.156, and 0.048 for time to turnover, time to transfer turnover and time to exit turnover, 
respectively. Based on these estimated coefficients, the corresponding acceleration factors are 






on increasing new teachers time to turnover, time to transfer turnover, and time to exit turnover 
by 1.09, 1.21, and 1.11 times. All these estimates are statistically significant. 
Although section 5.3 shows that the mentoring policy is a determinant of new teachers’ time 
to turnover, it is possible that the implementation of the mentoring policy reflects other 
unobserved factors’ effect (e.g., time effect) on teachers’ time to turnover as well. In other 
words, the mentoring policy variable may not be a random variable, and in this case, estimates of 
the mentoring policy on teachers’ time to turnover are biased and cannot be used for causal 
inference. According to Rockoff (2008), mentoring program participation rate is higher among 
new teachers who are hired on time and who are novice teachers with less than 1 year of prior 
teaching experience. It implies the mentoring policy may have more direct and prompt effects on 
teachers who are hired on time and who are novice teachers than on those who are late hires and 
experienced teachers. Then, comparing the differences in terms of time to turnover between new 
teachers who are hired on time and those who are late hires before and after the implementation 
of mentoring policy provides one solution to the potential endogeneity problem of the mentoring 
policy variable by differencing out unobserved time-invariant variables that may bias the 
estimates of mentoring policy’s effects. The second similar strategy is to compare differences in 
terms of time to turnover between novice new hires and experienced new hires before and after 
the implementation of the mentoring policy. And the third and more convincing strategy is to 
compare triple differences between novice and experienced teachers between on-time hires and 
late hires before and after the implementation of the mentoring policy. Section 5.4.1 present 
results of the first two difference-in-differences strategies and section 5.4.2 presents results of the 







5.4.1 Log-normal AFT models with a DID framework 
TABLE 5.11 shows the results of difference-in-differences estimates of acceleration factor 
of mentoring policy’s effect on time to turnover, time to transfer turnover, and time to exit 
turnover, respectively. These estimates use the framework of difference between on-time hire 
and late hire before and after the implementation of the mentoring policy. For results of time to 
turnover, it shows that the mentoring policy makes new teachers stay in their first teaching job 
1.140 times longer. For time to transfer turnover, it shows that the mentoring policy does not 
affect the length of time before a teacher chooses to switch to another teaching position. As for 
the time to exit turnover, it shows that the mentoring policy makes a teacher stay 1.323 times 
longer before he/she chooses to leave teaching from NYC DOE. However, none of these 
estimates are statistically significant, except for the estimate for exit turnover, which is 
marginally significant at 10%. 
 
TABLE 5.11: Difference-in-Differences Estimators of Acceleration Factor: Mentoring Policy * 
On-time Hire 
  Log-normal AFT model within DID framework 
 
Time to Turnover Time to Transfer Turnover Time to Exit Turnover 
AFT 1.140   0.995   1.323 * 
s.e. (0.144)   (0.151)   (0.136)   
No. of Obs. 26019   26019   26019   
Notes: Teachers newly hired in years from 2003 to 2006 are included in the sample. Acceleration factor is calculated 
within a difference-in-differences framework, and is calculated using difference between two cross differences of 
Log-normal AFT survival models. Acceleration factor of 1 means no difference. Standard errors are calculated using 
bootstrapping method and are reported in parentheses. 
 
TABLE 5.12 shows the results of estimates using the framework of difference between 
novice new hires and experienced new hires before and after the implementation of mentoring 






that mentoring policy makes new teachers stay in their first teaching job 1.229 times longer. For 
time to transfer turnover, it shows that the mentoring policy does not affect the length of time 
before a teacher chooses to switch to another teaching position. As for the time to exit turnover, 
it shows that mentoring policy makes a teacher stay 1.455 times longer before he/she chooses to 
leave teaching from NYC DOE. However, none of these estimates are statistically significant, 
except for the estimate for exit turnover, which is marginally significant at 10%. 
 
TABLE 5.12: Difference-in-Differences Estimators of Acceleration Factor: Mentoring Policy * 
Novice 
  Log-normal AFT model within DID framework 
 
Time to Turnover Time to Transfer Turnover Time to Exit Turnover 
AFT 1.229   0.946   1.455 * 
s.e. (0.222)   (0.255)   (0.247)   
No. of Obs. 26019   26019   26019   
Notes: Teachers newly hired in years from 2003 to 2006 are included in the sample. Acceleration factor is calculated 
within a difference-in-differences framework, and is calculated using difference between two cross differences of 
Log-normal AFT survival models. Acceleration factor of 1 means no difference. Standard errors are calculated using 
bootstrapping method and are reported in parentheses. 
 
5.4.2 Log-normal AFT Models with a DDD Framework 
TABLE 5.13 shows the results of using triple differences framework. It shows that the 
general trend is comparable with the results in TABLE 5.11 and TABLE 5.12. The estimates 
differ a little in the magnitude, for example, it shows that the mentoring policy’s effect on 
turnover becomes close to zero, and it decreases new hires’ time to transfer turnover and 
increases their time to exit turnover. Considering the situation of NYC DOE which has about 
7000 newly hired teachers per year, 1750 (or 25%) of these newly hired teachers leave their 
original teaching position in one year, and they either transfer to another school in DOE or leave 






separately, the survival time is 3 years and 2 years, respectively. The NYC mentoring policy 
shortens newly hired teachers’ time to transfer turnover by 8 months (3*(1-0.770)*12) and 
increase their time to exit turnover by about 8 months (2*(1.327-1)*12). But in general, there are 
still 25% of newly hired teachers who leave their original teaching position in one year.  
However, none of these estimates are statistically significant. 
 
TABLE 5.13: Difference-in-Differences-in-Differences Estimators of Acceleration Factor: 
Mentoring Policy * On-time Hire * Novice 
  Log-normal AFT model within DID framework 
 
Time to Turnover Time to Transfer Turnover Time to Exit Turnover 
AFT 1.015   0.770   1.327   
s.e. (0.711)   (0.644)   (0.723)   
No. of Obs. 26019   26019   26019   
Notes: Teachers newly hired in years from 2003 to 2006 are included in the sample. Acceleration factor is calculated 
within a difference-in-differences-in-differences framework, and is calculated using the three differences analog of 
difference between two cross differences of Log-normal AFT survival models. Acceleration factor of 1 means no 
difference. Standard errors are calculated using bootstrapping method and are reported in parentheses. 
 
By far, this study has analyzed the effect of policy on newly hired teachers’ time to 
turnover. However, due to lack of details on how this city-wide mentoring program was 
implemented, (e.g., who are actually mentored, mentor-mentee match, mentoring hours, etc.) 
according to data files obtained from NYC DOE, further analysis of the effect of mentoring 
program on time to turnover is not allowed. 
 
5.5 Exploration of Potential Heterogeneous Effects of NYC New-teacher Mentoring Policy 
To explore potential heterogeneous effects that the NYC mentoring policy may have on 
new teachers’ survival times, subgroup analysis is conducted using difference-in-differences 






different age groups, in different subject areas, in different types of schools, and in large and/or 
small schools, respectively. TABLE 5.14 through TABLE 5.19 summarize the results for time to 
turnover, time to transfer turnover, and time to exit turnover, respectively. Only consistent 
estimates across all three difference-in-differences frameworks are interpreted. Specifically, the 
mentoring policy tends to make black new teachers’ time to transfer turnover and time to exit 
turnover longer. In terms of age, the mentoring policy tends to make time to exit turnover of new 
teachers whose age is above 35 shorter. As for school size, mentoring policy tends to make large 
school new hires’ time to exit turnover shorter while making their time to exit turnover longer. 






TABLE 5.14: Sub-group Analysis by Gender 




Time to Transfer 
Turnover 




Time to Transfer 
Turnover 
Time to Exit 
Turnover 
DID: mentoring policy * on-time hire 1.089   0.899   1.361   1.152   1.026   1.301   
  (0.276)   (0.410)   (0.463)   (0.151)   (0.153)   (0.186)   




















 DDD: mentoring policy * on-time hire * 
novice 1.219   1.216   1.566   0.933   0.637   1.239   
  (1.943)   (1.443)   (2.464)   (0.703)   (1.429)   (0.732)   
No. of Obs. 6711   6711   6711   19308   19308   19308   
Notes: Teachers newly hired in years from 2003 to 2006 are included in the sample. Acceleration factor is calculated within a difference-in-differences 
framework, and is calculated using difference between two cross differences of Log-normal AFT survival models. Acceleration factor of 1 means no difference. 
Standard errors are calculated using bootstrapping method and are reported in parentheses. 
 
TABLE 5.15: Sub-group Analysis by Race and Ethnicity 


























DID: mentoring policy * on-
time hire 1.158   1.038   1.298   1.269   1.258   1.289   1.040   0.855   1.237   
  (0.213)   (0.220)   (0.161)   (0.387)   (0.171)   (0.716)   (0.500)   (0.363)   (0.578)   





























 DDD: mentoring policy * 
on-time hire * novice 0.757   0.445   1.131   3.071   6.343   2.270   1.068   0.765   2.091   






No. of Obs. 17521   17521   17521   3643   3643   3643   2879   2879   2879   
Notes: Teachers newly hired in years from 2003 to 2006 are included in the sample. Acceleration factor is calculated within a difference-in-differences 
framework, and is calculated using difference between two cross differences of Log-normal AFT survival models. Acceleration factor of 1 means no difference. 
Standard errors are calculated using bootstrapping method and are reported in parentheses. 
 
TABLE 5.16: Sub-group Analysis by Age Group 


























DID: mentoring policy * on-time 
hire 0.995   0.782   1.203   1.396   1.414   1.408   0.915   0.695   1.366   
  (0.219)   (0.302)   (0.199)   (0.238)   (0.180)   (0.264)   (0.527)   (0.710)   (0.432)   























(0.680)   (0.442)   (0.660) 
 DDD: mentoring policy * on-
time hire * novice 0.074   0.001   0.004   0.980   1.068   0.978   1.018   0.495   2.164   
  (0.448)   (0.330)   (0.492)   (1.120)   (0.484)   (0.480)   (1.079)   (0.961)   (1.956)   
No. of Obs. 8859   8859   8859   11416   11416   11416   5744   5744   5744   
Notes: Teachers newly hired in years from 2003 to 2006 are included in the sample. Acceleration factor is calculated within a difference-in-differences 
framework, and is calculated using difference between two cross differences of Log-normal AFT survival models. Acceleration factor of 1 means no difference. 
Standard errors are calculated using bootstrapping method and are reported in parentheses. 
 
TABLE 5.17: Sub-group Analysis by Subject Area 































policy * on-time hire 
  (0.341)   (0.349)   (0.354)   (0.558)   (0.640)   (0.622)   (0.788)   (0.642)   (0.755)   
DID: mentoring 




























 DDD: mentoring 
policy * on-time hire 
* novice 0.421   0.000   2.111   2.631   5.807   1.923   0.971   1.561   1.059   
  (575.944)   (1194.345)   (7.060)   (170.185)   (2.710)   (180.055)   (0.560)   (0.808)   (2.299)   
No. of Obs. 4304   4304   4304   1292   1292   1292   3704   3704   3704   
Notes: Teachers newly hired in years from 2003 to 2006 and teachers whose prior teaching experience is less than 1 year are included in the sample. Acceleration 
factor is calculated within a difference-in-differences framework, and is calculated using difference between two cross differences of Log-normal AFT survival 
models. Acceleration factor of 1 means no difference. Standard errors are calculated using bootstrapping method and are reported in parentheses 
 
TABLE 5.18: Sub-group Analysis by School Type 



































policy * on-time hire 1.208 0.859 1.638 1.029 0.899 1.215 1.055 1.056 1.066 1.319 1.474 1.191 
  (0.255) (0.377) (0.282) (0.257) (0.240) (0.278) (0.286) (0.248) (0.258) (0.325) (0.280) (0.218) 
DID: mentoring 
policy * novice 1.281 0.958 1.505 1.209 0.940 1.535 1.056 0.768 1.223 1.513 1.352 1.564 
 
(0.243) (0.325) (0.292) (0.399) (0.574) (0.543) (0.284) (0.601) (0.664) (0.455) (0.905) (0.943) 
DDD: mentoring 
policy * on-time hire 
* novice 0.853 0.583 1.336 2.188 2.014 2.716 1.088 0.443 2.639 0.335 0.570 0.003 
  (2.557) (1.786) (0.296) (1.987) (5.127) (2.790) (39.734) (95.456) (5.225) (0.370) (0.003) (1.393) 
No. of Obs. 10012 10012 10012 5782 5782 5782 6105 6105 6105 3914 3914 3914 
Notes: Teachers newly hired in years from 2003 to 2006 and teachers whose prior teaching experience is less than 1 year are included in the sample. Acceleration 
factor is calculated within a difference-in-differences framework, and is calculated using difference between two cross differences of Log-normal AFT survival 







TABLE 5.19: Sub-group Analysis by School Size 


























DID: mentoring policy 
* on-time hire 1.076   0.991   1.134   1.160   0.892   1.544 * 1.131   1.156   1.233   
  (0.183)   (0.199)   (0.174)   (0.207)   (0.235)   (0.282)   (0.241)   (0.366)   (0.309)   
DID: mentoring policy 




























 DDD: mentoring policy 
* on-time hire * novice 1.085   0.613   1.497   1.006   0.941   1.317   0.773   0.596   1.215   
  (3.178)   (1.901)   (2.681)   (0.600)   (1.138)   (1.373)   (331.281)   (169.076)   (1.301)   
No. of Obs. 8260   8260   8260   12615   12615   12615   5144   5144   5144   
Notes: Teachers newly hired in years from 2003 to 2006 and teachers whose prior teaching experience is less than 1 year are included in the sample. Acceleration 
factor is calculated within a difference-in-differences framework, and is calculated using difference between two cross differences of Log-normal AFT survival 









5.6 Summary of Findings 
In summary, this chapter uses NYC DOE administrative data to evaluate the effect 
of mentoring policy on teachers’ time to turnover. There are six empirical findings based 
on NYC data.  
First, some characteristics of newly hired teachers have changed over years, while 
most others have been constant over time. For example, the proportion of white new 
teachers has increased, while the proportion of black new hires has decreased over years; 
the proportion of special education teachers has increased, and the proportion of 
elementary school teachers has decreased.  
Second, teacher and school characteristics differ significantly before and after the 
implementation of NYC mentoring policy. For example, turnover variables (e.g., time to 
turnover, hazard rate of turnover) differ significantly before and after the implementation 
of the mentoring policy. Moreover, a number of teacher and school characteristics also 
differ before and after the implementation of the mentoring policy, including male, black, 
Hispanic, age, prior teaching experience, hired on-time, ELL and/or special education 
teacher, school type (e.g., elementary, middle, high, combined), school enrollment, 
ELL%, white%, Asian%, and female% of student-body, and school learning environment 
scores. 
Third, without taking into account unobserved factors, the estimation of the log-
normal AFT model shows that mentoring policy, gender, race and ethnicity, age, subject 
area, prior teaching experience, school enrollment, school type student-body 






new teachers’ time to turnover. In particular, mentoring policy increases the time to 
turnover.   
Fourth, the log-normal AFT model also shows that mentoring policy has positive 
and significant effect on both time to transfer and time to exit.  However, the effects of 
other determinants of time to transfer turnover and time to exit turnover may differ. For 
example, older new hires are associated with shorter time to transfer turnover but longer 
time to exit turnover. On-time hires are associated with longer time to transfer turnover, 
but shorter time to exit turnover. Higher percentages of free lunch students and/or Asian 
students are associated with longer time to exit turnover, but have no statistically 
significant relationships with time to transfer turnover. Moreover, higher percentages of 
ELL students are only associated with shorter time to transfer turnover. 
Fifth, using two difference-in-differences models and a triple-difference model to 
take account of unobserved factors, this study finds that mentoring policy tends to make 
new teachers’ time to exit turnover longer, but tends to make time to transfer turnover 
shorter. And as a result, the mentoring policy makes the overall time to turnover changed 
little. However, none of these effects are statistically significant. 
Sixth, subgroup analysis does not show statistically significant heterogeneous effects 
of mentoring policy on survival times. 
In summary, in terms of the effect of the mentoring policy on time to turnover, 
based on NYC data chapter 5 finds no statistically significant results, although this policy 
tends to increase newly hired teachers’ time to exit turnover and tends to decrease their 
time to transfer turnover. In terms of the signs of the estimates, these findings make sense 






specific, rather than the school-specific training for new hires. As introduced previously, 
the NYC city-wide mentoring program implemented according to the mentoring policy is 
a comprehensive mentoring program. In terms of the statistical significance, findings of 
chapter 5 imply that the comprehensive mentoring program implemented in NYC has no 
statistically significant effect on teachers’ time to turnover. One potential explanation is 
that this mentoring program provides not only job-specific trainings but also a job-related 
experience exposure, through which a newly hired teacher may reveal how good his/her 
job-match is. It is possible that the role of job-specific training competes with the role of 
job-related experience exposure in determining a newly hired teacher’s ultimate time to 
turnover. 
Using NYC data, the analyses in Chapter 5 address some data limitations of the 
analyses in Chapter 4, which uses SASS/TFS national datasets. For example, sample size 
of NYC data is large; NYC data data longitudinal data, which makes it possible to 
examine policy’s effect on time to turnover, rather than just on one-year turnover; 
moreover, different from the diversity of mandatory induction laws and induction 
programs described by national datasets, the mentoring policy and mentoring program is 
a relatively uniform policy and program. 
Nevertheless, NYC data has several limitations. For example, NYC data are based 
on a local education system, and the findings are not generalizable to other populations. 
In addition, due to reasons out of author’s control, NYC data has no information on some 
important variables, including detailed information on the implementation of the 
mentoring program. Lacking information on actual program participation prevents the 






program teachers actually participated, rather than only the mentoring policy, has effects 
on teacher turnover. 
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CHAPTER 6 DATA LIMITATIONS AND PROPER RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
The purpose of chapter 6 is to review strengths and limitations of data employed in this 
study and provide thoughts on proper research design considerations for future research on topics 
regarding new-teacher induction programs’ effect on teacher turnover. Specifically, critiques of 
SASS/TFS dataset and NYC dataset are provided in section 6.1 and 6.2, respectively. Based on 
these two sections, key research design considerations are summarized in section 6.3. 
 
6.1 Critique of Analysis of SASS/TFS Dataset 
Empirical analysis conducted in chapter 4 is based on multiple cycles of SASS/TFS data. 
SASS/TFS data are the largest sample survey concerning elementary and secondary school 
teachers in the United States. This dataset has several key strengths in terms of the research topic 
on new-teacher induction programs’ effect on teacher turnover. The first one is that the sample of 
each cycle of SASS/TFS is a nationally representative sample. Statistical weights are assigned to 
each teacher. By using the weights, it is possible to generalize the conclusions to the population. 
The second strength is that SASS/TFS is a sample survey that has been conducted for six cycles 
in the past 20 years. It allows for a trend analysis, which depicts changes over years. It also 
makes it possible to generalize the conclusions to the population across years. The third is that 
SASS/TFS is a comprehensive survey which provides detailed information on teachers and their 
jobs (e.g., salaries), which makes it possible to control for many confounding variables. And the 
last strength is that it is easy to link SASS/TFS teachers with information from other sources 
through each teacher’s identification number. For example, by linking teachers with state laws, it 
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allows for employing more sophisticated statistical methods (e.g., instrumental variable method) 
in the analysis. 
Nevertheless, it is noted that SASS/TFS also has several limitations with regard to 
answering the research question of the new-teacher induction programs’ effect on teacher 
turnover. One limitation lies in the sample size. The sample size for analysis is 3880, which is 
not small in absolute. However, considering that the state-level variation is used as the 
instrumental variable in the estimation of new-teacher induction programs’ effect, the sample 
that is affected by the state-level variation is only a portion of the whole sample. In addition, the 
average sample size for a state is 20, and for a few states, especially for earlier cycles of surveys, 
the size is even smaller, which makes the measures of state-level characteristics imprecise. 
The second limitation lies in the frequency of SASS/TFS surveys. SASS/TFS surveys are 
conducted only once every three/four years. Information for years between survey years are 
missing. On the one hand, trends may not be precise due to missing information for years in 
between. On the other hand, it makes it impossible to more precisely link the effective dates of 
state law to the period covered by surveys. For example, suppose a state implemented an 
induction law in 2002, the year in which no SASS/TFS surveys are conducted, and in the current 
analysis, the coding for state law is 0 in 1999 for this state and is not 1 until 2003. Changes in 
terms of induction participation in years in between are not able to be captured. However, it is 
possible that teachers’ participation increases after 2002 in response to the implementation of the 
law, but decreases again in 2003 due to reasons other than this induction law. But the only 
relationship that can be read through SASS/TFS is that no relationship or even negative 
relationship between a mandatory law and induction participation. 
280 
The third limitation is that SASS/TFS provides no longitudinal information about teachers’ 
job status over time. One year after SASS is administered, TFS is conducted to follow up on 
teachers’ job status. Therefore, it is not possible to examine induction programs’ effects on 
turnover measures other than one-year turnover, for example, teachers’ time to turnover. 
However, induction programs may be not effective at reducing teachers’ one-year turnover, but 
are effective at reducing, say, teachers’ three-year or five-year turnover. 
The fourth limitation lies in measures of the induction program. Earliest cycles of 
SASS/TFS surveys (e.g., 1990-1992, 1993-1995) asked only one question about induction 
program participation, and in the questionnaires it is noted that an induction program is a 
program that helps beginning teaches by assigning them to master or mentor teachers. In recent 
cycles of surveys (1999-2001, 2003-2005, 2007-2009), questionnaires asked about induction 
program participation without specially indicating how it is defined. Therefore, two slightly 
different ways of framing a question across years imply that this variable may have a validity 
problem, although it may not be severe. In addition, measures of components of induction 
programs are not available until 1999-2001 SASS/TFS, which makes it impossible to examine 
the effects of different components of an induction programs before that period. Moreover, there 
is no measure of program details such as the number of hours of induction/mentoring per week. 
It thus is impossible to control for variation in program implementation, which may be one 
reason why estimates are not precise. 
The last limitation is that SASS/TFS asks no questions about teachers’ opinions, evaluations, 
or feedback of the induction program in which they participated, for example, from what aspects 
of the induction program the teacher believed improved his/her teaching and familiarity of 
his/her job and school. This may limit this study in designing research to test empirically what 
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theoretical roles an induction program may have and how these roles may affect teacher turnover. 
These theoretical roles may provide some explanations for the black box between the induction 
program and teacher turnover. 
Despite these limitations, SASS/TFS data are still used in this dissertation study because on 
the one hand they are still the best available national datasets to study teacher turnover in the 
United States; on the other hand, empirical study based on these data helps us better understand 
the strengths and weaknesses of the national datasets and what may be done to improve such data. 
Moreover, using SASS/TFS data, one important contribution of the empirical study in chapter 4 
is that this study compares different analytical methods to estimate the effects of induction 
programs. Particularly, this study combines SASS/TFS data with data coded based on states’ 
mandatory induction laws, uses the timing variation of state mandatory induction legislation as 
the instrumental variable, and  incorporates it with a difference-in-differences framework to 
address the potential endogeneity issue in the estimation of induction program effects on teacher 
turnover. 
In summary, SASS/TFS have advantages on its generalizability and comprehensiveness. 
However, in terms of examining the effect of new-teacher induction programs on teacher 
turnover, SASS/TFS data would be better if it improves in frequency and consistency of 
measuring key variables such as induction program and turnover and increases sample size, 
particularly for a few small states. For example, it would be beneficial to research concerning 
teacher turnover and new-teacher induction programs’ effect, if SASS/TFS improves its data 
collection in the following aspects:  1) conducting on a yearly basis; 2) framing same questions 
in different cycles of questionnaire consistently; 3) linking induction program participation to 
detailed program components and participation in them; 4) using state as one level of sampling 
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unit to make the sample representative within each state; and 5) increasing the sample sizes of 
new teachers, especially first-year new teachers in small states. Improvement in frequency and 
consistency of measures of key variables and sample size would help in obtaining more precise 
estimates. SASS/TFS data may also improve by providing teachers’ feedback on the induction 
program participated. This additional information would be helpful in designing research to 
further explore reasons why induction programs have no statistically significant effect on 
reducing teachers’ one-year turnover. For example, it can include questions asking whether and 
how much a teacher feels improved in teaching skills and/or in familiarity with the job. Finally, 
SASS/TFS can be improved by providing longitudinal information on teachers’ job status. This 
longitudinal information would allow for examining time to turnover as an outcome variable by 
employing survival models. Research questions such as “when” to turnover, rather than just 
“whether” to turnover, can then be addressed. 
 
6.2 Critique of Analysis of NYC Dataset 
Empirical analysis conducted in chapter 5 is based on NYC DOE administrative data. NYC 
DOE administrative data are complementary to SASS/TFS data employed in chapter 4, in the 
sense that strengths of DOE administrative data address some weaknesses of SASS/TFS data. 
For example, one of the strengths is that DOE administrative data are longitudinal data, which 
capture all the job status changes within DOE after a teacher is hired by DOE for the first time. 
This longitudinal information allows the empirical study in chapter 5 to examine newly hired 
teachers’ time to turnover and to answer the “when” question.  Another one is that DOE 
administrative data provide multiple records for every teacher in the system, which makes it 
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possible to check consistency of measures of some variables (e.g., gender, race and ethnicity). 
The third strength lies in the sample size, which is large enough to obtain more precise estimates. 
However, the DOE administrative data available117 for this current study have several 
weaknesses. The first weakness lies in the generalizability. Since NYC DOE administrative data 
represent only a local population of public school teachers in New York City, the conclusions 
regarding the effect of the mentoring policy based on DOE data are not generalizable to new 
teachers in other cities and/or states in the United States. 
The second weakness is that available DOE administrative data cannot be linked to other 
sources of data. For example, there are no identifiers in DOE administrative data to link DOE 
teachers to their undergraduate universities or colleges and their SAT scores118. It makes this 
study short of measures of teacher qualification variables. Another example is that there are no 
identifiers to link NYC teachers to administrative data from other states, and it is impossible to 
know the accurate job status after teachers leave from NYC DOE. Therefore, the current study in 
chapter 5 defines exit turnover as leaving NYC DOE, rather than leaving the teaching profession. 
However, it is possible that a teacher is still teaching in other cities or counties in the New York 
State or other states after they leave New York City DOE, and this teacher should be defined as a 
mover rather than leaver according to definitions of the study in chapter 4. 
The third weakness is that available DOE administrative data do not have some individual 
teacher level variables that are related to teacher turnover. For example, there is no salary 
information provided. In addition, except for prior teaching experience, there are no additional 
teacher qualification variables including education level, pathway to teaching (e.g., regular state 
                                                          
117 Some administrative data that are kept by NYC DOE are not available for this study. 
118 One possible identifier for linking DOE data with other sources of data (e.g., College Board) could be teachers’ 
social security number. However, SSN is not available to this study. Data from other sources may have their own 
identifiers, and these identifiers may not exist in DOE. 
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certificate, Teaching Fellows, Teach for America), state certificate type (e.g., initial, 
professional, provisional, transitional) and NBPTS (National Board for Professional Teaching 
Standards) certificate status (e.g., getting certified, being prepared, not starting). Although these 
variables should not be related to the implementation of the mentoring policy, omitting these 
variables prevents empirical analysis in chapter 5 from getting more precise estimates. 
The fourth weakness is that available DOE administrative data do not allow for linking 
individual teachers to characteristics of the classes they taught, although they do allow for 
linking teacher to their schools. Given that variation of class characteristics (e.g., percentage of 
students who are eligible for free lunch, special education students, English learners, and so on) 
may be more direct predictors of teacher turnover, compared with variation of school-level 
characteristics, omitting these class characteristics also limit this study’s ability to obtain precise 
estimates. 
The last but most important weakness of available NYC DOE administrative data is that 
mentoring program implementation data are missing. Specifically, in the current data obtained 
from DOE, there is no information on which teachers actually received mentoring. According to 
Rockoff (2008), not every newly hired teacher who has less than 1 year of prior teaching 
experience is mentored; whereas some newly hired teachers who have more than 1 year of prior 
teaching experience get mentored instead. Lacking information on actual program participation 
prevents empirical study in chapter 5 from further evaluating whether the NYC mentoring 
program teachers actually participated, rather than only the mentoring policy, has effects on 
teacher turnover. Moreover, there is no information on mentoring program implementation 
details, including how many hours of mentoring a teacher actually received, who is the mentor 
for a specific teacher, how many teachers a specific mentor works with, how mentor and mentee 
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match in terms of their subject areas and other characteristics, whether the mentor has experience 
in teaching in the same school as the mentee, and how good is the mentor in terms of providing 
mentoring services, etc. According to Rockoff (2008), such program implementation variables 
do have variations among newly hired teachers who participated in the mentoring program. In 
addition, there is no information available from teachers about their feedback on the program. 
Lacking information on these variations on one hand make it impossible to examine which 
components or characteristics actually work or not in terms of increasing teachers’ time to 
turnover, on the other hand prevents this study from obtaining more precise and/or unbiased 
estimates on program’s effect, given that potential correlations between these variations and/or 
time to turnover.  Similar to the empirical analysis in chapter 4, it is impossible for the analysis 
in chapter 5 to further examine why a mentoring program work or not work from perspective of 
examining mentoring program’s theoretical roles. 
In summary, NYC DOE data are complementary to SASS/TFS data in the sense that DOE 
data have advantages in terms of sample size as well as longitudinal information. Nevertheless, 
lacking information in key variables (e.g., program implementation, teacher qualification) makes 
the empirical analysis in chapter 5 unable to examine the effect of actual participation in the 
mentoring program as well as not being able to obtain more precise estimates. Among these key 
variables, some variables may not be available to DOE, for example, teachers’ SAT scores, job 
status after leaving DOE. Some others are administered by DOE, but are not available to the 
current study due to reasons other than the author can control. Such variable include salaries, 
qualification variables, and program implementation variables. If these variables are available, 
empirical analysis in chapter 5 will be able to further examine whether the NYC mentoring 
program has effect on teachers’ time to turnover, which program components (e.g., mentor 
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quality, mentor caseload, mentor-mentee match on subjects and/or schools) works or not, and 
which aspects (e.g., teaching skills, knowledge of school) a teacher improves in after he/she 
participates in the mentoring program. 
Originally, NYC mentoring policy/program and NYC administrative data are not designed 
for research purposes. However, if resources are available to redesign the research in NYC, 
designing a comparison group of teachers who have comparable characteristics with program 
participators at the beginning would improve the study’s ability to find causal evidence on the 
effect of NYC mentoring program. Specifically, newly hired teachers could be randomly 
assigned to the treatment group and the control group through mechanisms such as a lottery, a 
cutoff score of a teacher’s assignment test score, or a cutoff point in terms of some 
characteristics of a teacher’s class, etc. 
Despite limitations of NYC data, these data are still used for the empirical study in chapter 
5 because they complement empirical study based on SASS/TFS data. For example, it makes it 
possible to answer “when” turnover takes place rather than just to answer “whether” to turnover; 
it also has implications on the potential effects of a comprehensive mentoring program, rather 
than just an average induction program. Most importantly, empirical study in chapter 5, based on 
NYC data, contributes to the literature by incorporating survival analysis with difference-in-
differences or difference-in-differences-in-differences strategies. This contribution makes it 






6.3 Key Research Design Considerations 
Based on critiques of analyses on both SASS/TFS and NYC DOE administrative datasets, 
for an observational study119, there are several key research design considerations that may 
enable researchers to ascertain the causal effect of new-teacher induction program on teacher 
turnover. 
First, longitudinal design is preferred. One reason is that among various observational study 
designs (e.g., case, case series, cross-sectional, case-control), longitudinal design provides the 
best evidence on cause and effect. Another reason is that longitudinal design allows for 
examining teachers’ time to turnover or when to turnover in addition to whether to turnover. 
Second, sample size as well as sampling methods should be considered. For example, 
SASS/TFS’s primary sampling unit is school, and state is not one of the sampling units. It leads 
to that teacher sample sizes of a few small states are small. Estimated teacher turnover rates 
would be more precise had more samples been drawn from those small states. More generally, 
power analysis should be performed according to the specific research design (e.g., type of 
analysis, variables) before a study is proposed. 
Third, one or more sources of random variation connected to the treatment variable should 
be incorporated within the research design. Examples of such random or conditionally random 
sources of variation include laws or policies, random lottery numbers, or cutoff points, etc. 
Fourth, validity and reliability of measures of key variables should be considered. For 
example, different ways, especially two inconsistent ways of framing the same question should 
                                                          
119 An experimental study which manipulates the treatment variable is the best design to reveal convincing causal 
relationships. However, due to cost and ethical considerations, it may not be realistic for some research topics. A 
well-designed observational study can provide good evidence for the absence of a relationship and may also 
suggest for an existence of a causal connection. 
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be avoided. In addition, multiple relevant questions can be asked with regard to one variable and 
the same question can be asked multiple times in different questionnaires (e.g., follow-ups). 
Fifth, mechanism variables that may reveal the black-box of a causal effect should be 
incorporated in the research design. For example, in the current study, if feedbacks from new-
teachers who participate in induction programs (e.g., what aspects they feel themselves have 
changed due to the program) were collected, it would be possible to examine why induction 
programs have no significant effects on reducing teacher turnover from perspectives of 




CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSIONS 
 
Admittedly, teacher turnover itself is not necessarily a bad thing, as it maintains the 
dynamics of an education system. A certain level of turnover may be good because not every 
teacher in the teaching force has high qualifications and high motivation in teaching. The 
existence of teacher turnover provides a room for improving the education system. Whether 
teacher turnover has a negative impact depends largely on who leaves the system and how 
teachers are distributed within the system. However, given the substantial costs associated with 
teacher turnover, reduction of teacher turnover has become a major objective of new-teacher 
induction programs and the relevant legislation and policy implemented in the United States. 
Therefore, the rest of this chapter is devoted to summarizing findings with regard to teacher 
turnover, regardless of whether it is a bad thing or not. 
As discussed in previous chapters, although many studies have attempted to examine new-
teacher induction programs’ effect on teacher turnover, very few of them have used rigorous 
analytical methods to address the potential endogeneity issue related to induction program 
participation. Distinguished from most previous studies, this study tries to address this issue by 
employing three different identification strategies, including propensity-score matching, 
instrumental variable, as well as difference-in-differences and its variants. Specifically, this study 
answers the following three key research questions: (1) what are the determinants of first-year 
new teachers’ turnover, (2) do new-teacher induction programs have effects on reducing first-
year new teachers’ turnover, and (3) do state mandatory induction laws and/or local mentoring 
policy have effects on reducing first-year new teachers’ turnover? 
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Key findings are summarized accordingly in this chapter, followed by the discussion of 
significance and limitations of this study. 
 
7.1 Summary of Key Findings 
7.1.1 Determinants of new teachers’ turnover 
As summarized in TABLE 7.1, teacher demographic characteristics, teacher qualification 
characteristics, teaching assignment and earnings, school type and size, student-body 
characteristics, and school accountability grade and learning environment scores are the six sets 
of determinants of new teachers’ turnover examined in this study. In order to compare signs of 
determinants of different measures of teacher turnover (e.g., one-year turnover, time to turnover), 
determinants of one-year turnover and one-year retention  is illustrated in the table as 
determinants of one-year retention, given that determinants of one-year turnover and one-year 
retention are opposite only in directions of signs. It is also noted that determinants of one-year 
retention and time to turnover are examined using different datasets. Particularly, since 
determinants of time to turnover are examined using New York City datasets, the corresponding 
findings may reflect only the conditions of large diversified urban education systems. 
Specifically, patterns of different sets of determinants of new teachers’ turnover are 
summarized as follows. First, gender, age and race and ethnicity are examined as teacher 
demographic characteristics that determine new teachers’ turnover. Male new teachers are not 
more or less likely to turnover compared with their female counterparts. If considering transfer 
turnover and exit turnover separately, male teachers are more likely to leave teaching after one 
year, but NYC male teachers have shorter time to transfer turnover.  Entering age has nonlinear 
impact on new teachers’ turnover. New teachers’ probability of turnover after one year first 
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decreases then increases as entering age increases, or new teachers’ time to turnover first 
increases then decreases as entering age increases. If considering transfer turnover and exit 
turnover separately, late entering new teachers are more likely to leave teaching and less likely to 
switch schools after one year. Compared with white new teachers, black new teachers are less 
likely to leave schools after one year, and Hispanic new teachers are more likely to turnover, 
including both switching schools and leaving teaching. However, in NYC public education 
system, black and Hispanic new teachers’ time to turnover is longer, especially for their time to 
exit turnover. It may be due to the specific demographic characteristics of student served by 
NYC public schools. 
Second, education, teaching certification, and prior teaching experience are examined as 
teacher qualification characteristics that determine new teachers’ turnover. New teachers who 
have master’s degree and above are more likely to turnover after one year, and this trend is true 
for both transfer turnover and exit turnover. It may reflect that those teachers who have higher 
level of education degree face more and better job opportunities and thus have higher 
opportunity cost to teach and teach in a particular school. Compared with new teachers who do 
not have state teaching certificates, new teachers who have partial or full state teaching 
certificates are less likely to turnover after one year, and the trend is particularly true for exit 
turnover. It implies that those who hold state teaching certificates invest more on teaching 
profession, and thus have higher costs of leaving teaching. Although prior teaching experience 
generally does not determine new teachers’ time to turnover, whether a teacher is a novice 
teacher (e.g., a teacher who has less than one year of prior teaching experience) does determine 
new teachers’ time to turnover. Novice teachers have shorter time to turnover, including both 
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time to transfer turnover and time to exit turnover. It may also be due to that novice teachers 
invest less on teaching and thus have lower costs of transferring or leaving. 
Third, teaching assignment and earnings are examined as determinants of teachers’ 
turnover. Regular full-time new teachers are less likely to turnover after one year, and it is true 
for both transfer turnover and exit turnover. Math and science new teachers are less likely to 
transfer turnover; however, in NYC math and science new teachers have shorter time to turnover, 
particularly shorter time to exit turnover. Special education new teachers are more likely to 
turnover after one year, especially for transfer turnover; and in NYC special education new 
teachers have shorter time to transfer turnover. New teachers whose assignment is teaching 
English language learners are less likely to leave teaching after one year; however in NYC, those 
teachers have shorter time to turnover and shorter time to transfer turnover. New teachers who 
have higher school-related earnings are less likely to turnover after one year, and it is true for 
both transfer turnover and exit turnover. In contrast, new teachers who have higher non-school 
earnings are more likely to turnover after one year, and it is particularly true for exit turnover. In 
NYC, new teachers who are hired on-time have longer time to transfer turnover, but have shorter 
time to exit turnover. 
Fourth, school type and size are examined as determinants of teachers’ turnover. Compared 
with new teachers hired in an elementary school, those who hired in secondary schools are not 
more or less likely to turnover after one year. However, in NYC, new teachers from middle 
schools have shorter time to turnover, and it is particularly true for time to transfer turnover; on 
the contrary, new teachers from high schools have longer time to turnover, and it is particularly 
for time to exit turnover. It may to some extent explain why teachers from secondary schools in 
general do not differ in turnover from their counterparts who are from elementary schools. In 
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NYC, teachers who are from special education schools have longer time to turnover, and it is 
particularly for time to exit turnover. New teachers who are from urban schools are more likely 
to turnover after one year, and it is particularly true for transfer turnover. New teachers who are 
from small schools are more likely to turnover and have shorter time to turnover, and it is true 
for both transfer turnover and exit turnover. In NYC, new teachers in large schools have longer 
time to turnover, and it is true for both time to transfer turnover and time to exit turnover. It may 
imply small schools provide teachers less opportunities, while large schools provide more. 
Fifth, schools’ student-body characteristics are examined as determinants of teachers’ 
turnover. New teachers in schools which have higher percentage of minority students are more 
likely to turnover after one year, especially for leaving teaching. In NYC, new teachers in 
schools which have higher percentage of white students have longer time to turnover, including 
both time to transfer turnover and time to exit turnover. As for new teachers in NYC schools 
which have higher percentage of minority students, their time to turnover also depends on 
specific race and ethnicity of minority students. New teachers who in schools having higher 
percentage of Asian students have longer time to turnover, including both time to transfer 
turnover and time to exit turnover. In NYC, new teachers in schools having higher percentage of 
students who are eligible for free lunch have longer time to exit turnover, and those who in 
schools having higher percentage of special education students have shorter time to transfer 
turnover. 
Lastly, school accountability grade and learning environment scores are examined as 
determinants of teachers’ turnover in NYC. New teachers in schools having higher progress 
report grades, higher communication scores, and/or higher academic expectation scores have 
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longer time to turnover. Surprisingly, new teachers in schools having engagement scores have 
shorter time to turnover. 
In summary, teacher demographic characteristics, teacher qualification characteristics, 
teaching assignment and earnings, school type and size, student-body characteristics, and school 
accountability grade and learning environment scores are examined as determinants of new 
teachers’ turnover. Findings based on national datasets sometimes differ from those based on 
NYC datasets, given that local public schools, such as New York City public school system, a 
large urban diversified public education system, may have their specific working conditions that 
are favorable or unfavorable to different groups of new teachers. No matter whether findings of 
determinants based on national datasets are consistent with those based on NYC datasets or not, 
the bottom line is that these determinants are controlled as potential confounding variables in the 







TABLE 7.1: Determinants of New Teachers’ Turnover 
Determinants One-year retention Time to turnover 
  Turnover Transfer Turnover Exit Turnover Turnover Transfer Turnover Exit Turnover 
Teacher demographic characteristics 
        male No no - No - no 
  age Nonlinear + - Nonlinear no nonlinear 
  black No no + + no + 
  Hispanic - - - + no + 
  other race and ethnicity + no + No no no 
Teacher qualification characteristics 
        Bachelor's degree No no no NA NA NA 
  Master's degree and above - - - NA NA NA 
  Partial state certification + no + NA NA NA 
  Full state certification + no + NA NA NA 
  Prior teaching experience/novice teacher NA NA NA no/- no/- no/- 
Teaching assignment and earnings 
        regular full-time + + + NA NA NA 
  math & science No + no - no - 
  special education - - no No - no 
  ESL/ELL No no + - - no 
  school-related earnings + + + NA NA NA 
  non-school earnings - no - NA NA NA 
  hired on-time NA NA NA No + - 
School type & size 
        secondary No no no NA NA NA 
  middle NA NA NA - - no 
  high NA NA NA + no + 
  combined No + no No no no 
  transfer NA NA NA No - + 
  special education school NA NA NA + no + 
  urban - - no NA NA NA 
  rural No no no NA NA NA 
  small - - - - - - 







        % free lunch NA NA NA No no + 
  % ELL NA NA NA No no no 
  % special education NA NA NA No - no 
  % white NA NA NA + + + 
  % minority - no - NA NA NA 
  % black NA NA NA No no no 
  % Hispanic NA NA NA No no no 
  % Asian NA NA NA + + + 
  % female NA NA NA No no no 
School grade and scores 
        progress report grade NA NA NA + + + 
  safety & respect score NA NA NA No no no 
  communication score NA NA NA + no + 
  engagement score NA NA NA - - - 
  academic expectation score NA NA NA + + + 
Notes: Determinants of one-year retention differ from those of one-year turnover only in directions of signs. Determinants of one-year retention are displayed 
because it is more convenient to compare signs between one-year retention and time to turnover. Turnover, transfer turnover, and exit turnover in the second row 
of this table indicate different types of turnover. “no” indicates not statistically significant; “+” or  “-” indicates statistically significant, and the relationship 








7.1.2 New-teacher induction programs’ effect 
TABLE 7.2 summarizes the effect of new-teacher induction programs on teacher turnover 
that are estimated using different analytical methods. After controlling for other covariates, OLS 
models with cycle and state fixed effects show that participation in an induction program reduces 
first-year new teachers’ turnover by 4.2%. If considering transfer turnover and exit turnover 
separately, an induction program reduces 2.1% and 3.8% of first-year new teachers’ transfer 
turnover and exit turnover, respectively. A comprehensive level of an induction program reduces 
all types of turnover, and its effect sizes are larger than those of an average induction program. 
The linear version and the Probit version of findings on the estimate of new-teacher induction 
programs on teacher turnover are consistent.  All these estimated effects are statistically 
significant.  
A better balance between treated and control groups’ distributions of confounding 
covariates is achieved after propensity-score matching is performed, and PSM estimates suggest 
that either an average induction program or a comprehensive induction program help reduce 
first-year new teachers’ turnover, except for that an average induction program tends to increase 
transfer turnover. The signs and magnitudes of PSM estimates are all comparable to that of OLS 
estimates, but standard errors are larger. Most of the estimates are not statistically significant at 
5% level. Sensitivity tests suggest that PSM estimates are sensitive to potential hidden biases, 
even though PSM models have made treated and control groups more comparable in terms of 
observed characteristics. 
Different from the patterns of estimates displayed in OLS and PSM models, IV-DID 






program because the law requires them to do so and would not if no law requires such a 
participation, participation in an induction program may increase, rather than decrease, teacher 
turnover, especially transfer turnover. Given that these IV-DID estimates about program effects 
are not statistically significant, the bottom line is that it is hard to conclude that induction 
programs on average has any effects on reducing teacher turnover. 
Differences between IV-DID findings and OLS and PSM findings with regard to the 
estimated effect of new-teacher induction programs on teacher turnover suggest that analytical 
methods do matter, and it is important to account for the potential endogeneity issue of program 
participation in the estimation of program effects. 
One explanation of why an induction program does not reduce teacher turnover lies in the 
nature of IV estimates. IV estimate is a local estimator and only applies to “compliers”, which in 
this study refer to those teachers who would not have participated in an induction program had 
no mandatory law required them to do so, and would have participated had a mandatory law 
required. It is argued that those “complier” teachers in “complier” schools may not be self-
motivated and willing to participate in or implement an induction program, which may prevent 
teachers from actively absorbing program effects. 
Another explanation lies in new-teacher induction programs’ theoretical roles: specific 
training and/or exposure to job-related experiences.120 Economic theories imply that both specific 
training and job-experience exposure influence teachers’ job turnover. Specifically, the more 
specific training a worker has, the less likely he/she leaves the job; however, more exposure to 
job-related experiences does not monotonically predict a worker’s probability of leaving, 
depending on how good the job-match is. In the case of new-teacher induction programs in this 
                                                          






study, a possible scenario may be that those programs help little in increasing one’s teaching 
specific human capital, whereas it helps to accelerate teachers’ process of getting familiar with 
their jobs, and teachers may realize more quickly that their jobs are not as pleasant as how they 
expect. 
 
TABLE 7.2: New-teacher Induction Programs’ effect on Teacher Turnover 
    One-year Turnover   
    Turnover Transfer Turnover Exit Turnover 
OLS New-teacher Induction Program -0.042 *** -0.021 ** -0.038 *** 
 
Comprehensive Induction Services -0.061 *** -0.038 ** -0.04 *** 
Probit New-teacher Induction Program -0.041 *** -0.018 * -0.031 *** 
 
Comprehensive Induction Services -0.065 *** -0.04 *** -0.035 *** 



























 IV-DID (Probit) New-teacher Induction Program 0.214   0.256   -0.096   
Notes: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. Effect of comprehensive induction services 
is not reported for IV-DID method, because the first-stage of IV-DID estimation is not significant, in other words, 
the instrumental variable does not encourage more participation in the comprehensive induction services. Both linear 
and Probit versions of estimates are summarized. 
 
7.1.3 Induction laws and policy’s effect 
TABLE 7.3 summarizes the effect of state mandatory induction laws and NYC mentoring 
policy. Panel (A) shows the results of effect of state mandatory induction laws on teachers’ 
induction program participation and one-year turnover. Panel (B) shows the results of effect of 
NYC mentoring policy’s effect on teachers’ time to turnover.  
Conditional on cycles and states, having a mandatory law requiring induction in a state 






does not increase the percentage of first-year new teachers who participated in a comprehensive 
level of induction program. 
In terms of the effect of state laws on teacher one-year turnover, ITT-DID estimates show 
that a mandatory law increases, rather than decreases, teacher turnover, especially for transfer 
turnover. The effect of a mandatory law on exit turnover is very close to zero. However, none of 
the estimates are statistically significant. 
In terms of the NYC mentoring policy’s effect on teachers’ time to turnover, ITT-DID and 
ITT-DDD models find that NYC mentoring policy tends to make new teachers time to exit 
turnover longer, but tends to make time to transfer turnover shorter. As a result, the mentoring 
policy makes the overall time to turnover changed little. However, none of these effects are 
statistically significant. 
In summary, state mandatory induction laws increase new-teachers’ participation in an 
average induction program, rather than a comprehensive induction program; state mandatory 
induction laws increase, rather than decrease, new-teachers’ one-year turnover, especially one-
year transfer turnover. NYC mentoring policy, a local policy requiring that new teachers 
participate in a comprehensive mentoring program, increases new teachers’ time to exit turnover, 
but shortens new teachers’ time to transfer turnover. Although none of these estimates are 
statistically significant, the patterns imply that if a mandatory induction/mentoring law/policy 
does not have effect on encouraging new teachers’ participation in a comprehensive 









TABLE 7.3: Induction Laws and Mentoring Policy’s Effect 
ITT-DID State Mandatory Induction Law   
  Turnover Transfer Turnover Exit Turnover 
Induction participation 0.202 *** 0.198 *** 0.171 *** 
One-year turnover 0.039   0.045   -0.0003   
Panel (A) 
  NYC Mentoring Policy   
Acceleration Factor Turnover Transfer Turnover Exit Turnover 
ITT-DID 1.140  0.995  1.323 * 1.229  0.946  1.455 * 
ITT-DDD 1.015   0.770   1.327  
Panel (B) 
Notes: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
 
7.2 Significance 
This study contributes to the literature of new-teacher induction programs’ effect on teacher 
turnover in the following aspects. 
First of all, multiple statistical methods (e.g., multiple regression, propensity-score 
matching, instrumental variable and difference-in-differences) are employed in this study, and 
comparison of findings based on different methods demonstrates that methods do matter in the 
estimation of the effect of new-teacher induction programs’ effect on teacher turnover. It implies 
that methods that do not account for the potential endogeneity issue of program participation 
would lead to biased findings. Although most previous studies on the effect of induction 
programs suggest that these programs have positive effect on teacher retention, this study implies 
that the conclusion concerning the effect of induction programs on teacher turnover is far from 
clear, given that most previous studies on this topic are subject to biased estimates due to the 






Second, distinguished from previous literature, this study incorporates the instrumental 
variable method with a difference-in-differences framework in order to take advantage of the 
strengths of both methods in the identification of induction programs’ effect. Specifically, this 
study employs a relatively exogenous source of variation (e.g., legislation) as the instrumental 
variable for the potential endogenous induction program participation and attempts to isolate the 
covariation in the endogenous induction program participation variable and turnover outcome 
variables. Moreover, this study examines the underlying assumptions of applying the 
instrumental variable method, and particularly, the instrumental variable method is further 
integrated  with a difference-in-differences framework, in order to make the ignorability (or 
exogeneity) assumption of the instrumental variable more valid. 
Third, in order to accommodate qualitative and limited dependent variables (e.g., whether to 
turnover, time to turnover) in the identification of induction programs and the relevant laws and 
policy’s effects, this study combines the difference-in-differences identification strategy with 
nonlinear statistical models (e.g., Probit model, survival model). It is traditionally noted that the 
difference-in-differences method works only when the linearity assumption holds. However, 
Puhani (2012) shows that the difference-in-differences method can also be used with nonlinear 
models, and demonstrates the theoretical procedures of obtaining nonlinear difference-in-
differences estimators. This study attempts to apply the newest development of statistical 
techniques to estimate the effects of induction programs and relevant laws and policy. 
Particularly, this study combines nonlinear models with difference-in-differences as well as its 
triple differences variant (e.g., difference-in-differences-in-differences) in the estimation of NYC 






Fourth, this study links the new-teacher induction programs to the broader background of 
relevant legislation. In particular, this study researches all 50 states and District of Columbia’s 
legal provisions with regard to new-teacher induction and mentoring. This study also tries to link 
the interpretation the findings of the induction programs’ effect to the findings of the effect of the 
broader background of legislation and/or policy. 
Fifth, this study has employed the best available data, and the findings are generalizable. 
The main data employed in this study draw from the largest sample survey (SASS/TFS) 
concerning teacher and schools in the United States. Specifically, this study combines data from 
multiple cycles of the nationally representative survey, which makes the findings generalizable 
both geographically and temporally. Furthermore, the combination of analyses based on national 
cross-sectional data and a local (NYC) administrative longitudinal data further makes the 
findings generalizable to different education settings as well as to different measures of teacher 
turnover (e.g., one-year turnover vs. time to turnover). 
Lastly, this study provides a critique of the data sources and suggests guidelines for proper 
design for data collection for research on the effect of new-teacher induction programs on 
teacher turnover. Specifically, after performing empirical analysis based on SASS/TFS data and 
NYC administrative data, both of these data employed in the study are examined on their 
strengths and limitations in terms of supporting studies that examine new-teacher induction 
programs’ effect on teacher turnover. Based on these critiques, considerations for proper research 
designs concerning data collection for research on topics of new-teacher induction programs and 








7.3 Policy Implications 
The conclusions about new-teacher induction programs' effect on teacher turnover based on 
this single study are far from definite.  Nevertheless, the pattern of this study's findings is 
suggestive and has implications for education policymakers. 
First, an average induction program that does not provide comprehensive induction services 
is unlikely effective in reducing teacher turnover. Education legislation or policy should 
purposely encourage new teachers' participation in comprehensive induction/mentoring 
programs, rather than indiscriminately promoting the participation of any nominal induction 
programs. Besides, funds for supporting new-teacher induction programs should be competitive 
and should not be allocated to those programs that are not comprehensive in substance. 
Second, ideal new-teacher induction programs should be flexible to accommodate needs of 
different teachers, schools and districts. As implied by the findings based on NYC mentoring 
policy's effect, the city-wide comprehensive mentoring program may help NYC Department of 
Education retain new teachers in the system, while encouraging mobility within the system. It 
suggests that this mentoring policy may be successful from the prospective of NYC Department 
of Education as a whole; however it could still improve in addressing local schools' and teachers' 
needs to adjust teacher turnover patterns within the system. 
Third, new-teacher induction programs by themselves may not work in reducing teacher 
turnover. Accompanying improvements in terms of teaching profession's and/or individual 
schools' attractiveness (e.g., salaries, working conditions), particularly for those teachers who are 
effective, teaching in high need subjects, and/or schools, are desirable. New-teacher induction 
programs should be able to facilitate new teachers' process of getting to know that teaching (or 







7.4 Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research 
7.4.1 Limitations 
This study has several limitations. The first one lies in the sample size and frequency of 
SASS/TFS surveys. Given that this study combines SASS/TFS data with the timing of state 
legislation with regard to mandatory induction, the instrumental variable analysis of SASS/TFS 
in chapter 4 is at essentially the state level. It thus requires that state-level teacher turnover and 
induction participation are calculated precisely. However, state is not one of the sampling units 
of SASS/TFS surveys, and SASS/TFS surveys are conducted only once every three/four years. 
Consequently, new-teacher sample sizes for a few small states are small, although new teachers 
in the SASS/TFS survey are nationally representative; information concerning new teachers, 
their induction program participation, and turnover are missing for years between survey years. 
Both sample size and frequency of SASS/TFS surveys impede obtaining more precise estimates 
of new-teacher induction programs’ effect on teacher turnover in this study. 
The second limitation is that some important information concerning teacher turnover and 
program participation is not available for this study. Specifically, TFS surveys are administered 
one year after SASS surveys are administered; therefore, only one-year turnover can be used as 
measures of teacher turnover and other measures such as time to turnover cannot be examined 
with SASS/TFS data. In addition, NYC administrative data do not provide mentoring program 
participation data due to reasons out of author’s control; therefore, this study is only able to 
examine the NYC mentoring policy’s effect on turnover. Although findings on the NYC 






the mentoring program required by the NYC mentoring policy, the mentoring program’s effect 
cannot be estimated directly with currently available NYC administrative data. 
The third limitation lies in potential variation in program implementation. The estimated 
effect of induction programs surveyed by SASS only refers to the effect of an average induction 
program. However, it is noted that induction programs implemented by different states and 
different local education agencies differ. According to Rockoff (2008), even one single 
mentoring program (e.g., the city-wide NYC mentoring program) differs in terms of its 
implementation, not to mention varies induction/mentoring programs implemented by different 
states, school districts, and schools. But available data, including both SASS/TFS and NYC 
administrative data, do not have information concerning specific program implementation, for 
example, number of hours of induction/mentoring per week, qualifications of mentor, etc., and 
thus prevent this study from estimating the effect of an induction program’s effect while 
controlling for the potential confounding effect on teacher turnover due to variation of program 
implementation. 
The fourth limitation is that there is no information about teachers’ opinions or feedback of 
the induction/mentoring programs they participated, and there are no measures of teachers’ 
teaching productivity and/or familiarity of their job. SASS/TFS surveys do not have questions 
with regard to teachers’ feedbacks of induction programs; NYC DOE did administer feedback 
surveys among new teachers who participated in the mentoring program every year, however, 
these data are not available to this current study. Both sources of data do not provide good 
measures of teachers’ teaching productivity and familiarity of their jobs, and those measures 






empirically what theoretical roles an induction program may have and how these roles may 
affect teacher turnover. 
The fifth limitation is that this study does not consider the influence of teachers’ transaction 
costs on teacher turnover. A case in point is the search costs suggested by the job search model. 
As illustrated in the review of theoretical models in Chapter 2, teachers may spend different 
amount of time on the on-the-job search. Costs (e.g., time, monetary costs) that a teacher spent 
on the on-the-job search may influence the wage-offer distributions the teacher received, and 
thus influence the teacher’s decision on turnover. Other examples of transaction costs include 
information costs, bargaining costs, and so on. Due to a lack of information regarding teachers’ 
transaction costs in SASS/TFS data as well as in NYC data, this study does not able to control 
such variables. 
The last limitation is lack of use of mixed research methods. The current study focuses only 
on the use of quantitative research methods, which may have limitations in contributing to an in-
depth understanding of teacher turnover behavior and the reasons that govern such behavior. 
Incorporation of qualitative research methods (e.g., interviews) and quantitative research 
methods in the research of new-teacher induction programs’ effect on teacher turnover may be 
able to provide a more comprehensive view of this phenomenon and explore the reasons. 
However, due to time constraints, qualitative research methods were not employed in this study. 
 
7.4.2 Suggestions for Further Research 
Future studies may contribute in the scholarship of estimating the effect of new-teacher 
induction programs on teacher turnover in at least four aspects. First, survival analysis of new 






first-year new teachers surveyed in SASS are followed for 5 years in the Beginning Teacher 
Longitudinal Study (BTLS), a new study conducted by National Center for Education Statistics. 
This new nationally representative longitudinal data will allow researchers to examine the 
determinants of new teachers’ time to turnover as well as the effect of new-teacher induction 
programs’ effect on teachers’ time to turnover. 
Second, if New York City Department of Education provides more detailed data with regard 
to NYC mentoring program participation and implementation, future studies may examine the 
actual effect of NYC mentoring program on teachers’ time to turnover. Future studies can take 
advantage of the natural experiment created by the NYC mentoring policy implemented in 2004, 
and discuss and use this relatively exogenous source of variation as the instrumental variable for 
NYC mentoring program participation to deal with the potential endogeneity issue of program 
participation. 
Third, future studies may contribute in literature by empirically exploring theoretical roles 
of induction/mentoring programs. Specifically, measures of teachers’ teaching productivity and 
familiarity of jobs can be further discussed. Based on these measures, future studies may 
examine why new-teacher induction programs work or not from a perspective of the theoretical 
roles. 
Fourth, future study may also expand the focus of this study to other types of turnover that 
are of policy importance, or to other reasons that may reconcile the existing inconsistency in the 
literature about the induction programs’ effect. For example, given that teacher turnover is not 
necessarily detrimental to the education system, it is worthwhile to explore whether or which 
types of new-teacher induction/mentoring programs help retain highly effective teachers while 






Fifth, it is possible that there may be a time lag before the impact of mandatory induction 
laws on teacher turnover is manifested, e.g., it may take some time for a law’s impacts to be 
manifested. This potential time lag in the impact of mandatory induction law on teacher turnover 
may be further explored in the future.  
Sixth, other laws and policies that are related to mandatory induction laws or policies may 
also be explored and controlled in the estimation of the effect of mandatory induction laws’ 
effect. For example, several states have incorporated new-teacher induction requirements into 
their teacher licensure requirements in legislation. Teacher licensing laws may also affect teacher 
education requirements and thus teacher turnover.  In the future, it is desirable to further control 
for the variation of laws and policies that are related to mandatory induction laws. 
Last, alternative measures of the “salary” variable may be considered in the future. For 
example, using ratio of salary of an individual teacher divided by the average salary of teachers 
at the state level as an alternative salary measure may be able to distinguish effects of within-
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Appendix A: Estimates of Components and Number of Induction Services and 
Comprehensive Induction Program on Teacher Turnover 
TABLE 4.9, TABLE 4.10 and TABLE 4.11 in Chapter 4 only report estimates of the 
effect of components of induction services, number of induction services, and a 
comprehensive induction program on teacher turnover, while omitting the estimates of other 
covariates. In appendix A, TABLE A1, TABLE A2, and TABLE A3 show the full estimation 







TABLE A1: Components of Induction Services (Full Results) 
  Turnover Transfer turnover Exit turnover 
  OLS   Probit   OLS   Probit   OLS   Probit   









































































































































































































(0.022)  (0.021)  (0.018)  (0.017)  




































































































































































































































































































































































































































No. of obs. 2790   2790   2370   2370   2130   2130   
R2 0.109    -   0.079    -   0.157    -   
Notes: Recent three cycles of TFS samples are used for analysis. Standard errors (s.e.) are reported in parentheses, and are calculated using survey final weight and replicate 
weights.  *** significant at p<0.001; ** significant at p<0.05; * significant at p<0.1. 
 
TABLE A2: Number of Induction services (Full Results) 
  Turnover Transfer turnover Exit turnover 
  OLS   Probit   OLS   Probit   OLS   Probit   
















































































































(0.023)  (0.022)  (0.018)  (0.017)  






(0.028)  (0.027)  (0.025)  (0.030)  






















































































































































































































































































































































































































No. of obs. 2790   2790   2370   2370   2130   2130   
R2 0.100    -   0.070    -   0.148    -   
Notes: Recent three cycles of TFS samples are used for analysis. Standard errors (s.e.) are reported in parentheses, and are calculated using survey final weight and replicate 







TABLE A3: Comprehensive Induction Program (Full Results) 
  Turnover Transfer turnover Exit turnover 
  OLS   Probit   OLS   Probit   OLS   Probit   




































-0.033  * -0.032  
 




















-0.031  * 0.024  
 












































(0.022)  (0.022)  (0.018)  (0.017)  






(0.028)  (0.027)  (0.025)  (0.028)  
Black -0.050  
 















































































































































































Bachelor's degree 0.145  ** 0.135  *** 0.096  *** 0.128  *** 0.091  
 












































































































































































































































No. of obs. 2790   2790   2370   2370   2130   2130   
R2 0.097    -   0.067    -   0.146    -   
Notes: Recent three cycles of TFS samples are used for analysis. Standard errors (s.e.) are reported in parentheses, and are calculated using survey final weight and replicate 







Appendix B: Probit Models Conducted for Propensity-Score Matching and 
Corresponding Balance Checks 
Twenty-one pair of Probit models with different specifications are tried in the initial 
stage to predict each first-year new teacher’s conditional probabilities of participation in an 
induction program and in a comprehensive program, respectively. In addition to models 
showed in TABLE 4.12 in Chapter 4, estimation results of all other models are showed in 
TABLE B1 in Appendix B. Based on each Probit matching model, checks of the balance 
between distributions of two groups with regard to 21 individual confounding covariates 








TABLE B1: Other Probit Models Conducted for Matching 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variable Induction Comprehensive Induction Comprehensive Induction Comprehensive Induction Comprehensive 
Male 0.134 *** -0.046 
 
0.134 *** -0.042 
 
0.138 *** -0.039 
 
























0.074 *** -0.030 
 



















 Black -0.141 
 
0.478 *** -0.133 
 
0.461 *** -0.128 
 



















 Hispanic -0.111 
 
0.249 ** -0.103 
 
0.219 * -0.088 
 



















































 Regular full-time 0.278 *** -0.125 
 
0.279 *** -0.125 
 
0.278 *** -0.125 
 


















































































 ESL 0.118 
 
0.490 * 0.119 
 
-0.904 * 0.098 
 



















 School-related earnings 0.021 *** 0.009 
 
0.020 *** -0.009 
 
0.020 *** -0.010 
 


















































 Bachelor's degree 0.061 
 



































































 Partial state certification 0.211 *** 0.085 
 
0.209 *** -0.099 
 
0.204 *** -0.100 
 


















 Full state certification 0.105 * 0.080 
 
0.102 * -0.009 
 
0.103 * -0.009 
 





































































 Urban -0.124 ** 0.078 
 
-0.123 ** -0.078 
 
-0.121 ** -0.077 
 







































































-0.001  *** 0.000  
 
-0.001  *** 0.000  
 

























0.000  *** 0.000  
 
















































 Constant -0.548 * -1.153 *** -0.140 
 
-2.363 *** -0.182 
 























































 No. of Observations 3810  2790  3810  2790  3810  2790  3810  2790  
Pseudo R2 0.1207   0.066   0.1211   0.0692   0.1233   0.0696   0.124   0.07   
Panel (A) 
 
  Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Variable Induction Comprehensive Induction Comprehensive Induction Comprehensive Induction Comprehensive 
Male 0.136 *** -0.037 
 
0.147 *** -0.037 
 
0.137 *** -0.039 
 















































0.469 *** -0.121 
 


























0.239 * -0.080 
 
0.231 * -0.089 
 























































Regular full-time 0.248 *** -0.116 
 
0.275 *** -0.126 
 
0.278 *** -0.125 
 
























































































































0.037 *** 0.022 
 
0.020 *** -0.010 
 
0.020 *** -0.010 
 


























































































































0.200 *** 0.085 
 
0.203 *** -0.101 
 



























0.102 * -0.010 
 
0.102 * -0.008 
 









































































Urban -0.128 ** 0.078 
 
-0.119 * -0.076 
 
-0.120 ** -0.078 
 





































































































Enrollment2 0.000 *** 0.000 
 
0.000 *** 0.000 
 
0.000 *** 0.000 
 























































































































































































































































No. of Observations 3810   2790   3810   2790   3810   2790   3810   2790   
Pseudo R2 0.1244   0.0701   0.1242   0.0696   0.1233   0.0696   0.123   0.0696   
Panel (B) 
 






Variable Induction Comprehensive Induction Comprehensive Induction Comprehensive Induction Comprehensive 
Male 0.138 *** -0.039 
 
0.138 *** -0.040 
 
0.138 *** -0.042 
 





















0.073 *** -0.030 
 
0.073 *** -0.032 
 






















0.464 *** -0.129 
 
0.464 *** -0.128 
 






















0.231 * -0.090 
 
0.230 * -0.094 
 





















































Regular full-time 0.281 *** -0.129 
 
0.281 *** -0.132 
 
0.283 *** -0.132 
 























































































0.492 * 0.103 
 
-0.920 * 0.108 
 




















School-related earnings 0.016 * 0.012 
 
0.015 * -0.002 
 
0.016 * -0.006 
 



























0.038 * -0.028 
 




























































































0.204 *** 0.086 
 
0.204 *** -0.099 
 
0.208 *** -0.102 
 



















Full state certification 0.103 * 0.081 
 
0.103 * -0.009 
 
0.105 * -0.012 
 









































































Urban -0.123 ** 0.078 
 
-0.123 ** -0.074 
 
-0.120 * -0.082 
 








































































-0.001 *** 0.000 
 
-0.001 *** 0.000 
 




















Enrollment2 0.000 *** 0.000 
 
0.000 *** 0.000 
 
0.000 *** 0.000 
 






























































































































































-2.418 *** -0.141 
 
-2.488 *** -0.161 
 




















































No. of Observations 3810   2790   3810   2790   3810   2790   3810   2790   
Pseudo R2 0.1234   0.0696   0.1234   0.0699   0.1233   0.0708   0.125   0.0709   
Panel (C) 
 
  Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 
Variable Induction Comprehensive Induction Comprehensive Induction Comprehensive Induction Comprehensive 
Male 0.138 *** -0.039 
 
0.136 *** -0.039 
 
0.133 *** -0.043 
 




















0.073 *** -0.031 
 
0.075 *** -0.031 
 






















0.465 *** -0.133 
 
0.469 *** -0.129 
 






















0.232 * -0.091 
 
0.234 * -0.096 
 





























































Regular full-time 0.267 *** -0.118 
 
0.283 *** -0.131 
 
0.288 *** -0.123 
 























































































0.492 * 0.106 
 
-0.922 * 0.099 
 






















0.016 * 0.012 
 
0.016 ** -0.007 
 
0.016 * -0.007 
 






















































































































0.203 *** 0.086 
 
0.207 *** -0.103 
 
0.211 *** -0.092 
 



















Full state certification 0.102 * 0.081 
 
0.106 * -0.013 
 
0.106 * -0.004 
 























































Enrollment 0.001 *** 0.000 ** 0.001 *** 0.000 ** 0.001 *** 0.000 
 























Urban -0.125 ** 0.078 
 















































































-0.001 *** 0.000 
 
-0.001 *** 0.000 
 




















Enrollment2 0.000 *** 0.000 
 
0.000 *** 0.000 
 
0.000 *** 0.000 
 

































































































































































































-2.428 *** -0.161 
 
-2.404 *** -0.169 
 























































yes   
No. of Observations 3810   2790   3810   2790   3810   2790   3810   2790 
 
Pseudo R2 0.1234   0.0697   0.1238   0.0701   0.1243   0.0704   0.123   0.0697   
Panel (D) 
 
  Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 
Variable Induction Comprehensive Induction Comprehensive Induction Induction Comprehensive Comprehensive 
Male 0.136 *** -0.040 
 
0.137 *** -0.042 
 





















0.074 *** -0.030 
 




















































0.229 * -0.101 
 

























































Regular full-time 0.280 *** -0.130 
 
0.278 *** -0.128 
 

























































































0.493 * 0.099 
 





























0.016 * 0.012 
 
0.015 * -0.006 
 






























































































































0.202 *** 0.086 
 
0.201 *** -0.100 
 














































































































Urban -0.123 ** 0.078 
 
-0.117 * -0.078 
 



















































































-0.001 *** 0.000 
 






















Enrollment2 0.000 *** 0.000 
 
0.000 *** 0.000 
 















































































































































































































































-2.422 *** -0.170 
 
























































3810   2790   3810   2790   3810   3810   2790   2790   
Pseudo R2 0.1235   0.0697   0.1241   0.0699   0.1261   0.1237   0.071   0.0699   
Panel (E) 
Notes: Recent five cycles of TFS samples are used for analysis of induction program, and recent three cycles of TFS samples are used for analysis of comprehensive 
induction program. Standard errors (s.e.) are reported in parentheses, and no statistical weights are used for standard error calculation.  *** significant at p<0.001; ** 








TABLE B2: Balance Checks for Covariates Before and After Matching (Model 1) 
    Mean     %reduct t-test   
Variable Sample Treated  Control %bias bias t     p>|t| 




Matched 0.31652 0.32493 -1.8 76.8 -0.62 0.535 




Matched 29.567 29.797 -2.7 74.8 -0.93 0.352 




Matched 0.06431 0.07398 -3.9 -1025.5 -1.31 0.189 




Matched 0.05801 0.05969 -0.7 43.2 -0.25 0.805 
        Other race and 
ethnicity 




Matched 0.0496 0.0454 1.9 27 0.68 0.496 




Matched 0.87852 0.85246 7 72.4 2.64 0.008 




Matched 0.19462 0.19546 -0.2 96.3 -0.07 0.942 




Matched 0.10677 0.11559 -2.9 -135.1 -0.97 0.333 




Matched 0.01051 0.00588 4.5 -557.1 1.77 0.077 




Matched 16.824 16.646 4.1 85.9 1.48 0.138 




Matched 1.6771 1.6522 0.6 92.7 0.21 0.836 




Matched 0.80286 0.82219 -4.8 -65.4 -1.71 0.088 
        Master's degree and 
above 









Matched 0.15174 0.13199 5.5 -1731.5 1.95 0.051 
        Partial state 
certification 




Matched 0.32072 0.30433 3.7 80.9 1.22 0.223 




Matched 0.47835 0.48298 -0.9 84.4 -0.32 0.75 




Matched 0.47961 0.47079 1.8 77.3 0.61 0.542 




Matched 0.09794 0.09794 0 100 0 1 




Matched 796.18 768.66 4.7 84.9 1.53 0.126 




Matched 0.24338 0.27112 -6.4 -91.3 -2.19 0.029 




Matched 0.30307 0.27911 5 82.2 1.82 0.069 
        % Minority enrollment Unmatched 39.977 38.174 5.1 
 
1.55 0.122 
  Matched 39.977 43.09 -8.9 -72.6 -3.07 0.002 
Panel (A): Induction 
 
    Mean     %reduct t-test   
Variable Sample Treated  Control %bias bias t     p>|t| 




Matched 0.27968 0.26559 3.1 49.4 0.5 0.618 




Matched 29.799 29.765 0.4 53.5 0.06 0.952 




Matched 0.12274 0.13481 -4.2 81 -0.57 0.57 




Matched 0.07646 0.0664 4.1 56.9 0.62 0.539 










Matched 0.04427 0.04628 -0.9 74.8 -0.15 0.879 




Matched 0.85312 0.833 5.8 -76.1 0.87 0.384 




Matched 0.17505 0.20926 -8.7 -26.5 -1.37 0.171 




Matched 0.12475 0.10262 7 13 1.1 0.272 




Matched 0.00201 0.00201 0 100 0 1 




Matched 16.62 16.584 0.9 72.8 0.14 0.891 




Matched 2.0369 2.0873 -1 72.6 -0.15 0.882 




Matched 0.82093 0.82495 -1 91.2 -0.17 0.868 
        Master's degree and 
above 




Matched 0.13883 0.13078 2.2 74.1 0.37 0.711 
        Partial state 
certification 




Matched 0.27767 0.28571 -1.8 53.2 -0.28 0.778 




Matched 0.46881 0.44668 4.4 -253 0.7 0.484 




Matched 0.47284 0.44869 4.8 -314.8 0.76 0.446 




Matched 0.10664 0.09256 4.3 53.9 0.74 0.459 




Matched 873.54 851.41 3.4 83.2 0.53 0.597 




Matched 0.25755 0.2495 1.8 -152.3 0.29 0.771 










Matched 0.22535 0.20121 5.5 65.5 0.93 0.353 
        % Minority enrollment Unmatched 45.846 41.085 13.6 
 
2.73 0.006 
  Matched 45.846 47.599 -5 63.2 -0.79 0.43 
Panel (B): Comprehensive 
 
TABLE B3: Balance Checks for Covariates Before and After Matching (Model 2) 
    Mean     %reduct t-test   
Variable Sample Treated  Control %bias bias t     p>|t| 




Matched 0.31652 0.30517 2.5 68.7 0.85 0.398 




Matched 29.567 29.572 -0.1 99.4 -0.02 0.984 




Matched 0.06431 0.06347 0.3 2.1 0.12 0.906 




Matched 0.05801 0.06179 -1.6 -27.8 -0.55 0.583 
        Other race and 
ethnicity 




Matched 0.0496 0.05338 -1.7 34.3 -0.59 0.555 




Matched 0.87852 0.86717 3.1 88 1.17 0.24 




Matched 0.19462 0.19756 -0.8 87.2 -0.26 0.798 




Matched 0.10677 0.11812 -3.7 -202.3 -1.24 0.215 




Matched 0.01051 0.00925 1.2 -79.2 0.44 0.66 




Matched 16.824 17.118 -6.7 76.6 -2.17 0.03 









Matched 1.6771 1.8233 -3.2 57 -1.09 0.276 




Matched 0.80286 0.82261 -4.9 -69 -1.75 0.081 
        Master's degree and 
above 




Matched 0.15174 0.14082 3 -913.2 1.07 0.286 
        Partial state 
certification 




Matched 0.32072 0.30895 2.6 86.3 0.87 0.382 




Matched 0.47835 0.45776 4.1 30.7 1.42 0.155 




Matched 0.47961 0.49433 -3 62.1 -1.02 0.31 




Matched 0.09794 0.0929 1.5 92.5 0.59 0.554 




Matched 796.18 805.96 -1.7 94.6 -0.53 0.598 




Matched 0.24338 0.28247 -9 -169.5 -3.07 0.002 




Matched 0.30307 0.28583 3.6 87.2 1.3 0.192 
        % Minority enrollment Unmatched 39.977 38.174 5.1 
 
1.55 0.122 
  Matched 39.977 44.138 -11.9 -130.7 -4.07 0 
Panel (A): Induction 
 
    Mean     %reduct t-test   
Variable Sample Treated  Control %bias bias t     p>|t| 




Matched 0.27968 0.26157 4 34.9 0.64 0.521 




Matched 29.799 29.875 -0.9 -3.9 -0.14 0.888 










Matched 0.12274 0.15091 -9.8 55.6 -1.29 0.197 




Matched 0.07646 0.06237 5.7 39.6 0.87 0.383 
        Other race and 
ethnicity 




Matched 0.04427 0.04427 0 100 0 1 




Matched 0.85312 0.88129 -8.1 -146.5 -1.31 0.191 




Matched 0.17505 0.15493 5.1 25.6 0.85 0.393 




Matched 0.12475 0.13883 -4.5 44.6 -0.66 0.512 




Matched 0.00201 0 2.8 70 1 0.318 




Matched 16.62 16.884 -6.3 -100 -1.04 0.297 




Matched 2.0369 1.6313 7.8 -120.3 1.3 0.193 




Matched 0.82093 0.81891 0.5 95.6 0.08 0.934 
        Master's degree and 
above 




Matched 0.13883 0.14286 -1.1 87 -0.18 0.855 
        Partial state 
certification 




Matched 0.27767 0.27767 0 100 0 1 




Matched 0.46881 0.45875 2 -60.5 0.32 0.751 




Matched 0.47284 0.49296 -4 -245.6 -0.63 0.526 














Matched 873.54 911.81 -5.9 71 -0.9 0.366 




Matched 0.25755 0.2495 1.8 -152.3 0.29 0.771 




Matched 0.22535 0.20926 3.7 77 0.61 0.539 
        % Minority enrollment Unmatched 45.846 41.085 13.6 
 
2.73 0.006 
  Matched 45.846 44.676 3.3 75.4 0.52 0.601 
Panel (B): Comprehensive 
 
TABLE B4: Balance Checks for Covariates Before and After Matching (Model 3) 
    Mean     %reduct t-test   
Variable Sample Treated  Control %bias bias t     p>|t| 




Matched 0.31652 0.31106 1.2 84.9 0.41 0.685 




Matched 29.567 29.67 -1.2 88.6 -0.42 0.677 




Matched 0.06431 0.07104 -2.7 -683 -0.92 0.356 




Matched 0.05801 0.05717 0.4 71.6 0.12 0.901 
        Other race and 
ethnicity 




Matched 0.0496 0.0433 2.8 -9.5 1.03 0.302 




Matched 0.87852 0.85456 6.4 74.6 2.43 0.015 




Matched 0.19462 0.18075 3.6 39.5 1.23 0.221 




Matched 0.10677 0.10551 0.4 66.4 0.14 0.888 










Matched 0.01051 0.01555 -4.9 -616.8 -1.53 0.125 




Matched 16.824 16.781 1 96.6 0.35 0.729 




Matched 1.6771 1.7246 -1.1 86 -0.41 0.684 




Matched 0.80286 0.81337 -2.6 10.1 -0.92 0.357 
        Master's degree and 
above 




Matched 0.15174 0.13703 4.1 -1263.9 1.44 0.149 
        Partial state 
certification 




Matched 0.32072 0.34552 -5.6 71.2 -1.81 0.07 




Matched 0.47835 0.47247 1.2 80.2 0.41 0.685 




Matched 0.47961 0.48129 -0.3 95.7 -0.12 0.908 




Matched 0.09794 0.11097 -3.9 80.7 -1.47 0.142 




Matched 796.18 788.75 1.3 95.9 0.43 0.669 




Matched 0.24338 0.25095 -1.7 47.8 -0.6 0.545 




Matched 0.30307 0.29004 2.7 90.3 0.98 0.325 
        % Minority enrollment Unmatched 39.977 38.174 5.1 
 
1.55 0.122 
  Matched 39.977 41.796 -5.2 -0.8 -1.82 0.068 
Panel (A): Induction 
 
    Mean     %reduct t-test   










Matched 0.27968 0.26761 2.7 56.6 0.43 0.67 




Matched 29.799 30.493 -8 -842.9 -1.22 0.224 




Matched 0.12274 0.12475 -0.7 96.8 -0.1 0.923 




Matched 0.07646 0.08451 -3.3 65.5 -0.47 0.641 
        Other race and 
ethnicity 




Matched 0.04427 0.04225 0.9 74.8 0.16 0.876 




Matched 0.85312 0.8833 -8.7 -164.1 -1.41 0.16 




Matched 0.17505 0.18712 -3.1 55.4 -0.49 0.622 




Matched 0.12475 0.1006 7.7 5.1 1.2 0.229 




Matched 0.00201 0.00201 0 100 0 1 




Matched 16.62 16.81 -4.5 -44.1 -0.75 0.45 




Matched 2.0369 1.8948 2.7 22.8 0.43 0.664 




Matched 0.82093 0.80684 3.5 69.2 0.57 0.569 
        Master's degree and 
above 




Matched 0.13883 0.15292 -3.9 54.6 -0.63 0.53 
        Partial state 
certification 




Matched 0.27767 0.27565 0.4 88.3 0.07 0.944 









Matched 0.46881 0.46881 0 100 0 1 




Matched 0.47284 0.4829 -2 -72.8 -0.32 0.751 




Matched 0.10664 0.10262 1.2 86.8 0.21 0.836 




Matched 873.54 909.18 -5.5 73 -0.82 0.414 




Matched 0.25755 0.26559 -1.8 -152.3 -0.29 0.773 




Matched 0.22535 0.20322 5.1 68.4 0.85 0.396 
        % Minority enrollment Unmatched 45.846 41.085 13.6 
 
2.73 0.006 
  Matched 45.846 47.63 -5.1 62.5 -0.8 0.426 
Panel (B): Comprehensive 
 
TABLE B5: Balance Checks for Covariates Before and After Matching (Model 4) 
    Mean     %reduct t-test   
Variable Sample Treated  Control %bias bias t     p>|t| 




Matched 0.31652 0.28583 6.7 15.3 2.31 0.021 




Matched 29.567 29.97 -4.7 55.8 -1.6 0.11 




Matched 0.06431 0.05422 4.1 -1074.5 1.47 0.141 




Matched 0.05801 0.05675 0.5 57.4 0.19 0.852 
        Other race and 
ethnicity 




Matched 0.0496 0.04666 1.3 48.9 0.47 0.635 














Matched 0.19462 0.17108 6.1 -2.7 2.1 0.036 




Matched 0.10677 0.10635 0.1 88.8 0.05 0.963 




Matched 0.01051 0.00841 2 -198.7 0.75 0.454 




Matched 16.824 16.696 2.9 89.8 1 0.316 




Matched 1.6771 1.6828 -0.1 98.3 -0.05 0.963 




Matched 0.80286 0.80034 0.6 78.4 0.22 0.827 
        Master's degree and 
above 




Matched 0.15174 0.15216 -0.1 61 -0.04 0.968 
        Partial state 
certification 




Matched 0.32072 0.33712 -3.7 80.9 -1.2 0.229 




Matched 0.47835 0.45397 4.9 17.9 1.69 0.092 




Matched 0.47961 0.49811 -3.7 52.4 -1.28 0.202 




Matched 0.09794 0.09584 0.6 96.9 0.24 0.806 




Matched 796.18 814.29 -3.1 90.1 -1.03 0.303 




Matched 0.24338 0.24254 0.2 94.2 0.07 0.946 




Matched 0.30307 0.30433 -0.3 99.1 -0.09 0.925 
        % Minority enrollment Unmatched 39.977 38.174 5.1 
 
1.55 0.122 






Panel (A): Induction 
 
    Mean     %reduct t-test   
Variable Sample Treated  Control %bias bias t     p>|t| 




Matched 0.27968 0.2998 -4.4 27.7 -0.7 0.485 




Matched 29.799 30.33 -6.1 -621.5 -0.97 0.331 




Matched 0.12274 0.13481 -4.2 81 -0.57 0.57 




Matched 0.07646 0.08853 -4.9 48.2 -0.69 0.49 
        Other race and 
ethnicity 




Matched 0.04427 0.04225 0.9 74.8 0.16 0.876 




Matched 0.85312 0.85915 -1.7 47.2 -0.27 0.787 




Matched 0.17505 0.18913 -3.6 47.9 -0.57 0.566 




Matched 0.12475 0.13078 -1.9 76.3 -0.28 0.776 




Matched 0.00201 0.00805 -8.3 9.9 -1.34 0.179 




Matched 16.62 16.598 0.5 83.7 0.08 0.934 




Matched 2.0369 2.4262 -7.5 -111.5 -1.04 0.297 




Matched 0.82093 0.80684 3.5 69.2 0.57 0.569 
        Master's degree and 
above 









Matched 0.13883 0.14688 -2.2 74.1 -0.36 0.717 
        Partial state 
certification 




Matched 0.27767 0.31791 -8.9 -134 -1.39 0.166 




Matched 0.46881 0.41046 11.7 -830.7 1.85 0.064 




Matched 0.47284 0.52515 -10.5 -798.6 -1.65 0.099 




Matched 0.10664 0.09256 4.3 53.9 0.74 0.459 




Matched 873.54 931.41 -9 56.2 -1.37 0.17 




Matched 0.25755 0.27565 -4.1 -467.7 -0.65 0.519 




Matched 0.22535 0.19316 7.4 54 1.25 0.213 
        % Minority enrollment Unmatched 45.846 41.085 13.6 
 
2.73 0.006 
  Matched 45.846 44.839 2.9 78.9 0.46 0.647 
Panel (B): Comprehensive 
 
TABLE B6: Balance Checks for Covariates Before and After Matching (Model 5) 
    Mean     %reduct t-test   
Variable Sample Treated  Control %bias bias t     p>|t| 




Matched 0.31652 0.32535 -1.9 75.6 -0.65 0.514 




Matched 29.567 29.665 -1.1 89.2 -0.39 0.693 




Matched 0.06431 0.07356 -3.8 -976.6 -1.26 0.208 










        Other race and 
ethnicity 




Matched 0.0496 0.05254 -1.3 48.9 -0.46 0.645 




Matched 0.87852 0.86423 3.8 84.9 1.47 0.141 




Matched 0.19462 0.18663 2.1 65.2 0.7 0.483 




Matched 0.10677 0.12947 -7.4 -504.6 -2.43 0.015 




Matched 0.01051 0.01051 0 100 0 1 




Matched 16.824 16.845 -0.5 98.3 -0.18 0.858 




Matched 1.6771 1.7986 -2.7 64.2 -0.98 0.325 




Matched 0.80286 0.82388 -5.2 -79.8 -1.86 0.063 
        Master's degree and 
above 




Matched 0.15174 0.13661 4.2 -1302.8 1.49 0.137 
        Partial state 
certification 




Matched 0.32072 0.33712 -3.7 80.9 -1.2 0.229 




Matched 0.47835 0.45229 5.2 12.3 1.8 0.072 




Matched 0.47961 0.47373 1.2 84.8 0.41 0.685 




Matched 0.09794 0.10929 -3.4 83.2 -1.28 0.199 




Matched 796.18 770.86 4.3 86.1 1.47 0.141 









Matched 0.24338 0.23413 2.1 36.2 0.75 0.454 




Matched 0.30307 0.31148 -1.8 93.8 -0.63 0.53 
        % Minority enrollment Unmatched 39.977 38.174 5.1 
 
1.55 0.122 
  Matched 39.977 41.046 -3 40.7 -1.08 0.281 
Panel (A): Induction 
 
    Mean     %reduct t-test   
Variable Sample Treated  Control %bias bias t     p>|t| 




Matched 0.27968 0.30584 -5.7 6 -0.91 0.365 




Matched 29.799 30.35 -6.3 -648.9 -1 0.316 




Matched 0.12274 0.10463 6.3 71.5 0.9 0.369 




Matched 0.07646 0.07042 2.5 74.1 0.36 0.716 
        Other race and 
ethnicity 




Matched 0.04427 0.05433 -4.7 -25.8 -0.73 0.464 




Matched 0.85312 0.84105 3.5 -5.6 0.53 0.597 




Matched 0.17505 0.1831 -2.1 70.2 -0.33 0.741 




Matched 0.12475 0.11469 3.2 60.5 0.49 0.626 




Matched 0.00201 0 2.8 70 1 0.318 




Matched 16.62 16.357 6.2 -98.9 1.01 0.313 









Matched 2.0369 2.2598 -4.3 -21.1 -0.65 0.519 




Matched 0.82093 0.80684 3.5 69.2 0.57 0.569 
        Master's degree and 
above 




Matched 0.13883 0.14085 -0.6 93.5 -0.09 0.927 
        Partial state 
certification 




Matched 0.27767 0.30785 -6.7 -75.5 -1.05 0.296 




Matched 0.46881 0.43461 6.9 -445.6 1.08 0.279 




Matched 0.47284 0.48089 -1.6 -38.3 -0.25 0.8 




Matched 0.10664 0.11066 -1.2 86.8 -0.2 0.839 




Matched 873.54 921.91 -7.5 63.4 -1.14 0.254 




Matched 0.25755 0.27163 -3.2 -341.5 -0.5 0.615 




Matched 0.22535 0.20724 4.1 74.1 0.69 0.489 
        % Minority enrollment Unmatched 45.846 41.085 13.6 
 
2.73 0.006 
  Matched 45.846 44.595 3.6 73.7 0.56 0.574 
Panel (B): Comprehensive 
 
TABLE B7: Balance Checks for Covariates Before and After Matching (Model 6) 
    Mean     %reduct t-test   
Variable Sample Treated  Control %bias bias t     p>|t| 




Matched 0.31652 0.32156 -1.1 86.1 -0.37 0.709 









Matched 29.567 30.24 -7.8 26.3 -2.61 0.009 




Matched 0.06431 0.05885 2.2 -536.2 0.78 0.433 




Matched 0.05801 0.06263 -2 -56.2 -0.67 0.503 
        Other race and 
ethnicity 




Matched 0.0496 0.05296 -1.5 41.6 -0.53 0.599 




Matched 0.87852 0.85708 5.8 77.3 2.18 0.029 




Matched 0.19462 0.18327 2.9 50.5 1 0.317 




Matched 0.10677 0.10467 0.7 44 0.24 0.814 




Matched 0.01051 0.01093 -0.4 40.3 -0.14 0.888 




Matched 16.824 16.675 3.4 88.2 1.23 0.218 




Matched 1.6771 1.9907 -6.9 7.7 -2.38 0.017 




Matched 0.80286 0.77007 8.2 -180.5 2.76 0.006 
        Master's degree and 
above 




Matched 0.15174 0.17949 -7.7 -2471.9 -2.58 0.01 
        Partial state 
certification 




Matched 0.32072 0.31568 1.1 94.1 0.37 0.709 




Matched 0.47835 0.4918 -2.7 54.7 -0.93 0.353 




Matched 0.47961 0.47415 1.1 85.9 0.38 0.706 










Matched 0.09794 0.09248 1.6 91.9 0.64 0.521 




Matched 796.18 814.45 -3.1 90 -1.02 0.306 




Matched 0.24338 0.24422 -0.2 94.2 -0.07 0.946 




Matched 0.30307 0.29634 1.4 95 0.51 0.613 
        % Minority enrollment Unmatched 39.977 38.174 5.1 
 
1.55 0.122 
  Matched 39.977 41.283 -3.7 27.6 -1.3 0.193 
Panel (A): Induction 
 
    Mean     %reduct t-test   
Variable Sample Treated  Control %bias bias t     p>|t| 




Matched 0.27968 0.2998 -4.4 27.7 -0.7 0.485 




Matched 29.799 30.425 -7.2 -750 -1.13 0.257 




Matched 0.12274 0.12475 -0.7 96.8 -0.1 0.923 




Matched 0.07646 0.07042 2.5 74.1 0.36 0.716 
        Other race and 
ethnicity 




Matched 0.04427 0.04829 -1.9 49.7 -0.3 0.763 




Matched 0.85312 0.85312 0 100 0 1 




Matched 0.17505 0.167 2.1 70.2 0.34 0.736 




Matched 0.12475 0.11066 4.5 44.6 0.69 0.491 










Matched 0.00201 0 2.8 70 1 0.318 
        School-related 
earnings 




Matched 16.62 16.419 4.8 -52.5 0.77 0.439 




Matched 2.0369 2.2921 -4.9 -38.7 -0.7 0.487 




Matched 0.82093 0.833 -3 73.6 -0.5 0.615 
        Master's degree and 
above 




Matched 0.13883 0.13078 2.2 74.1 0.37 0.711 
        Partial state 
certification 




Matched 0.27767 0.27565 0.4 88.3 0.07 0.944 




Matched 0.46881 0.43461 6.9 -445.6 1.08 0.279 




Matched 0.47284 0.49497 -4.4 -280.2 -0.7 0.486 




Matched 0.10664 0.10262 1.2 86.8 0.21 0.836 




Matched 873.54 880.87 -1.1 94.4 -0.18 0.861 




Matched 0.25755 0.23742 4.6 -530.8 0.73 0.463 




Matched 0.22535 0.22736 -0.5 97.1 -0.08 0.94 
        % Minority enrollment Unmatched 45.846 41.085 13.6 
 
2.73 0.006 
  Matched 45.846 44.448 4 70.6 0.63 0.53 








TABLE B8: Balance Checks for Covariates Before and After Matching (Model 7) 
    Mean     %reduct t-test   
Variable Sample Treated  Control %bias bias t     p>|t| 




Matched 0.31652 0.30055 3.5 55.9 1.19 0.233 




Matched 29.567 30.045 -5.6 47.6 -1.89 0.059 




Matched 0.06431 0.06221 0.9 -144.7 0.3 0.766 




Matched 0.05801 0.05885 -0.4 71.6 -0.12 0.902 
        Other race and 
ethnicity 




Matched 0.0496 0.04414 2.5 5.1 0.89 0.373 




Matched 0.87852 0.85414 6.6 74.2 2.47 0.013 




Matched 0.19462 0.17108 6.1 -2.7 2.1 0.036 




Matched 0.10677 0.11307 -2.1 -67.9 -0.7 0.487 




Matched 0.01051 0.01093 -0.4 40.3 -0.14 0.888 




Matched 16.824 16.853 -0.7 97.7 -0.24 0.807 




Matched 1.6771 1.8106 -3 60.7 -1.04 0.301 




Matched 0.80286 0.78268 5 -72.6 1.72 0.086 
        Master's degree and 
above 




Matched 0.15174 0.17612 -6.8 -2160.1 -2.27 0.023 










Matched 0.32072 0.33712 -3.7 80.9 -1.2 0.229 




Matched 0.47835 0.46826 2 66 0.7 0.486 




Matched 0.47961 0.47499 0.9 88.1 0.32 0.75 




Matched 0.09794 0.10593 -2.4 88.2 -0.91 0.363 




Matched 796.18 784.26 2 93.5 0.68 0.495 




Matched 0.24338 0.24086 0.6 82.6 0.2 0.839 




Matched 0.30307 0.30223 0.2 99.4 0.06 0.95 
        % Minority enrollment Unmatched 39.977 38.174 5.1 
 
1.55 0.122 
  Matched 39.977 40.677 -2 61.2 -0.7 0.481 
Panel (A): Induction 
 
    Mean     %reduct t-test   
Variable Sample Treated  Control %bias bias t     p>|t| 




Matched 0.27968 0.30382 -5.3 13.2 -0.84 0.403 




Matched 29.799 29.734 0.7 12.5 0.12 0.905 




Matched 0.12274 0.11871 1.4 93.7 0.19 0.846 




Matched 0.07646 0.07445 0.8 91.4 0.12 0.905 
        Other race and 
ethnicity 




Matched 0.04427 0.03823 2.8 24.5 0.48 0.633 










Matched 0.85312 0.88129 -8.1 -146.5 -1.31 0.191 




Matched 0.17505 0.16499 2.6 62.8 0.42 0.673 




Matched 0.12475 0.10865 5.1 36.7 0.79 0.43 




Matched 0.00201 0.00201 0 100 0 1 




Matched 16.62 16.755 -3.2 -2.2 -0.53 0.597 




Matched 2.0369 1.8597 3.4 3.8 0.54 0.589 




Matched 0.82093 0.83099 -2.5 78 -0.42 0.676 
        Master's degree and 
above 




Matched 0.13883 0.14487 -1.7 80.5 -0.27 0.785 
        Partial state 
certification 




Matched 0.27767 0.31187 -7.6 -98.9 -1.18 0.237 




Matched 0.46881 0.46479 0.8 35.8 0.13 0.899 




Matched 0.47284 0.49899 -5.2 -349.3 -0.82 0.41 




Matched 0.10664 0.09859 2.5 73.7 0.42 0.676 




Matched 873.54 918.31 -6.9 66.1 -1.02 0.308 




Matched 0.25755 0.24748 2.3 -215.4 0.36 0.715 




Matched 0.22535 0.22334 0.5 97.1 0.08 0.939 






% Minority enrollment Unmatched 45.846 41.085 13.6 
 
2.73 0.006 
  Matched 45.846 43.563 6.5 52 1.04 0.3 
Panel (B): Comprehensive 
 
TABLE B9: Balance Checks for Covariates Before and After Matching (Model 8) 
    Mean     %reduct t-test   
Variable Sample Treated  Control %bias bias t     p>|t| 




Matched 0.31652 0.31652 0 100 0 1 




Matched 29.567 30 -5 52.5 -1.73 0.084 




Matched 0.06431 0.06305 0.5 -46.8 0.18 0.859 




Matched 0.05801 0.06137 -1.4 -13.6 -0.49 0.625 
        Other race and 
ethnicity 




Matched 0.0496 0.0538 -1.9 27 -0.65 0.513 




Matched 0.87852 0.85708 5.8 77.3 2.18 0.029 




Matched 0.19462 0.19 1.2 79.8 0.4 0.686 




Matched 0.10677 0.11307 -2.1 -67.9 -0.7 0.487 




Matched 0.01051 0.00967 0.8 -19.5 0.29 0.772 




Matched 16.824 16.834 -0.2 99.1 -0.08 0.932 




Matched 1.6771 1.7639 -1.9 74.4 -0.71 0.476 









Matched 0.80286 0.7852 4.4 -51 1.51 0.132 
        Master's degree and 
above 




Matched 0.15174 0.16604 -4 -1224.9 -1.35 0.178 
        Partial state 
certification 




Matched 0.32072 0.3203 0.1 99.5 0.03 0.975 




Matched 0.47835 0.47961 -0.3 95.8 -0.09 0.931 




Matched 0.47961 0.46406 3.1 59.9 1.07 0.283 




Matched 0.09794 0.10551 -2.2 88.8 -0.86 0.388 




Matched 796.18 760.18 6.1 80.2 2.13 0.033 




Matched 0.24338 0.24842 -1.2 65.2 -0.4 0.686 




Matched 0.30307 0.30307 0 100 0 1 
        % Minority enrollment Unmatched 39.977 38.174 5.1 
 
1.55 0.122 
  Matched 39.977 39.384 1.7 67.1 0.59 0.553 
Panel (A): Induction 
 
    Mean     %reduct t-test   
Variable Sample Treated  Control %bias bias t     p>|t| 




Matched 0.27968 0.29376 -3.1 49.4 -0.49 0.624 




Matched 29.799 30.396 -6.9 -711.7 -1.08 0.278 




Matched 0.12274 0.1167 2.1 90.5 0.29 0.77 










Matched 0.07646 0.09054 -5.7 39.6 -0.8 0.423 
        Other race and 
ethnicity 




Matched 0.04427 0.04628 -0.9 74.8 -0.15 0.879 




Matched 0.85312 0.8672 -4 -23.2 -0.64 0.523 




Matched 0.17505 0.18913 -3.6 47.9 -0.57 0.566 




Matched 0.12475 0.11871 1.9 76.3 0.29 0.771 




Matched 0.00201 0 2.8 70 1 0.318 




Matched 16.62 16.921 -7.2 -128 -1.22 0.223 




Matched 2.0369 1.5816 8.8 -147.3 1.5 0.135 




Matched 0.82093 0.84708 -6.5 42.7 -1.11 0.268 
        Master's degree and 
above 




Matched 0.13883 0.11066 7.8 9.2 1.34 0.179 
        Partial state 
certification 




Matched 0.27767 0.26559 2.7 29.8 0.43 0.669 




Matched 0.46881 0.46881 0 100 0 1 




Matched 0.47284 0.50503 -6.4 -453 -1.01 0.31 




Matched 0.10664 0.07646 9.2 1.2 1.65 0.099 














Matched 0.25755 0.25151 1.4 -89.2 0.22 0.827 




Matched 0.22535 0.20926 3.7 77 0.61 0.539 
        % Minority enrollment Unmatched 45.846 41.085 13.6 
 
2.73 0.006 
  Matched 45.846 46.03 -0.5 96.1 -0.08 0.934 
Panel (B): Comprehensive 
 
TABLE B10: Balance Checks for Covariates Before and After Matching (Model 9) 
    Mean     %reduct t-test   
Variable Sample Treated  Control %bias bias t     p>|t| 




Matched 0.31652 0.30895 1.7 79.1 0.56 0.574 




Matched 29.567 30.045 -5.6 47.6 -1.93 0.054 




Matched 0.06431 0.05885 2.2 -536.2 0.78 0.433 




Matched 0.05801 0.06768 -4.1 -226.7 -1.37 0.17 
        Other race and 
ethnicity 




Matched 0.0496 0.04834 0.6 78.1 0.2 0.84 




Matched 0.87852 0.86969 2.4 90.6 0.92 0.359 




Matched 0.19462 0.19966 -1.3 78 -0.44 0.662 




Matched 0.10677 0.11728 -3.4 -179.9 -1.15 0.251 




Matched 0.01051 0.00967 0.8 -19.5 0.29 0.772 










Matched 16.824 16.788 0.8 97.1 0.28 0.782 




Matched 1.6771 1.4643 4.7 37.4 2.06 0.04 




Matched 0.80286 0.80916 -1.6 46.1 -0.55 0.582 
        Master's degree and 
above 




Matched 0.15174 0.14838 0.9 -211.7 0.32 0.745 
        Partial state 
certification 




Matched 0.32072 0.33291 -2.7 85.8 -0.9 0.37 




Matched 0.47835 0.46784 2.1 64.6 0.73 0.468 




Matched 0.47961 0.46196 3.5 54.5 1.22 0.223 




Matched 0.09794 0.11181 -4.1 79.4 -1.56 0.118 




Matched 796.18 769.66 4.5 85.4 1.52 0.129 




Matched 0.24338 0.26944 -6 -79.7 -2.06 0.04 




Matched 0.30307 0.30013 0.6 97.8 0.22 0.825 
        % Minority enrollment Unmatched 39.977 38.174 5.1 
 
1.55 0.122 
  Matched 39.977 42.93 -8.4 -63.7 -2.94 0.003 
Panel (A): Induction 
 
    Mean     %reduct t-test   
Variable Sample Treated  Control %bias bias t     p>|t| 














Matched 29.799 30.815 -11.7 -1280.2 -1.78 0.076 




Matched 0.12274 0.11066 4.2 81 0.59 0.554 




Matched 0.07646 0.07042 2.5 74.1 0.36 0.716 
        Other race and 
ethnicity 




Matched 0.04427 0.04024 1.9 49.7 0.32 0.753 




Matched 0.85312 0.87525 -6.4 -93.7 -1.02 0.309 




Matched 0.17505 0.20724 -8.2 -19.1 -1.29 0.197 




Matched 0.12475 0.10262 7 13 1.1 0.272 




Matched 0.00201 0 2.8 70 1 0.318 




Matched 16.62 16.597 0.6 82.4 0.09 0.925 




Matched 2.0369 2.1312 -1.8 48.8 -0.25 0.804 




Matched 0.82093 0.80684 3.5 69.2 0.57 0.569 
        Master's degree and 
above 




Matched 0.13883 0.14286 -1.1 87 -0.18 0.855 
        Partial state 
certification 




Matched 0.27767 0.24346 7.6 -98.9 1.23 0.22 




Matched 0.46881 0.47284 -0.8 35.8 -0.13 0.899 









Matched 0.47284 0.47887 -1.2 -3.7 -0.19 0.849 




Matched 0.10664 0.08853 5.5 40.7 0.96 0.337 




Matched 873.54 924.19 -7.9 61.6 -1.21 0.228 




Matched 0.25755 0.2495 1.8 -152.3 0.29 0.771 




Matched 0.22535 0.20926 3.7 77 0.61 0.539 
        % Minority enrollment Unmatched 45.846 41.085 13.6 
 
2.73 0.006 
  Matched 45.846 44.534 3.7 72.4 0.59 0.555 
Panel (B): Comprehensive 
 
TABLE B11: Balance Checks for Covariates Before and After Matching (Model 10) 
    Mean     %reduct t-test   
Variable Sample Treated  Control %bias bias t     p>|t| 




Matched 0.31652 0.30391 2.8 65.2 0.94 0.347 




Matched 29.567 30.5 -10.8 -2.2 -3.64 0 




Matched 0.06431 0.06137 1.2 -242.6 0.42 0.676 




Matched 0.05801 0.06641 -3.6 -184.1 -1.2 0.23 
        Other race and 
ethnicity 




Matched 0.0496 0.04876 0.4 85.4 0.13 0.893 




Matched 0.87852 0.86633 3.3 87.1 1.26 0.208 














Matched 0.10677 0.11223 -1.8 -45.6 -0.6 0.546 




Matched 0.01051 0.01093 -0.4 40.3 -0.14 0.888 




Matched 16.824 16.747 1.7 93.9 0.63 0.53 




Matched 1.6771 1.6542 0.5 93.3 0.19 0.849 




Matched 0.80286 0.80118 0.4 85.6 0.15 0.884 
        Master's degree and 
above 




Matched 0.15174 0.14292 2.5 -718.3 0.86 0.39 
        Partial state 
certification 




Matched 0.32072 0.3161 1 94.6 0.34 0.732 




Matched 0.47835 0.47625 0.4 92.9 0.15 0.885 




Matched 0.47961 0.49727 -3.5 54.5 -1.22 0.223 




Matched 0.09794 0.09416 1.1 94.4 0.44 0.658 




Matched 796.18 809.78 -2.3 92.5 -0.76 0.448 




Matched 0.24338 0.25725 -3.2 4.4 -1.1 0.27 




Matched 0.30307 0.29298 2.1 92.5 0.76 0.447 
        % Minority enrollment Unmatched 39.977 38.174 5.1 
 
1.55 0.122 
  Matched 39.977 41.593 -4.6 10.4 -1.62 0.106 







    Mean     %reduct t-test   
Variable Sample Treated  Control %bias bias t     p>|t| 




Matched 0.27968 0.25755 4.9 20.4 0.79 0.432 




Matched 29.799 30.926 -12.9 -1430.5 -2.01 0.045 




Matched 0.12274 0.13682 -4.9 77.8 -0.66 0.509 




Matched 0.07646 0.08853 -4.9 48.2 -0.69 0.49 
        Other race and 
ethnicity 




Matched 0.04427 0.04427 0 100 0 1 




Matched 0.85312 0.87928 -7.5 -128.9 -1.21 0.226 




Matched 0.17505 0.20121 -6.7 3.3 -1.05 0.292 




Matched 0.12475 0.11871 1.9 76.3 0.29 0.771 




Matched 0.00201 0.00201 0 100 0 1 
        School-related 
earnings 




Matched 16.62 16.832 -5 -60.6 -0.86 0.392 




Matched 2.0369 1.6804 6.9 -93.7 1.15 0.252 




Matched 0.82093 0.8169 1 91.2 0.16 0.869 
        Master's degree and 
above 




Matched 0.13883 0.14487 -1.7 80.5 -0.27 0.785 












Matched 0.27767 0.30382 -5.8 -52.1 -0.91 0.364 




Matched 0.46881 0.42857 8.1 -541.9 1.28 0.203 




Matched 0.47284 0.47284 0 100 0 1 




Matched 0.10664 0.09658 3.1 67.1 0.52 0.6 




Matched 873.54 942.93 -10.8 47.4 -1.59 0.113 




Matched 0.25755 0.28571 -6.5 -783.1 -1 0.319 




Matched 0.22535 0.2173 1.8 88.5 0.31 0.76 
        % Minority enrollment Unmatched 45.846 41.085 13.6 
 
2.73 0.006 
  Matched 45.846 48.375 -7.2 46.9 -1.14 0.255 
Panel (B): Comprehensive 
 
TABLE B12: Balance Checks for Covariates Before and After Matching (Model 11) 
    Mean     %reduct t-test   
Variable Sample Treated  Control %bias bias t     p>|t| 




Matched 0.31652 0.32955 -2.8 64 -0.96 0.337 




Matched 29.567 29.595 -0.3 96.9 -0.11 0.91 




Matched 0.06431 0.07356 -3.8 -976.6 -1.26 0.208 




Matched 0.05801 0.05675 0.5 57.4 0.19 0.852 










Matched 0.0496 0.0517 -0.9 63.5 -0.33 0.741 




Matched 0.87852 0.87264 1.6 93.8 0.61 0.539 




Matched 0.19462 0.18663 2.1 65.2 0.7 0.483 




Matched 0.10677 0.10635 0.1 88.8 0.05 0.963 




Matched 0.01051 0.01093 -0.4 40.3 -0.14 0.888 
        School-related 
earnings 




Matched 16.824 16.877 -1.2 95.8 -0.44 0.66 




Matched 1.6771 1.659 0.4 94.7 0.16 0.869 




Matched 0.80286 0.79613 1.7 42.5 0.58 0.562 
        Master's degree and 
above 




Matched 0.15174 0.15511 -0.9 -211.7 -0.32 0.748 
        Partial state 
certification 




Matched 0.32072 0.33039 -2.2 88.8 -0.71 0.477 




Matched 0.47835 0.45481 4.7 20.8 1.63 0.104 




Matched 0.47961 0.46028 3.9 50.2 1.34 0.182 




Matched 0.09794 0.09878 -0.2 98.8 -0.1 0.922 




Matched 796.18 788.2 1.4 95.6 0.46 0.644 














Matched 0.30307 0.28752 3.3 88.5 1.18 0.24 
        % Minority enrollment Unmatched 39.977 38.174 5.1 
 
1.55 0.122 
  Matched 39.977 42.82 -8.1 -57.6 -2.86 0.004 
Panel (A): Induction 
 
    Mean     %reduct t-test   
Variable Sample Treated  Control %bias bias t     p>|t| 




Matched 0.27968 0.30181 -4.9 20.4 -0.77 0.443 




Matched 29.799 30.06 -3 -255.3 -0.48 0.634 




Matched 0.12274 0.13078 -2.8 87.3 -0.38 0.703 




Matched 0.07646 0.07847 -0.8 91.4 -0.12 0.906 
        Other race and 
ethnicity 




Matched 0.04427 0.03018 6.6 -76.1 1.17 0.241 




Matched 0.85312 0.84909 1.2 64.8 0.18 0.859 




Matched 0.17505 0.15694 4.6 33 0.77 0.443 




Matched 0.12475 0.10463 6.4 20.9 0.99 0.32 




Matched 0.00201 0.00402 -2.8 70 -0.58 0.564 
        School-related 
earnings 




Matched 16.62 16.542 1.8 41.3 0.3 0.761 









Matched 2.0369 2.1395 -2 44.2 -0.26 0.794 




Matched 0.82093 0.79276 7 38.3 1.12 0.261 
        Master's degree and 
above 




Matched 0.13883 0.16901 -8.4 2.7 -1.32 0.188 
        Partial state 
certification 




Matched 0.27767 0.26761 2.2 41.5 0.36 0.722 




Matched 0.46881 0.47485 -1.2 3.7 -0.19 0.849 




Matched 0.47284 0.47887 -1.2 -3.7 -0.19 0.849 




Matched 0.10664 0.10664 0 100 0 1 




Matched 873.54 879.9 -1 95.2 -0.15 0.88 




Matched 0.25755 0.27767 -4.6 -530.8 -0.72 0.474 




Matched 0.22535 0.22938 -0.9 94.2 -0.15 0.88 
        % Minority enrollment Unmatched 45.846 41.085 13.6 
 
2.73 0.006 
  Matched 45.846 44.348 4.3 68.5 0.68 0.498 
Panel (B): Comprehensive 
 
TABLE B13: Balance Checks for Covariates Before and After Matching (Model 12) 
    Mean     %reduct t-test   
Variable Sample Treated  Control %bias bias t     p>|t| 




Matched 0.31652 0.32072 -0.9 88.4 -0.31 0.756 









Matched 29.567 29.905 -3.9 62.9 -1.33 0.183 




Matched 0.06431 0.07314 -3.6 -927.7 -1.2 0.229 




Matched 0.05801 0.05927 -0.5 57.4 -0.19 0.853 
        Other race and 
ethnicity 




Matched 0.0496 0.05254 -1.3 48.9 -0.46 0.645 




Matched 0.87852 0.84027 10.3 59.5 3.8 0 




Matched 0.19462 0.19252 0.5 90.8 0.18 0.854 




Matched 0.10677 0.10298 1.2 -0.8 0.43 0.67 




Matched 0.01051 0.00841 2 -198.7 0.75 0.454 




Matched 16.824 16.594 5.3 81.7 1.98 0.048 




Matched 1.6771 1.623 1.2 84.1 0.49 0.623 




Matched 0.80286 0.79361 2.3 20.9 0.79 0.427 
        Master's degree and 
above 




Matched 0.15174 0.15216 -0.1 61 -0.04 0.968 
        Partial state 
certification 




Matched 0.32072 0.32745 -1.5 92.2 -0.5 0.62 




Matched 0.47835 0.45565 4.5 23.6 1.57 0.117 




Matched 0.47961 0.46995 1.9 75.1 0.67 0.504 










Matched 0.09794 0.09332 1.4 93.1 0.54 0.588 




Matched 796.18 795.09 0.2 99.4 0.06 0.95 




Matched 0.24338 0.25515 -2.7 18.9 -0.94 0.348 




Matched 0.30307 0.28205 4.4 84.4 1.59 0.111 
        % Minority enrollment Unmatched 39.977 38.174 5.1 
 
1.55 0.122 
  Matched 39.977 41.441 -4.2 18.9 -1.45 0.146 
Panel (A): Induction 
 
    Mean     %reduct t-test   
Variable Sample Treated  Control %bias bias t     p>|t| 




Matched 0.27968 0.32596 -10.2 -66.4 -1.59 0.113 




Matched 29.799 29.831 -0.4 56.3 -0.06 0.953 




Matched 0.12274 0.13481 -4.2 81 -0.57 0.57 




Matched 0.07646 0.07646 0 100 0 1 
        Other race and 
ethnicity 




Matched 0.04427 0.04024 1.9 49.7 0.32 0.753 




Matched 0.85312 0.86318 -2.9 12 -0.45 0.65 




Matched 0.17505 0.16901 1.5 77.7 0.25 0.801 




Matched 0.12475 0.13078 -1.9 76.3 -0.28 0.776 










Matched 0.00201 0 2.8 70 1 0.318 
        School-related 
earnings 




Matched 16.62 16.442 4.2 -34.4 0.68 0.496 




Matched 2.0369 2.0583 -0.4 88.3 -0.06 0.95 




Matched 0.82093 0.82696 -1.5 86.8 -0.25 0.803 
        Master's degree and 
above 




Matched 0.13883 0.11871 5.6 35.2 0.95 0.344 
        Partial state 
certification 




Matched 0.27767 0.27364 0.9 76.6 0.14 0.887 




Matched 0.46881 0.44266 5.2 -317.2 0.83 0.408 




Matched 0.47284 0.45674 3.2 -176.5 0.51 0.611 




Matched 0.10664 0.13078 -7.4 21 -1.18 0.24 




Matched 873.54 888.95 -2.4 88.3 -0.36 0.716 




Matched 0.25755 0.27968 -5.1 -593.8 -0.79 0.432 




Matched 0.22535 0.21529 2.3 85.6 0.38 0.702 
        % Minority enrollment Unmatched 45.846 41.085 13.6 
 
2.73 0.006 
  Matched 45.846 46.761 -2.6 80.8 -0.41 0.683 








TABLE B14: Balance Checks for Covariates Before and After Matching (Model 13) 
    Mean     %reduct t-test   
Variable Sample Treated  Control %bias bias t     p>|t| 




Matched 0.31652 0.30937 1.6 80.3 0.53 0.595 




Matched 29.567 29.633 -0.8 92.7 -0.27 0.786 




Matched 0.06431 0.06768 -1.4 -291.5 -0.47 0.64 




Matched 0.05801 0.06347 -2.3 -84.6 -0.79 0.43 
        Other race and 
ethnicity 




Matched 0.0496 0.05296 -1.5 41.6 -0.53 0.599 




Matched 0.87852 0.85582 6.1 75.9 2.31 0.021 




Matched 0.19462 0.1942 0.1 98.2 0.04 0.971 




Matched 0.10677 0.08911 5.8 -370.3 2.05 0.041 




Matched 0.01051 0.01135 -0.8 -19.5 -0.28 0.78 




Matched 16.824 16.826 0 99.8 -0.02 0.987 




Matched 1.6771 1.7678 -2 73.3 -0.71 0.475 




Matched 0.80286 0.80622 -0.8 71.2 -0.29 0.77 
        Master's degree and 
above 




Matched 0.15174 0.14418 2.1 -601.4 0.73 0.462 










Matched 0.32072 0.34132 -4.6 76 -1.51 0.131 




Matched 0.47835 0.46448 2.8 53.3 0.96 0.338 




Matched 0.47961 0.47625 0.7 91.3 0.23 0.816 




Matched 0.09794 0.09794 0 100 0 1 




Matched 796.18 783.12 2.2 92.8 0.74 0.457 




Matched 0.24338 0.25473 -2.6 21.8 -0.9 0.366 




Matched 0.30307 0.31106 -1.7 94.1 -0.6 0.551 
        % Minority enrollment Unmatched 39.977 38.174 5.1 
 
1.55 0.122 
  Matched 39.977 42.03 -5.9 -13.8 -2.05 0.041 
Panel (A): Induction 
 
    Mean     %reduct t-test   
Variable Sample Treated  Control %bias bias t     p>|t| 




Matched 0.27968 0.27968 0 100 0 1 




Matched 29.799 30.581 -9 -963.2 -1.43 0.153 




Matched 0.12274 0.12877 -2.1 90.5 -0.29 0.774 




Matched 0.07646 0.05835 7.4 22.4 1.14 0.255 
        Other race and 
ethnicity 




Matched 0.04427 0.04829 -1.9 49.7 -0.3 0.763 










Matched 0.85312 0.86318 -2.9 12 -0.45 0.65 




Matched 0.17505 0.16499 2.6 62.8 0.42 0.673 




Matched 0.12475 0.12072 1.3 84.2 0.19 0.847 




Matched 0.00201 0.00402 -2.8 70 -0.58 0.564 




Matched 16.62 16.434 4.4 -40.6 0.73 0.464 




Matched 2.0369 2.0593 -0.4 87.8 -0.07 0.947 




Matched 0.82093 0.82495 -1 91.2 -0.17 0.868 
        Master's degree and 
above 




Matched 0.13883 0.12676 3.3 61.1 0.56 0.575 
        Partial state 
certification 




Matched 0.27767 0.26559 2.7 29.8 0.43 0.669 




Matched 0.46881 0.49497 -5.2 -317.2 -0.82 0.41 




Matched 0.47284 0.47887 -1.2 -3.7 -0.19 0.849 




Matched 0.10664 0.11066 -1.2 86.8 -0.2 0.839 




Matched 873.54 895.01 -3.3 83.7 -0.5 0.614 




Matched 0.25755 0.20322 12.4 -1603.1 2.04 0.042 




Matched 0.22535 0.22736 -0.5 97.1 -0.08 0.94 






% Minority enrollment Unmatched 45.846 41.085 13.6 
 
2.73 0.006 
  Matched 45.846 41.936 11.1 17.9 1.74 0.081 
Panel (B): Comprehensive 
 
TABLE B15: Balance Checks for Covariates Before and After Matching (Model 14) 
    Mean     %reduct t-test   
Variable Sample Treated  Control %bias bias t     p>|t| 




Matched 0.31652 0.31063 1.3 83.7 0.44 0.662 




Matched 29.567 29.767 -2.3 78 -0.81 0.416 




Matched 0.06431 0.06263 0.7 -95.7 0.24 0.812 




Matched 0.05801 0.06641 -3.6 -184.1 -1.2 0.23 
        Other race and 
ethnicity 




Matched 0.0496 0.0433 2.8 -9.5 1.03 0.302 




Matched 0.87852 0.84531 8.9 64.8 3.32 0.001 




Matched 0.19462 0.18621 2.2 63.3 0.74 0.46 




Matched 0.10677 0.124 -5.6 -359.1 -1.86 0.063 




Matched 0.01051 0.00883 1.6 -138.9 0.59 0.554 




Matched 16.824 16.85 -0.6 97.9 -0.2 0.84 




Matched 1.6771 1.621 1.2 83.5 0.47 0.638 









Matched 0.80286 0.8016 0.3 89.2 0.11 0.913 
        Master's degree and 
above 




Matched 0.15174 0.15259 -0.2 22.1 -0.08 0.936 
        Partial state 
certification 




Matched 0.32072 0.33586 -3.4 82.4 -1.11 0.266 




Matched 0.47835 0.45691 4.3 27.8 1.48 0.138 




Matched 0.47961 0.46196 3.5 54.5 1.22 0.223 




Matched 0.09794 0.08701 3.2 83.8 1.3 0.193 




Matched 796.18 769.07 4.6 85.1 1.56 0.119 




Matched 0.24338 0.26103 -4.1 -21.7 -1.4 0.161 




Matched 0.30307 0.28541 3.7 86.9 1.34 0.182 
        % Minority enrollment Unmatched 39.977 38.174 5.1 
 
1.55 0.122 
  Matched 39.977 41.22 -3.5 31.1 -1.25 0.21 
Panel (A): Induction 
 
    Mean     %reduct t-test   
Variable Sample Treated  Control %bias bias t     p>|t| 




Matched 0.27968 0.2998 -4.4 27.7 -0.7 0.485 




Matched 29.799 29.763 0.4 50.8 0.07 0.947 




Matched 0.12274 0.11469 2.8 87.3 0.39 0.695 










Matched 0.07646 0.07646 0 100 0 1 
        Other race and 
ethnicity 




Matched 0.04427 0.03622 3.8 -0.6 0.65 0.519 




Matched 0.85312 0.86117 -2.3 29.6 -0.36 0.717 




Matched 0.17505 0.17505 0 100 0 1 




Matched 0.12475 0.1006 7.7 5.1 1.2 0.229 




Matched 0.00201 0.00604 -5.5 39.9 -1 0.317 




Matched 16.62 16.494 3 4.6 0.5 0.616 




Matched 2.0369 2.0367 0 99.9 0 1 




Matched 0.82093 0.81489 1.5 86.8 0.25 0.805 
        Master's degree and 
above 




Matched 0.13883 0.14889 -2.8 67.6 -0.45 0.652 
        Partial state 
certification 




Matched 0.27767 0.31791 -8.9 -134 -1.39 0.166 




Matched 0.46881 0.43863 6 -381.4 0.96 0.34 




Matched 0.47284 0.46278 2 -72.8 0.32 0.751 




Matched 0.10664 0.12475 -5.5 40.7 -0.89 0.373 














Matched 0.25755 0.27163 -3.2 -341.5 -0.5 0.615 




Matched 0.22535 0.23944 -3.2 79.9 -0.53 0.6 
        % Minority enrollment Unmatched 45.846 41.085 13.6 
 
2.73 0.006 
  Matched 45.846 46.964 -3.2 76.5 -0.5 0.617 
Panel (B): Comprehensive 
 
TABLE B16: Balance Checks for Covariates Before and After Matching (Model 15) 
    Mean     %reduct t-test   
Variable Sample Treated  Control %bias bias t     p>|t| 




Matched 0.31652 0.30811 1.8 76.8 0.63 0.532 




Matched 29.567 29.512 0.6 94 0.22 0.823 




Matched 0.06431 0.05549 3.6 -927.7 1.28 0.2 




Matched 0.05801 0.06726 -3.9 -212.5 -1.32 0.188 
        Other race and 
ethnicity 




Matched 0.0496 0.04035 4.1 -60.5 1.54 0.124 




Matched 0.87852 0.86591 3.4 86.6 1.3 0.193 




Matched 0.19462 0.20261 -2.1 65.2 -0.69 0.49 




Matched 0.10677 0.10677 0 100 0 1 




Matched 0.01051 0.00546 4.9 -616.8 1.95 0.051 












Matched 16.824 17.088 -6 79 -2.03 0.043 




Matched 1.6771 1.7074 -0.7 91.1 -0.26 0.793 




Matched 0.80286 0.7768 6.5 -123 2.21 0.027 
        Master's degree and 
above 




Matched 0.15174 0.1736 -6.1 -1926.3 -2.04 0.041 
        Partial state 
certification 




Matched 0.32072 0.36234 -9.3 51.6 -3.03 0.002 




Matched 0.47835 0.44935 5.8 2.4 2.01 0.045 




Matched 0.47961 0.48886 -1.9 76.2 -0.64 0.523 




Matched 0.09794 0.10677 -2.6 86.9 -1 0.315 




Matched 796.18 761.97 5.8 81.2 1.96 0.05 




Matched 0.24338 0.24548 -0.5 85.5 -0.17 0.866 




Matched 0.30307 0.3182 -3.2 88.8 -1.13 0.259 
        % Minority enrollment Unmatched 39.977 38.174 5.1 
 
1.55 0.122 
  Matched 39.977 41.108 -3.2 37.3 -1.12 0.262 
Panel (A): Induction 
 
    Mean     %reduct t-test   
Variable Sample Treated  Control %bias bias t     p>|t| 









Matched 0.27968 0.27968 0 100 0 1 




Matched 29.799 29.879 -0.9 -9.3 -0.15 0.882 




Matched 0.12274 0.13078 -2.8 87.3 -0.38 0.703 




Matched 0.07646 0.08853 -4.9 48.2 -0.69 0.49 
        Other race and 
ethnicity 




Matched 0.04427 0.05433 -4.7 -25.8 -0.73 0.464 




Matched 0.85312 0.86519 -3.5 -5.6 -0.55 0.585 




Matched 0.17505 0.17706 -0.5 92.6 -0.08 0.934 




Matched 0.12475 0.11066 4.5 44.6 0.69 0.491 




Matched 0.00201 0.00402 -2.8 70 -0.58 0.564 




Matched 16.62 16.621 0 99.3 0 0.997 




Matched 2.0369 1.9806 1.1 69.4 0.17 0.865 




Matched 0.82093 0.82093 0 100 0 1 
        Master's degree and 
above 




Matched 0.13883 0.13481 1.1 87 0.18 0.854 
        Partial state 
certification 




Matched 0.27767 0.30181 -5.3 -40.4 -0.84 0.402 




Matched 0.46881 0.47284 -0.8 35.8 -0.13 0.899 










Matched 0.47284 0.44266 6 -418.4 0.95 0.34 




Matched 0.10664 0.10463 0.6 93.4 0.1 0.918 




Matched 873.54 885.12 -1.8 91.2 -0.27 0.786 




Matched 0.25755 0.32193 -14.7 -1918.5 -2.24 0.025 




Matched 0.22535 0.19115 7.8 51.1 1.33 0.185 
        % Minority enrollment Unmatched 45.846 41.085 13.6 
 
2.73 0.006 
  Matched 45.846 48.733 -8.2 39.4 -1.28 0.2 
Panel (B): Comprehensive 
 
TABLE B17: Balance Checks for Covariates Before and After Matching (Model 16) 
    Mean     %reduct t-test   
Variable Sample Treated  Control %bias bias t     p>|t| 




Matched 0.31652 0.30055 3.5 55.9 1.19 0.233 




Matched 29.567 30.209 -7.5 29.6 -2.58 0.01 




Matched 0.06431 0.06053 1.5 -340.4 0.54 0.59 




Matched 0.05801 0.06515 -3 -141.5 -1.03 0.305 
        Other race and 
ethnicity 




Matched 0.0496 0.05044 -0.4 85.4 -0.13 0.894 




Matched 0.87852 0.86843 2.7 89.3 1.05 0.295 









Matched 0.19462 0.20513 -2.7 54.2 -0.91 0.365 




Matched 0.10677 0.11475 -2.6 -112.7 -0.88 0.38 




Matched 0.01051 0.00841 2 -198.7 0.75 0.454 




Matched 16.824 16.884 -1.4 95.2 -0.46 0.649 




Matched 1.6771 1.7048 -0.6 91.8 -0.23 0.821 




Matched 0.80286 0.8058 -0.7 74.8 -0.26 0.798 
        Master's degree and 
above 




Matched 0.15174 0.14922 0.7 -133.8 0.24 0.808 
        Partial state 
certification 




Matched 0.32072 0.35267 -7.2 62.8 -2.33 0.02 




Matched 0.47835 0.45565 4.5 23.6 1.57 0.117 




Matched 0.47961 0.4628 3.4 56.7 1.16 0.245 




Matched 0.09794 0.10887 -3.2 83.8 -1.24 0.216 




Matched 796.18 776.45 3.4 89.2 1.13 0.261 




Matched 0.24338 0.2665 -5.3 -59.4 -1.83 0.067 




Matched 0.30307 0.29718 1.2 95.6 0.44 0.658 
        % Minority enrollment Unmatched 39.977 38.174 5.1 
 
1.55 0.122 
  Matched 39.977 42.093 -6 -17.3 -2.11 0.035 






    Mean     %reduct t-test   
Variable Sample Treated  Control %bias bias t     p>|t| 




Matched 0.27968 0.27364 1.3 78.3 0.21 0.832 




Matched 29.799 29.817 -0.2 75.4 -0.03 0.973 




Matched 0.12274 0.12274 0 100 0 1 




Matched 0.07646 0.06439 4.9 48.2 0.74 0.457 
        Other race and 
ethnicity 




Matched 0.04427 0.04024 1.9 49.7 0.32 0.753 




Matched 0.85312 0.8672 -4 -23.2 -0.64 0.523 




Matched 0.17505 0.167 2.1 70.2 0.34 0.736 




Matched 0.12475 0.10463 6.4 20.9 0.99 0.32 




Matched 0.00201 0 2.8 70 1 0.318 




Matched 16.62 16.531 2.1 32.9 0.35 0.727 




Matched 2.0369 1.8679 3.3 8.2 0.5 0.615 




Matched 0.82093 0.82696 -1.5 86.8 -0.25 0.803 
        Master's degree and 
above 




Matched 0.13883 0.1167 6.1 28.7 1.04 0.296 
        Partial state 
certification 














Matched 0.46881 0.50704 -7.7 -509.8 -1.21 0.228 




Matched 0.47284 0.47686 -0.8 30.9 -0.13 0.899 




Matched 0.10664 0.11871 -3.7 60.5 -0.6 0.548 




Matched 873.54 855.45 2.8 86.3 0.43 0.669 




Matched 0.25755 0.28571 -6.5 -783.1 -1 0.319 




Matched 0.22535 0.25553 -6.9 56.8 -1.11 0.266 
        % Minority enrollment Unmatched 45.846 41.085 13.6 
 
2.73 0.006 
  Matched 45.846 48.731 -8.2 39.4 -1.28 0.202 
Panel (B): Comprehensive 
 
TABLE B18: Balance Checks for Covariates Before and After Matching (Model 17) 
    Mean     %reduct t-test   
Variable Sample Treated  Control %bias bias t     p>|t| 




Matched 0.31652 0.31862 -0.5 94.2 -0.16 0.876 




Matched 29.567 29.923 -4.1 60.9 -1.42 0.155 




Matched 0.06431 0.07566 -4.6 -1221.3 -1.53 0.125 




Matched 0.05801 0.06557 -3.2 -155.7 -1.08 0.279 
        Other race and 
ethnicity 




Matched 0.0496 0.04456 2.3 12.4 0.82 0.412 










Matched 0.87852 0.85624 6 76.4 2.27 0.023 




Matched 0.19462 0.19966 -1.3 78 -0.44 0.662 




Matched 0.10677 0.11349 -2.2 -79.1 -0.74 0.459 




Matched 0.01051 0.01009 0.4 40.3 0.14 0.886 




Matched 16.824 16.692 3 89.5 1.13 0.258 




Matched 1.6771 1.8898 -4.7 37.4 -1.57 0.116 




Matched 0.80286 0.80118 0.4 85.6 0.15 0.884 
        Master's degree and 
above 




Matched 0.15174 0.14502 1.9 -523.5 0.65 0.514 
        Partial state 
certification 




Matched 0.32072 0.35393 -7.4 61.4 -2.42 0.015 




Matched 0.47835 0.44683 6.3 -6.1 2.18 0.029 




Matched 0.47961 0.50483 -5.1 35 -1.74 0.082 




Matched 0.09794 0.1034 -1.6 91.9 -0.63 0.531 




Matched 796.18 817.98 -3.7 88 -1.21 0.226 




Matched 0.24338 0.25767 -3.3 1.5 -1.14 0.255 




Matched 0.30307 0.30349 -0.1 99.7 -0.03 0.975 






% Minority enrollment Unmatched 39.977 38.174 5.1 
 
1.55 0.122 
  Matched 39.977 43.705 -10.6 -106.7 -3.69 0 
Panel (A): Induction 
 
    Mean     %reduct t-test   
Variable Sample Treated  Control %bias bias t     p>|t| 




Matched 0.27968 0.28773 -1.8 71.1 -0.28 0.779 




Matched 29.799 29.93 -1.5 -77.7 -0.24 0.808 




Matched 0.12274 0.12072 0.7 96.8 0.1 0.923 




Matched 0.07646 0.07646 0 100 0 1 
        Other race and 
ethnicity 




Matched 0.04427 0.05634 -5.6 -50.9 -0.87 0.384 




Matched 0.85312 0.86117 -2.3 29.6 -0.36 0.717 




Matched 0.17505 0.16901 1.5 77.7 0.25 0.801 




Matched 0.12475 0.12676 -0.6 92.1 -0.1 0.924 




Matched 0.00201 0.00201 0 100 0 1 




Matched 16.62 16.273 8.2 -162.8 1.37 0.172 




Matched 2.0369 2.1725 -2.6 26.3 -0.38 0.701 




Matched 0.82093 0.87123 -12.5 -10.2 -2.2 0.028 






Master's degree and 
above 




Matched 0.13883 0.09054 13.4 -55.6 2.39 0.017 
        Partial state 
certification 




Matched 0.27767 0.26358 3.1 18.1 0.5 0.618 




Matched 0.46881 0.46278 1.2 3.7 0.19 0.849 




Matched 0.47284 0.48491 -2.4 -107.4 -0.38 0.704 




Matched 0.10664 0.11871 -3.7 60.5 -0.6 0.548 




Matched 873.54 917.27 -6.8 66.9 -1.02 0.31 




Matched 0.25755 0.25956 -0.5 36.9 -0.07 0.942 




Matched 0.22535 0.21932 1.4 91.4 0.23 0.819 
        % Minority enrollment Unmatched 45.846 41.085 13.6 
 
2.73 0.006 
  Matched 45.846 45.346 1.4 89.5 0.23 0.82 
Panel (B): Comprehensive 
 
TABLE B19: Balance Checks for Covariates Before and After Matching (Model 18) 
    Mean     %reduct t-test   
Variable Sample Treated  Control %bias bias t     p>|t| 




Matched 0.31652 0.31526 0.3 96.5 0.09 0.925 




Matched 29.567 29.711 -1.7 84.2 -0.57 0.568 




Matched 0.06431 0.06221 0.9 -144.7 0.3 0.766 










Matched 0.05801 0.07987 -9.2 -638.6 -2.98 0.003 
        Other race and 
ethnicity 




Matched 0.0496 0.05254 -1.3 48.9 -0.46 0.645 




Matched 0.87852 0.85834 5.4 78.6 2.06 0.04 




Matched 0.19462 0.17991 3.8 35.8 1.3 0.193 




Matched 0.10677 0.12778 -6.9 -459.8 -2.25 0.024 




Matched 0.01051 0.00631 4.1 -497.3 1.59 0.112 




Matched 16.824 16.784 0.9 96.8 0.32 0.752 




Matched 1.6771 1.7454 -1.5 79.9 -0.5 0.617 




Matched 0.80286 0.8058 -0.7 74.8 -0.26 0.798 
        Master's degree and 
above 




Matched 0.15174 0.13997 3.3 -991.1 1.15 0.25 
        Partial state 
certification 




Matched 0.32072 0.31442 1.4 92.7 0.47 0.64 




Matched 0.47835 0.4855 -1.4 75.9 -0.49 0.622 




Matched 0.47961 0.47709 0.5 93.5 0.17 0.862 




Matched 0.09794 0.095 0.9 95.6 0.34 0.731 














Matched 0.24338 0.26314 -4.6 -36.2 -1.57 0.117 




Matched 0.30307 0.29004 2.7 90.3 0.98 0.325 




Matched 39.977 42.784 -8 -55.6 -2.81 0.005 
Panel (A): Induction 
 
    Mean     %reduct t-test   
Variable Sample Treated  Control %bias bias t     p>|t| 




Matched 0.27968 0.30785 -6.2 -1.3 -0.97 0.33 




Matched 29.799 29.64 1.8 -115.9 0.31 0.76 




Matched 0.12274 0.13883 -5.6 74.7 -0.75 0.452 




Matched 0.07646 0.06439 4.9 48.2 0.74 0.457 
        Other race and 
ethnicity 




Matched 0.04427 0.03823 2.8 24.5 0.48 0.633 




Matched 0.85312 0.84909 1.2 64.8 0.18 0.859 




Matched 0.17505 0.19718 -5.7 18.1 -0.9 0.371 




Matched 0.12475 0.1006 7.7 5.1 1.2 0.229 




Matched 0.00201 0 2.8 70 1 0.318 




Matched 16.62 16.751 -3.1 0.3 -0.51 0.613 










Matched 2.0369 2.0458 -0.2 95.2 -0.03 0.979 




Matched 0.82093 0.80684 3.5 69.2 0.57 0.569 
        Master's degree and 
above 




Matched 0.13883 0.14085 -0.6 93.5 -0.09 0.927 
        Partial state 
certification 




Matched 0.27767 0.28571 -1.8 53.2 -0.28 0.778 




Matched 0.46881 0.47485 -1.2 3.7 -0.19 0.849 




Matched 0.47284 0.43662 7.2 -522.1 1.15 0.252 




Matched 0.10664 0.12072 -4.3 53.9 -0.7 0.485 




Matched 873.54 850.38 3.6 82.5 0.56 0.577 




Matched 0.25755 0.3159 -13.4 -1729.2 -2.04 0.042 




Matched 0.22535 0.18913 8.3 48.2 1.41 0.159 
        % Minority enrollment Unmatched 45.846 41.085 13.6 
 
2.73 0.006 
  Matched 45.846 47.874 -5.8 57.4 -0.91 0.365 
Panel (B): Comprehensive 
 
TABLE B20: Balance Checks for Covariates Before and After Matching 
(Induction, Model 19) 
    Mean     %reduct t-test   
Variable Sample Treated  Control %bias bias t     p>|t| 









Matched 0.31652 0.31232 0.9 88.4 0.31 0.755 




Matched 29.567 30.017 -5.2 50.6 -1.8 0.072 




Matched 0.06431 0.08113 -6.8 -1857.5 -2.23 0.026 




Matched 0.05801 0.04834 4.1 -226.7 1.49 0.137 
        Other race and 
ethnicity 




Matched 0.0496 0.05002 -0.2 92.7 -0.07 0.947 




Matched 0.87852 0.86549 3.5 86.2 1.35 0.179 




Matched 0.19462 0.19714 -0.7 89 -0.22 0.827 




Matched 0.10677 0.12232 -5.1 -314.3 -1.68 0.092 




Matched 0.01051 0.01009 0.4 40.3 0.14 0.886 




Matched 16.824 16.633 4.3 84.9 1.56 0.118 




Matched 1.6771 1.6069 1.6 79.3 0.54 0.588 




Matched 0.80286 0.83228 -7.3 -151.7 -2.63 0.009 
        Master's degree and 
above 




Matched 0.15174 0.11854 9.3 -2978.5 3.35 0.001 
        Partial state 
certification 




Matched 0.32072 0.31652 0.9 95.1 0.31 0.756 




Matched 0.47835 0.46616 2.4 59 0.84 0.4 










Matched 0.47961 0.49306 -2.7 65.4 -0.93 0.353 




Matched 0.09794 0.09164 1.9 90.7 0.74 0.458 




Matched 796.18 770.18 4.4 85.7 1.5 0.134 




Matched 0.24338 0.23707 1.5 56.5 0.51 0.611 




Matched 0.30307 0.29634 1.4 95 0.51 0.613 
        % Minority enrollment Unmatched 39.977 38.174 5.1 
 
1.55 0.122 
  Matched 39.977 40.053 -0.2 95.8 -0.08 0.939 
Notes: Balance checks based on model 19 are for induction only. Results for comprehensive are showed in 
TABLE 4.15 in Chapter 4. 
 
TABLE B21: Balance Checks for Covariates Before and After Matching (Model 20) 
    Mean     %reduct t-test   
Variable Sample Treated  Control %bias bias t     p>|t| 




Matched 0.31652 0.30181 3.2 59.4 1.1 0.272 




Matched 29.567 30.07 -5.8 44.9 -2.01 0.045 




Matched 0.06431 0.05969 1.9 -438.3 0.66 0.509 




Matched 0.05801 0.05969 -0.7 43.2 -0.25 0.805 
        Other race and 
ethnicity 




Matched 0.0496 0.0517 -0.9 63.5 -0.33 0.741 




Matched 0.87852 0.85498 6.3 75.1 2.39 0.017 









Matched 0.19462 0.20261 -2.1 65.2 -0.69 0.49 




Matched 0.10677 0.11223 -1.8 -45.6 -0.6 0.546 




Matched 0.01051 0.00883 1.6 -138.9 0.59 0.554 




Matched 16.824 16.816 0.2 99.4 0.06 0.952 




Matched 1.6771 1.7218 -1 86.8 -0.34 0.732 




Matched 0.80286 0.79487 2 31.7 0.69 0.492 
        Master's degree and 
above 




Matched 0.15174 0.16015 -2.3 -679.4 -0.8 0.424 
        Partial state 
certification 




Matched 0.32072 0.33628 -3.5 81.9 -1.14 0.254 




Matched 0.47835 0.46784 2.1 64.6 0.73 0.468 




Matched 0.47961 0.48424 -0.9 88.1 -0.32 0.75 




Matched 0.09794 0.09836 -0.1 99.4 -0.05 0.961 




Matched 796.18 795.59 0.1 99.7 0.03 0.973 




Matched 0.24338 0.24044 0.7 79.7 0.24 0.813 




Matched 0.30307 0.30223 0.2 99.4 0.06 0.95 
        % Minority enrollment Unmatched 39.977 38.174 5.1 
 
1.55 0.122 
  Matched 39.977 40.199 -0.6 87.7 -0.22 0.824 







    Mean     %reduct t-test   
Variable Sample Treated  Control %bias bias t     p>|t| 




Matched 0.27968 0.27565 0.9 85.5 0.14 0.887 




Matched 29.799 30.439 -7.3 -769.1 -1.14 0.256 




Matched 0.12274 0.13682 -4.9 77.8 -0.66 0.509 




Matched 0.07646 0.08249 -2.5 74.1 -0.35 0.725 
        Other race and 
ethnicity 




Matched 0.04427 0.04225 0.9 74.8 0.16 0.876 




Matched 0.85312 0.84909 1.2 64.8 0.18 0.859 




Matched 0.17505 0.13883 9.3 -33.9 1.57 0.117 




Matched 0.12475 0.11469 3.2 60.5 0.49 0.626 




Matched 0.00201 0 2.8 70 1 0.318 




Matched 16.62 16.641 -0.5 84.2 -0.08 0.936 




Matched 2.0369 2.7902 -14.5 -309.2 -1.69 0.09 




Matched 0.82093 0.78672 8.5 25.1 1.36 0.175 
        Master's degree and 
above 




Matched 0.13883 0.13883 0 100 0 1 










Matched 0.27767 0.27163 1.3 64.9 0.21 0.831 




Matched 0.46881 0.42052 9.7 -670.3 1.53 0.126 




Matched 0.47284 0.49095 -3.6 -211.1 -0.57 0.568 




Matched 0.10664 0.09457 3.7 60.5 0.63 0.527 




Matched 873.54 896.52 -3.6 82.6 -0.54 0.591 




Matched 0.25755 0.27163 -3.2 -341.5 -0.5 0.615 




Matched 0.22535 0.21127 3.2 79.9 0.54 0.591 
        % Minority enrollment Unmatched 45.846 41.085 13.6 
 
2.73 0.006 
  Matched 45.846 47.093 -3.6 73.8 -0.56 0.579 
Panel (B): Comprehensive 
 
TABLE B22: Balance Checks for Covariates Before and After Matching 
(Comprehensive, Model 21) 
    Mean     %reduct t-test   
Variable Sample Treated  Control %bias bias t     p>|t| 




Matched 0.27968 0.29779 -4 34.9 -0.63 0.529 




Matched 29.799 30.272 -5.4 -542.3 -0.86 0.391 




Matched 0.12274 0.13481 -4.2 81 -0.57 0.57 




Matched 0.07646 0.08652 -4.1 56.9 -0.58 0.563 






Other race and 
ethnicity 




Matched 0.04427 0.04427 0 100 0 1 




Matched 0.85312 0.84306 2.9 12 0.44 0.659 




Matched 0.17505 0.15493 5.1 25.6 0.85 0.393 




Matched 0.12475 0.15694 -10.2 -26.5 -1.46 0.145 




Matched 0.00201 0.00201 0 100 0 1 




Matched 16.62 16.636 -0.4 87.9 -0.06 0.951 




Matched 2.0369 2.5234 -9.4 -164.3 -1.31 0.191 




Matched 0.82093 0.80885 3 73.6 0.49 0.625 
        Master's degree and 
above 




Matched 0.13883 0.14688 -2.2 74.1 -0.36 0.717 
        Partial state 
certification 




Matched 0.27767 0.22334 12 -215.9 1.98 0.048 




Matched 0.46881 0.49698 -5.6 -349.3 -0.89 0.375 




Matched 0.47284 0.47887 -1.2 -3.7 -0.19 0.849 




Matched 0.10664 0.11268 -1.8 80.2 -0.3 0.761 




Matched 873.54 901.34 -4.3 78.9 -0.66 0.512 














Matched 0.22535 0.20322 5.1 68.4 0.85 0.396 
        % Minority enrollment Unmatched 45.846 41.085 13.6 
 
2.73 0.006 
  Matched 45.846 41.967 11 18.5 1.76 0.079 
Notes: Balance checks based on model 21 are for comprehensive only. Results for induction are showed in 
TABLE 4.13 in Chapter 4. 
 
